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Abstract
The increasing deployment of wireless devices has connected humans and objects all around
the world, benefiting our daily life and the entire society in many aspects. Achieving those connec-
tivity motivates the emergence of different types of paradigms, such as cellular networks, large-scale
Internet of Things (IoT), cognitive networks, etc. Among these networks, enabling reliable and
secure data transmission requires various resources including spectrum, energy, and computational
capability. However, these resources are usually limited in many scenarios, especially when the num-
ber of devices is considerably large, bringing catastrophic consequences to data transmission. For
example, given the fact that most of IoT devices have limited computational abilities and inadequate
security protocols, data transmission is vulnerable to various attacks such as eavesdropping and re-
play attacks, for which traditional security approaches are unable to address. On the other hand,
in the cellular network, the ever-increasing data traffic has exacerbated the depletion of spectrum
along with the energy consumption. As a result, mobile users experience significant congestion and
delays when they request data from the cellular service provider, especially in many crowded areas.
In this dissertation, we target on reliable and secure data transmission in resource-constrained
emerging networks. The first two works investigate new security challenges in the current heteroge-
neous IoT environment, and then provide certain countermeasures for reliable data communication.
To be specific, we identify a new physical-layer attack, the signal emulation attack, in the heteroge-
neous environment, such as smart home IoT. To defend against the attack, we propose two defense
strategies with the help of a commonly found wireless device. In addition, to enable secure data
transmission in large-scale IoT network, e.g., the industrial IoT, we apply the amply-and-forward
cooperative communication to increase the secrecy capacity by incentivizing relay IoT devices. Be-
sides security concerns in IoT network, we seek data traffic alleviation approaches to achieve reliable
and energy-efficient data transmission for a group of users in the cellular network. The concept
ii
of mobile participation is introduced to assist data offloading from the base station to users in the
group by leveraging the mobility of users and the social features among a group of users. Following
with that, we deploy device-to-device data offloading within the group to achieve the energy effi-
ciency at the user side while adapting to their increasing traffic demands. In the end, we consider a
perpendicular topic - dynamic spectrum access (DSA) - to alleviate the spectrum scarcity issue in
cognitive radio network, where the spectrum resource is limited to users. Specifically, we focus on
the security concerns and further propose two physical-layer schemes to prevent spectrum misuse in
DSA in both additive white Gaussian noise and fading environments.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research Overview
Our daily lives and even our society are greatly benefited from the emerging wireless net-
works such as Internet of Things (IoT) and the cellular network. Different from traditional networks,
there are several new features in the emerging networks, including large quantities of data, an in-
creasing number of users and devices, heterogeneous environment, etc. However, due to the fact that
resources such as energy, spectrum, and computational capabilities are constrained, the deployment
of the emerging networks faces lots of challenges. For example, although the exploding popularity of
mobile devices enables people to enjoy benefits brought by various interesting mobile apps, such as
social networking, mobile video services, and location-based services, the ever-increasing data traffic
has exacerbated the depletion of licensed wireless spectrum bands along with the energy consump-
tion in the cellular network. As a result, users experience severe congestion when they request data
from the cellular provider. Not only by mobile devices such as mobile phones, but abundant data is
also being continuously generated by ever-growing IoT devices like sensors, decision-making devices,
and other miscellaneous electronic measuring apparatuses that are indiscriminately connected to the
internet. These devices facilitate the evolution of the IoT, which forms a new networking paradigm
that connects humans and the physical world through ubiquitous sensing, computing, and commu-
nications. The exponentially increasing number of those IoT devices also results in severe spectrum
shortage specifically in the already crowded ISM band, resulting in several interferences as well.
Besides, compared with mobile phones, IoT devices have very limited computational abilities and
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inadequate security protocols. As a result, data communication in IoT networks is more vulnerable
to various attacks due to the open nature of the wireless environment, such as eavesdropping and
replay attacks. In this dissertation, we strive to solve the mentioned issues around achieving reliable
and secure data transmission in the emerging networks by carrying out feasible solutions.
1.2 Research Challenges
This subsection outlines the major reliability and security issues during data transmission
that ought to be addressed in the emerging networks.
First of all, depending on different requirements on wireless transmission, dedicated wireless
protocols have been adopted on various types of IoT, resulting in a heterogeneous environment. To
alleviate interference among heterogeneous IoT devices and further improve the spectrum utilization
efficiency, recent advances in Cross-Technology Communication (CTC) enable direct communication
across those wireless protocols. However, this new methodology incurs serious security concerns on
heterogeneous IoT devices. Data transmission becomes more vulnerable to various attacks such as
eavesdropping and replay attacks. Even worse, with limited computational capabilities, traditional
crypto approaches cannot work to defend against the above attacks.
Second, the information sensed, collected, and transmitted by IoT devices can be easily
intercepted by adversaries, which becomes a serious concern in most IoT applications requiring
sensitive data. The above problem becomes more serious in the large-scale IoT environment, such
as the industrial IoT. In practice, cooperative communication approaches can effectively improve
the security level for wireless communication under the presence of eavesdroppers with unbounded
computational ability. How to motivate the participation of relay nodes to ensure reliable and secure
data transmission becomes a huge challenge.
Third, mobile data offloading is a promising paradigm to alleviate data traffic by utilizing
complementary and revolutionary networking techniques (e.g., small cell, WiFi offloading, and op-
portunistic communication) to deliver mobile data originally from the cellular network. However,
the current approaches cannot fully address the issue in terms of user demand and offloaded traffic.
As a result, mobile users still experience severe congestion when a large number of users request
data. How to enable data delivery from the base station to a group of users becomes a big challenge
and should be well addressed.
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The last but not the least, Dynamic spectrum access (DSA) has been envisioned to become
the key to enabler to solve worldwide spectrum shortage. However, the open nature of the wireless
medium brings severe threats to the DSA system resulting from unauthorized access. Specifically, an
unauthorized secondary user (SU) utilizes the licensed spectrum by faking/replaying the spectrum
permit, which will not only introduce severe interference to authorized SUs but also disable the
DSA system due to the lack of stability and incentives. Even worse, in practical DSA systems,
pervasive fading channels would also cause wireless signal attenuation. Therefore, ensuring reliable
communication between authorized secondary users while preventing spectrum misuse becomes a
key challenge.
1.3 Scope and Organization of the Dissertation
The dissertation contributes to the scheme designs to achieve reliable and secure data trans-
mission for several key research problems in the emerging networks given limited resources. The rest
of the dissertation is organized as follows.
Cross-Technology Communication (CTC) tackles the interoperability issue in the heteroge-
neous IoT environment by enabling direct communication among devices across different wireless
technologies. It can greatly avoid repeated data transmission among different protocols, enhance
the spectrum efficiency in the already-crowded ISM band, and reduce the cost of gateway deploy-
ment. However, this new paradigm poses significant challenges. For example, an attacker can take
advantage of CTC to launch attacks to IoT devices with a different protocol without being identified
because of the protocol differences. Even worse, the low-computational capabilities of IoT devices
hinder the deployment of computational-intensive cryptographic approaches at higher layers for de-
tection. In Chapter 2, we identify a new physical-layer attack, cross-technology signal emulation
attack, where a WiFi device can eavesdrop a ZigBee packet on the fly, and further manipulate the
ZigBee IoT device by emulating a ZigBee signal. To defend against this attack, we propose two
defense strategies with the help of a commonly found WiFi router.
In Chapter 3, we target on security enhancement in large-scale IoT network. On the one
hand, over 60% of IoT applications are required to achieve low power consumption, long battery
life, high data rate, and wide coverage simultaneously. However, none of the existing wireless tech-
nologies can satisfy the above requirement simultaneously. On the other hand, the disclosure of
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sensitive information, including machinery data, patients’ health data, or financial files, collected by
many IoT applications is unacceptable. Unfortunately, data communication is de facto vulnerable
to the eavesdropping attack due to the heterogeneous wireless environment in the large-scale IoT
system. Cooperative communication is a perfect fit to tackle the above challenges with its advan-
tages on wide coverage, energy efficiency, and high interference mitigation capability. In addition,
it introduces the inherent randomness of wireless channels, which could prevent eavesdroppers from
intercepting the transmitted message. In Chapter 3, we apply the amplify-and-forward (AF) coop-
erative communication to increase the secrecy capacity of IoT systems by incentivizing relay IoT
devices.
Facing the challenges that mobile users still experience severe congestion when a large
number of users request data from the base station with the consideration of mobile data offloading,
we take a step further to reconsider the human-enabled approach for mobile offloading, which takes
human social behaviors and human activities into consideration. Intuitively, users with similar social
interests often group together in certain crowded areas such as football stadiums and theme parks,
which potentially results in similar content requests. The above phenomenon leads us to consider
how to avoid repeated requests/retrievals in order to reduce the number of accesses to the service
provider. As for human activities, an observation is that users in crowded areas either walk around
or go to their interested attractions. Therefore, in Chapter 4, we introduce the concept of mobile
participation to assist data offloading by leveraging the mobility of users and the social features
among a group of users. A mobile caching user, who pre-caches a certain amount of contents, will
roam around congested areas to participate in data dissemination in order to satisfy users’ requests,
which is expected to benefit both himself and users in the crowd simultaneously. To motivate such
human-enabled mobile participation for data offloading, a Stackelberg game is deployed with joint
considerations on social effect and delay effect.
As an extension work in Chapter 4, the data dissemination among the users within the group
is well studied in Chapter 5 to achieve energy efficiency. The explosively increasing data traffic leads
to a significant increase in energy consumption and thus puts an adverse effect on the environment.
Having the offloaded data, similar social interests among users motivates them Device-to-Device
(D2D) communication for further data dissemination within the group, which would greatly relieve
the traffic burden at base stations and thus free energy consumption. However, energy consump-
tion in D2D communication becomes one of the most critical challenges for deployment. Frequently
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transceiving data between battery-powered mobile devices could quickly drain their energy. Mean-
while, arbitrarily caching data in their buffer will bring trouble due to limited buffer size. Even
worse, the stability of the entire network suffers from break-off users. In Chapter 4, we leverage
users’ social preference to reduce energy consumption on mobile devices and keep the stability of
the entire system while satisfying users’ traffic demands.
Dynamic System Access (DSA) has received considerable attention recently due to its ability
to alleviate the spectrum scarcity issue. However, the unauthorized secondary user can utilize
the licensed spectrum by faking/replaying the spectrum permit, which not only introduces severe
interference to authorized SU but also disables the DSA system due to the lack of stability and
incentives. In Chapter 6, we propose a secure and optimized unauthorized SU detection scheme. Our
scheme achieves accurate and efficient permit detection. Meanwhile, unauthorized SU is effectively
prevented from faking/replaying the spectrum permit, which improves the security of the DSA
system.
As an extension work of Chapter 6, we consider the fading effects when designing an unau-
thorized secondary user detection scheme in Chapter 7. In practical DSA systems, due to the atmo-
spheric ducting, ionospheric reflection and refraction, and the reflection from terrestrial objects, the
communication between authorized second users is via a wireless multipath channel, which would
suffer the wireless signal from an arbitrary time dispersion, attenuation, and phase shift, known
as fading. In Chapter 7, we devise an authorized secondary user authentication scheme that is
robustness to fading effects and further unleash its great potential for future wireless systems.
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes this dissertation and discusses some future research work.
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Chapter 2
Signal Emulation Attack and
Defense for Smart Home IoT
2.1 Chapter Overview
The proliferation of the Internet of Things (IoT) enables ubiquitous connections among
various wireless devices, such as wearable health monitors, security locks, fitness trackers, etc., for
bettering our daily life [9,161]. According to a recent market report [40], it is expected the number of
IoT devices will reach to a total of 41.6 billion by 2025. Among different wireless technologies being
used, ZigBee is one of the dominant protocols used for smart home applications. Many household
appliances have equipped with ZigBee chips for receiving commands from a multi-protocol gateway
(ZigBee communication) and further being managed by users’ mobile devices (WiFi communication).
However, the wireless transmission between the gateway and ZigBee devices can be easily overheard
by eavesdroppers, in the sense that the smart home IoT devices have the potential of being hacked
in the wireless environment. Considering the dramatic growth of IoT used in home areas and the
critical functionalities that IoT has involved, the loss could be immense. For example, attackers
can turn on the cooling on smart thermostats during winter, unlock the smart garage door, and
even turn off security camera for break-in, by transmitting the eavesdropped ZigBee signal directly
without using the authorized gateway. Even worse, as our experimental results demonstrate, existing
upper-layer cryptographic approaches do not work, and thus the attacker can completely bypass the
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upper-level security detection at ZigBee receivers.
Besides ZigBee, WiFi and Bluetooth protocols also play important roles in smart home
applications. They all occupy the Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) 2.4 GHz band, generating
a heterogeneous environment [45,109,115,165]. To tackle the interoperability issue, Cross-Technology
Communication (CTC) serves as a feasible solution by enabling direct communication among devices
across different wireless technologies [35, 74, 119]. It can greatly avoid repeated data transmission
among different protocols, enhance the spectrum efficiency in the already-crowded ISM band, and
reduce the cost of gateway deployment. However, this new paradigm poses significant security
challenges. One of them is: an attacker can take advantages of CTC to launch attacks to IoT devices
with a different protocol without being identified. Even worse, the low-computational capabilities of
IoT devices hinders the deployment of computational-intensive cryptographic approaches at higher
layers for detection. Taking WiFi to ZigBee CTC as an example, with a much higher transmission
power and mobility, WiFi devices can generate a stronger signal with a greater transmission range
than ZigBee devices. As a result, WiFi devices can successfully attack ZigBee devices from a
further distance without being found, making the attack more practical and powerful. Given the
increasing deployment of IoT devices, it is critical to detect this type of attack and design effective
countermeasures.
In this chapter, we identify a new attack named as Signal Emulation Attack in the
practical smart home scenario, where a WiFi attacker first eavesdrops on the control message by
listening to the communication between ZigBee devices and their gateway. Then, it embeds the
control message into its WiFi signal to manipulate the functionality of ZigBee devices. The emulated
signal can pass the demodulation process at the ZigBee receiver, and thus it is infeasible to be
detected. To protect the ZigBee devices, this work proposes two defense strategies with the help of
an auxiliary anchor, i.e., a WiFi router. We list our contribution as follows,
• We are the first to identify a new physical-layer attack, the signal emulation attack, in the
heterogeneous environment.
• The proposed passive defense strategy prevents the WiFi attacker from emulating a perfect
ZigBee signal by leveraging the noise generated by the anchor.
• We also propose a proactive defense strategy to protect ZigBee receiver with the help of the
anchor, which can determine whether the signal is coming from a valid ZigBee source in a
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real-time manner.
• We perform extensive experiments to validate threats of the signal emulation attack and further
demonstrate the effectiveness of two defense strategies.
• We design a real-world prototype to enable the smartphone to perform the signal emulation
attack, while defense strategies are thoroughly evaluated in practical scenarios.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.The related works are discussed in Section
2.2. Section 2.3 illustrates the motivation of signal emulation attack, together with the introduction
of a threat model. Section 2.4 gives some background information about the ZigBee receiver and
the WiFi transmitter, based on which we demonstrate the details of the signal emulation attack in
Section 2.5. As the countermeasures, passive and proactive strategies are proposed in Section 2.6
and Section 2.7, respectively. We give our experimental confirmation of the signal emulation attack
as well as evaluation of two defense strategies in Section 2.8, followed by the conclusion in Section
2.9.
2.2 Related Work
2.2.1 Solutions to PHY Security Problems
Physical-layer security problems mostly focus on how to prevent attacks (e.g., eavesdropping
and interception) during the communication. Corresponding defense strategies can be categorized
into two groups. One is to theoretically discuss the secrecy capacity, which exploits the property
of the wireless channel for secure communication [54, 178]. Many transmission strategies, such as
cooperative transmission [201], artificial noise [124], and secure beamforming [121], are proposed to
enhance the security capacity in the physical layer. The other group is to embed the private permit
into the message to prevent it from being replayed, such as RF fingerprinting in [26, 83, 166] and
authentication signal embedding in [97,98,105,106,142,163,185,193]. However, the above methods
cannot prevent the signal from being eavesdropped and emulated.
2.2.2 Cross-Technology Communication
Cross-Technology Communication (CTC) is envisioned to serve as an effective approach
to alleviate the cross-technology interference by allowing direct communication between devices
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with different protocols [32,194,197,198]. B2W 2 [35] enables the high throughput and long distance
concurrent N -way CTC between BLE and WiFi by leveraging channel state information. In FreeBee
[102], Esense [32] and GSense [195], the communication between WiFi and ZigBee devices is enabled
by using RSS to measure the WiFi signal. Different from the above packet-level CTCs, Li et. al
in [119] propose a physical-level emulation technique. Their objective is to increase the throughput
in CTC. From security perspective, Chen et. al discuss potential jamming attacks and sniffing attack
in [33]. Different from these works, we consider the emulation technique as a powerful attacking
method and further make the emulation attack complete and more practical to real life.
2.2.3 RF Fingerprinting
Most radio fingerprinting methods identify a device by considering various PHY layer classi-
fication approaches. Based on [26], RF features are broadly classified into: (1) channel-specific ones,
e.g., channel impulse response, that characterize the wireless channel. They have been successfully
adopted in robust location distinction [118,141]; (2) Transmitter-specific ones that are independent
of the channel, e.g., artifacts of individual wireless frames [26], unique features in the radio turn-on
transients [46], and joint time-frequency Gaborand Gabor-Wigner Transform features [149]; and (3)
Hardware properties like TCP and ICMP time stamp in [103]. All the above work apply radio fin-
gerprint techniques to distinguishing different wireless devices whiles our proactive defense strategy
is to differentiate signals generated based on different protocols. In other words, our strategy still
works even if the ZigBee device is changed to a new (unknown to the classifier) one.
2.3 Motivation
From the attackers’ perspective, when performing attacks to ZigBee devices, one of the
major difficulties is the short attacking range (approx. 10m). Due to the limited transmission
power, attackers can even be identified within the line-of-sight (LoS) range. In what follows, we
conduct an experiment to demonstrate the limitation of attacking ZigBe devices using the ZigBee
protocol, and further discuss the feasibility and severeness of the WiFi-enabled emulation attack.
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Figure 2.1: Experiment on the Vulnerability of ZigBee devices
2.3.1 Experimental Results and Observations
2.3.1.1 Experiment Settings
As shown in Fig.2.1a, we use a Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) Sylvania ZigBee LED [14]
light bulb as an end IoT device, and we also let a gateway send “TURNING ON” and “TURNING OFF”
commands to LED. The LaunchPad CC26x2R [92] (ZigBee attacker) is deployed to eavesdrop on
the communication between the gateway and LED. The command messages are stored and re-sent
using both the LaunchPad and USRP (WiFi attacker) as shown in Fig. 2.1b, where the USRP sends
an emulated signal based on the eavesdropped ZigBee signal. Given the experimental results, we
analyze the advantages of using WiFi for launching the attack.
2.3.1.2 Payload Analysis
We use WireShark [8] to analyze the packets sent by the gateway in Fig.2.1c. To launch
the attack, we use the LaunchPad to send the eavesdropped ZigBee packet for attacking the smart
LED. Although the commands change over time, the ciphertext form of “TURNING ON” shown in the
“Data” field can still be re-used on the LaunchPad for turning on the LED as shown in Fig.2.1d.
In our case, the receiver LED does not verify the sequence numbers and frame counters, making
it already vulnerable to the replay attack. However, even if the protocol enforces the verification
to defend, this type of attack is still possible because of the potential key leakage issue during the
initialization process [99,133,155] especially when there is a new device added into the network [51].
Many cracking tools [7] can be used to steal the keys and finally decrypt the received commands.
Therefore, even if ZigBee devices are using symmetric upper-layer encryption schemes, such as AES-
CCM, this type of attacker still can change the sequence number and/or frame counters in the
decrypted message and then re-encrypt as a new message, achieving the successful replay attack to
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ZigBee devices.
2.3.1.3 Attacking Performance Analysis
From the perspective ZigBee devices, given the above vulnerability, they may suffer even
more serious attacks in the heterogeneous environment consisting of malicious WiFi attackers.
• Attacking range: Adopting IEEE802.15.4 protocols, the transmission power of ZigBee at-
tackers is relatively low at 5dBm, while a common smartphone WiFi transmission power is 6-7
times more than that, making the attacking range greatly improved.
• Attacker detection: The low transmission power of ZigBee attackers prevents them from
performing the attack at Non Line-of-Sight (NLoS) locations. Thus, they are at a higher risk
of being detected. However, the WiFi attacker can stay at NLoS locations to attack ZigBee
devices without being found.
• Device ubiquity: Compared to WiFi devices that pervasively exist in people’s daily life,
devices with ZigBee protocol are always fixed at certain places, which reduces the feasibility
for attacks.
From the attacker’s viewpoint, to verify the feasibility and benefits brought by WiFi proto-
col, we extend the above experiment by using a USRP to attack LED using both ZigBee signal and
WiFi emulated signal (detail will be presented later). We also deploy a LaunchPad next to LED to
record received packets.
As shown in Table.2.1, both the symbol-error-rate (SER) and packet-error-rate (PER) will
increase in the LoS scenario for both ZigBee and WiFi attackers, resulting in a significant drop in
attack success rate. When both attackers are closer to the LED, their SER and PER remain similar.
However, the WiFi attacker has higher attacking success rate as the distance increases to 15m and
20m. In addition, due to the NLoS propagation feature of the WiFi signal, the WiFi attacker can
also launch the attack when hiding outside of the house. According to the above discussion, WiFi
attackers are more powerful than ZigBee attackers in terms of 1) longer attacking range; 2) NLoS
capability; 3) ubiquity of devices. Given these advantages, the resulting consequences would be
immense if no prevention mechanism is deployed.
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Table 2.1: Symbol/Packet Level Performance (LoS)
Distance 5m 10m 15m 20m
SER (WiFi) 0.55% 0.4% 0.52% 1.23%
PER (WiFi) 0.75% 1.8% 4.1% 4.8%
SER (ZigBee) 0.51% 0.44% 1.34% 2.31%
PER (ZigBee) 1.1% 1.7% 6% 15.2 %
2.3.2 Threat Model
Motivated by the above observation, we focus on a physical-layer signal emulation attack on
ZigBee devices. Instead of launching the attack using ZigBee devices, we consider a WiFi attacker
for longer attacking range and higher success rate, for which it can hide somewhere (50m away)
without being found. Specifically, the entire signal emulation attack consists of the following steps.
Step 1: Signal Eavesdropping. The WiFi attacker moves close to ZigBee devices to eavesdrop
on the communication between ZigBee devices and their authorized gateway.
Step 2: Signal Emulation. The WiFi attacker “translates” the eavesdropped ZigBee signals into
its “own language” for attacking.
Step 3: Device Attacking. By ensuring the channel is not occupied by ZigBee devices, the WiFi
attacker sends emulated signal via its RF component for attacking purpose.
With this being said, the WiFi attacker will follow the IEEE 802.11g standard for physical
(PHY) and media access control layer (MAC) when launching the attack. We assume it will be able
to eavesdrop on the overlapped frequency band between WiFi and ZigBee within a close proximity.
The WiFi attacker can also store the historical knowledge of ZigBee signals, such as eavesdropping
time, location, and amplitude. Given previously discussed advantages, the WiFi attacker can be
any device with a WiFi radio, which can send signals with a higher power (approx. 8dB higher than
ZigBee) at any place within the transmission range. Meanwhile, we limit the WiFi capabilities from
the following aspects: due to protocol differences, 1) WiFi attackers are unable to generate a WiFi
signal that is completely the same with the eavesdropped ZigBee signal; and 2) WiFi attackers are
unable to simply replay and amplify the eavesdropped ZigBee signal.
As for ZigBee devices, they follow the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. Mostly, they are fixed at
specific locations, such as kitchen, bedroom, and garage, where they communicate with gateways as
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usual. In particular, they are unable to detect the existence of WiFi attackers. Most importantly, we
assume they cannot distinguish the sources of received signals and can only execute the command
as long as the signal passes its security check (in the case where cryptographic keys have been
compromised).
2.4 Preliminaries
Before stepping into the detailed design of signal emulation attack, we first analyze its
feasibility by reconsidering the ZigBee transmitter/receiver and WiFi transmitter.
2.4.1 ZigBee Transmitter and Receiver
ZigBee devices work in the unlicensed 2.4 to 2.4835 GHz ISM bands where 16 channels are
allocated. Each channel occupies 2 MHz bandwidth with 5 MHz spaced apart. They apply Direct
Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) to improve interference/noise resilience. At the transmitter,
each original ZigBee symbol (4 bits) is mapped to a 32-chip sequence by being multiplied by a
pseudo-random noise spreading code. Offset Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (OQPSK) is deployed
as the modulation scheme, which maps every 2 DSSS chips to one of the 4 complex symbols. At
the receiver, after OQPSK decoding, the ZigBee receiver calculates the Hamming distance between
received 32-chip sequence and all the 16 predefined 32-chip sequences as shown in Fig.2.2, where
each predefined one corresponds to one ZigBee symbol. The predefined chip sequence having the
minimum Hamming distance is chosen as the candidate. Meanwhile, the ZigBee receiver sets a
threshold. If the minimum Hamming distance is smaller than the threshold, the received chip
sequence is decoded to the ZigBee symbol that the candidate represents. Otherwise, the received
chip sequence is discarded.
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Figure 2.2: DSSS Demodulation
2.4.2 WiFi Transmitter
WiFi devices have a higher transmission power and longer transmission range compared
to ZigBee devices. They also work in the 2.4GHz ISM band with 20 MHz bandwidth for each
channel, which results in the potential spectrum overlapping between the WiFi and ZigBee signals.
One example is that the ZigBee signal occupied on channel 17 (2434 − 2436MHz) is completely
overlapped with that of the WiFi signal centered on the 2442 MHz (2432 − 2452MHz). However,
WiFi transmitters deploy complete different PHY techniques compared to ZigBee transmitter. In
our chapter, we mainly consider the following three differences.
2.4.2.1 Modulation scheme.
WiFi transmitter deploys 64-Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM) followed by the
Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM). Specifically, after preprocessing (scrambling,
encoding, and interleaving), every 6 data bits are mapped to one of the 64 complex symbols on
QAM constellation. Every 48 complex symbols together with 4 pilot symbols and 12 null symbols,
representing the signal on 64 subcarriers (each occupies 312.5 kHz bandwidth) respectively, form an
OFDM symbol [63] in frequency domain. The 64-point Inverse Fast Fourier Transform (IFFT) is
then employed, changing the OFDM symbol from the frequency domain to the time domain.
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2.4.2.2 Cyclic Prefix (CP)
After IFFT, a guard interval (CP), which is the repetition of the last 16 complex data, is
added to the beginning, forming a complete WiFi symbol with 80 complex data. The CP together
with OFDM helps WiFi signals combat multi-path effect by inhibiting inter-symbol interference
(ISI) between adjacent OFDM symbols. ZigBee transmitter does not have CP process.
2.4.2.3 Repetitive Short Training Sequences (STSs)
WiFi receiver calculates the carrier frequency offset (CFO) from the center frequency via
auto correlation among 10 repetitive STSs. Each STS contains 16 raw WiFi symbol. However, those
repetitive STSs do not exist in the ZigBee signals.
In practice, the WiFi device can overhear the ZigBee signal due to spectrum overlapping.
However, it cannot generate a signal that is completely the same as the ZigBee signal. Fortunately,
the DSSS demodulation allows a few errors in received signals at the ZigBee receiver, which gives
attackers opportunities to control ZigBee devices. Based on the above discussion, we list the main
challenges in launching signal emulation attack, 1) how to generate a WiFi signal that is similar
enough to the actual ZigBee signal? and 2) how to guarantee that the emulated signal can pass the
DSSS demodulation and be decoded correctly?
2.5 Signal Emulation Attack
To answer the above questions, we detail our design in the signal emulation attack in this
section.
2.5.1 Attack Overview
The signal emulation attack is shown in Fig.2.3. The WiFi attacker first eavesdrops on the
signal from the communication between two ZigBee devices. Then, it generates a signal that is
similar to the eavesdropped one. As a result, the emulated signal passes the DSSS demodulation
process and the ZigBee device executes the command from the WiFi attacker.
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Figure 2.3: Cross-Technology Signal Emulation Attack
2.5.2 ZigBee Signal Eavesdropping
2.5.2.1 Overview
To launch the emulation attack, the WiFi attacker needs to know the ZigBee transmitter’s
signal. Locating close to ZigBee devices, the attacker passively senses the channel and records the
received ZigBee signal. However, with a 20 MHz sensing bandwidth, the WiFi attacker also senses
the signals from other sources, especially the environmental WiFi signals. Therefore, the difficulty
becomes how to recognize and further capture the ZigBee signal from the received ones.
2.5.2.2 Short-Distance Eavesdropping
We first conduct an experiment to explain why the WiFi attacker has to eavesdrop on
the ZigBee signal from a short distance to ZigBee devices. Two USRPs operating at the Channel
11 (centered at 2405MHz) play roles of the ZigBee transmitter and receiver, respectively. Their
distance is set to 0.5m, 1m and 1.5m and 2m, respectively. The ZigBee transmitter randomly sends
two signals each time. The real component amplitude of the received signals is shown in Fig.2.4,
where the amplitude of the ZigBee signal decreases with the increase of the distance. When the
transmitter is 2m away from the receiver, the ZigBee signal is overwhelmed by the noise. However,
the ZigBee signal can still be decoded by the ZigBee receiver due to the error tolerance of DSSS. For
the WiFi attacker, unfortunately, with completely different PHY layer techniques, it cannot extract
the ZigBee signal from the noise. Therefore, the WiFi attacker has to locate in the close proximity
to ZigBee devices to eavesdrop on the ZigBee signal.
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Figure 2.4: Received signal at ZigBee receiver
2.5.2.3 ZigBee Signal Distinguish and Extraction
WiFi attacker distinguishes the ZigBee signal from the view of WiFi frame structure. After
detecting a sufficiently high amplitude, WiFi attacker temporarily stores the received signal and
calculates the CFO as,
fo =
1
16
arg
∑NSTS−1−16
n=0
t[n]t∗[n+ 16], (2.1)
where t[n] denotes the n-th STS sample and NSTS = 160 represents total STS samples. t
∗ is the
complex conjugate of the t. If fo is above a given threshold, the received signal is supposed to be the
ZigBee signal. WiFi attacker stores it for the further emulation. Otherwise, WiFi attacker assumes
it as a WiFi signal and begins to decode it.
We conduct an experiment to verify the above method. Two USRPs send WiFi and ZigBee
signals alternately while another USRP plays the role of the WiFi receiver. The distance between
the transmitters and receiver is 0.6m, 1.5m and 2m. Each transmitter sends signals 100 times on
each location. We illustrate the CFO performance in Fig.2.5a. The CFO of WiFi signal centralizes
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at 0 whereas the CFO of ZigBee signal is far larger (e.g., Z60 denotes ZigBee signal at 60cm and
W100 denotes WiFi signal at 100cm). Fig.2.5b shows the eavesdropping accuracy. The false positive
rate represents that the received normal WiFi signal is mistakenly considered to be from the ZigBee
transmitter whereas the false negative rate denotes that the received ZigBee signal is regarded as
from another WiFi device. As we can see, when the WiFi attacker sets its decision threshold for
CFO to around 0.001, it can effectively eavesdrop on ZigBee signal while the WiFi signal receiving
is not affected.
(a) CFO (b) Accuracy
Figure 2.5: Eavesdropping Performance at WiFi attacker
Note that WiFi attacker can effectively extract the ZigBee signal without buffer overflow and
extra cost as explained in the following. (1), Because WiFi attacker locates near to ZigBee devices,
most RF samples with high amplitudes should come from either WiFi or ZigBee devices instead of
other devices equipped with different wireless protocols. (2), Since users’ operations to smart home
ZigBee devices usually has the daily routines, WiFi attacker eavesdrops the ZigBee signal during a
fixed period. Hence, WiFi attacker does not have to store the received signal all the time. (3), CFO
calculation is the necessary step when decoding signals, there is no extra computational cost at the
WiFi attacker.
2.5.3 ZigBee Signal Emulation
The objective of the ZigBee signal emulation is to generate a WiFi signal that is similar
to the eavesdropped ZigBee signal. As shown in Fig.2.6, the attacker processes the eavesdropped
signal in a reverse direction to obtain the corresponding WiFi data bits, which are sent to ZigBee
devices when launching the attack. We ponder the problem step by step by comparing the difference
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between the ZigBee and WiFi transmitters.
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Figure 2.6: ZigBee Waveform Emulation
2.5.3.1 Cyclic Prefix Manipulation
Each WiFi symbol consists of 80 complex data, including 16 cyclic prefix data followed by
the 64 effective data. However, the ZigBee signal does not have such a characteristic. Hence, given
80 eavesdropped data, the attacker inevitably discards the first 16 data and chooses the rest 64
data as the emulation objective. We assume every 64 data to be emulated constructs a sample.
Meanwhile, we denote z(n, s), where n = 1, 2, · · · , N and s = 1, 2, · · · , S, as the n-th data in the
s-th sample. We further assume there are S samples in the eavesdropped ZigBee signal and N = 64.
2.5.3.2 Frequency Subcarrier Selection
To get the corresponding WiFi data bits for each raw sample, a 64-point FFT is applied,
Z(k, s) =
∑N
n=1
z(n, s)e−j
2π
N nk, k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, (2.2)
where the FFT point Z(k, s) denotes the component on the subcarrier k in the s-th raw sample in
the frequency domain and K = 64. Since each WiFi symbol occupies 20MHz bandwidth with 64
subcarriers whereas the spectrum with 2MHz bandwidth is occupied by the ZigBee signal, only 7
subcarriers ( 220 × 64) of the WiFi signal are overlapped with the ZigBee Signal. The WiFi attacker
emulates the eavesdropped signal by manipulating the components on 7 subcarriers. The question
becomes how to locate those subcarriers.
Since the signal on the non-overlapped subcarriers is mostly the noise whereas that on
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the overlapped channels is more powerful. Hence, we deploy a folding process to locate them by
considering the energy of the FFT points E(k, s),
E(k, s) = Z(k, s)Z(k, s), (2.3)
where Z(k, s) indicates the conjugate of Z(k, s). The energy E(k, s) forms a two-dimension matrix,
where the elements in the kth row indicate the energy of each raw sample on the subcarrier k whereas
those in the sth column signify the energy on each subcarrier in the raw sample s. Thus, a histogram
ES(k) of E(k, s) is built according to the following equation,
ES(k) =
∑S
s=1
E(k, s), k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, (2.4)
where ES(k) is the total energy of all the samples on the subcarrier k. We sort ES(k) using the
merge-sort algorithm [39] to identify the location of 8 most powerful subcarriers. The reason to
choose 8 subcarriers instead of 7 is to ensure that the spectrum occupied by the emulated signal
completely overlaps that occupied by the ZigBee signal. Here, subcarrier 29− 36 are chosen.
2.5.3.3 64-QAM Quantization Optimization
WiFi and ZigBee signals have different constellation structures. An example is shown in
Fig. 2.7a, where blue circles and red diamonds represent FFT points of the eavesdropped signal
and the 64-QAM constellation, respectively. To get WiFi data bits, the WiFi attacker quantizes
FFT points to 64-QAM points. Such quantization results in irreversible distortion. WiFi attacker
attempts to minimize the quantization distortion.
Based on the Parseval’s theorem view [39], minimizing the signal distortion in the time-
domain under energy metric is equivalent to minimizing the total deviation of frequency components
after quantization. Hence, our principle is to choose the closest 64-QAM constellation point to each
of the FFT points in term of Euclidean distance. Without considering constellation scale, the real
and imaginary components of the 64-QAM points, QRe and QIm, are chosen from the set {-7, -5,
-3, -1, +1, +3, +5, +7}, respectively. To minimize quantization errors, a scalar α is introduced. We
have the following optimization problem,
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α
SE∑
k=SS
(ZRe(k, s)− αQRe(m))2 + (ZIm(k, s)− αQIm(m))2
α > 0, (2.5)
where ZRe(k, s) and ZIm(k, s) represent real and imaginary components of the FFT point Z(k, s)
respectively. SS and SE denote the start and end locations of the chosen FFT points, respectively.
Let j =
√
−1. We have Z(k, s) = ZRe(k, s) + jZIm(k, s). In particular, α(QRe(m) + jQIm(m))
indicates the 64-QAM point that is the nearest to the FFT point Z(k, s). The optimization problem
(2.5) aims to find the optimal scalar α such that the total quantization error between the chosen FFT
points and their nearest QAM points is minimized. However, we cannot solve the problem directly
since different QRe(m) and QIm(m) are chosen for the same FFT point Z(k, s) given different scalar
αs. For example, we choose 3 FFT points from Fig.2.7a and mark them as No. 1, 2, and 3 as
shown in Fig. 2.7b. The scalar for the red-diamond 64-QAM constellation is α = 1 while that of
the green-pentagram 64-QAM constellation is α = 1.2. In Fig.2.7b, the basic QAM point QRe(m)
and QIm(m) for No.3 FFT point does not change, which is −3− 3j. However, for No.1 FFT point,
it is changed from −3 + 3j to −1 + 3j while from 3 + 5j to 1 + 5j for No.2 FFT point.
The above result indicates that an optimal scaler definitely exists that results in the least
quantization error. We propose a quick algorithm to find the optimal scalar. As shown in Algorithm
1, we define a unit quantization (Line 7 − 14) as the process that quantizes the FFT points to the
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Figure 2.7: 64-QAM Quantization Optimization
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Algorithm 1: Quantization Error Minimization
Input: initial start and end of the scalar range αS and αE
basic 64 QAM constellation points QRe(m) and QIm(m), m = 1, 2, · · · , 64
chosen FFT points from ZigBee signal samples Z(k, s), k = SS, SS + 1, · · · , SE, s = 1, 2, · · · , S
its increasing gap δ = 1
error threshold η = 10−5
Output: α∗
1 ê = 0, e = 105;
2 while |ê− e| > η do
3 M = αE − αS/δ ;
4 ê = e ;
5 for i = 0; i < M do
6 αi = αS + i ∗ δ; ei = 0 ;
7 for i = 1; i ≤ 8 ∗ S do
8 for m = 1; m ≤ 64 do
9 D(i,m) = (ZRe(k, s)− αiQRe(m))2 + (ZIm(k, s)− αiQIm(m))2
10 end
11 E(i) = min
0≤m≤64
D(i,m);
12 k = arg0≤i≤64 E(i);
13 ei = ei + E(k)
14 end
15 end
16 e = min
0≤i≤M
ei; k = arg0≤i≤M e;
17 αS = αk − δ/2; αE = αk + δ/2; δ = δ/10 ;
18 end
19 α∗ = αk ;
20 return α∗;
64-QAM points given a scalar and calculates the corresponding quantization error. Our key idea is
that: instead of processing each unit quantization given a fixed scalar range [αS , αE ] with a fixed gap
δ, we attempt to minimize the number of unit quantization process with a variable range and gap.
As shown in Step 17, we shrink the optimal scalar range and decrease the gap simultaneously. Since
the quantization error is a convex function of the scalar, the global optimal scalar is unique [25].
After each unit quantization, a current optimal scalar is found given a scalar range and gap. The
global optimal scalar must be around the current one. Hence, after a few iterations, we can get a
global optimal scalar.
Next, we demonstrate how the proposed algorithm speeds up the quantization process.
Denote the number of the iterations as Inum. To ease description, we apply the symbol
′ on the
upper right to represent the initial values while the symbol ∗ to denote the values with the global
optimal scalar. Without our algorithm, the unit quantization is processed
α′S−α
′
E
δ∗ times to minimize
the quantization error by choosing the optimal scalar. Our algorithm reduces the times to
α′S−α
′
E
δ′ +
10Inum, where δ
∗ = δ′10−Inum as shown in Step 12. In the case with more iterations, our algorithm
decreases the number of unit quantization processes by about 10Inum times.
After 64-QAM quantization, WiFi data bits are obtained from the inverse process of the
interleaver, convolution encoding, and scrambler as in [119]. Those bits are stored in the cache. The
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WiFi attacker launches the attack by sending them to ZigBee devices.
Figure 2.8: Eavesdropped Signal Vs. Emulated Signal
Fig.2.8 compares the ZigBee and emulated signals in a general case where ZigBee devices
and WiFi attackers are centered in different frequencies, e.g., ZigBee on 2.405GHz and WiFi on
2.410GHz. The blue lines are the waveform of the ZigBee signal and the orange line represents the
emulated signal. Those two waveforms are very similar except those in the red rectangle due to
cyclic prefix rules. To achieve the goal of attacking the ZigBee receiver at its operation frequency,
the WiFi attacker allocates the subcarriers 13− 20 to the emulated signal, which are 16 subcarriers’
ahead from the central subcarrier locations 29− 36. Hence, the waveform of the transmitted signal
is shown as the green lines in Fig.2.8.
2.6 Passive Defense Strategy
2.6.1 Motivation
The intuition behind our passive defense strategy is that “Quantitative Changes lead to
Qualitative Changes”. By making trouble to the eavesdropping process, we mislead the WiFi attacker
to generate the imperfect emulated signal, which cannot pass the detection at the ZigBee receiver.
The proposed approach makes use of an auxiliary WiFi transmitter, for which we refer as an anchor.
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As shown in Fig. 2.9, locating near the ZigBee transmitter, the anchor transmits the AWGN noise
when the ZigBee device transmits the signal. We assume that the it follows the Gaussian distribution
nz ∼ CN (0, σ2) with the mean 0 and the variance σ2. The signal received at both the ZigBee receiver
and the WiFi attacker becomes,
z′(n, s) = z(n, s) + nz(n, s). (2.6)
ZigBee DeviceZigBee Gateway
Mobile Anchor
ZigBee Device
Wi-Fi Attacker
Channel Listening Attack & Defense
Wi-Fi Attacker
Discard
Emulation Attack
Wireless Transmission
Channel Eavesdropping 
Figure 2.9: Passive Defense Model
2.6.2 Noise Effect to the WiFi Attacker
In the DSSS demodulation, ZigBee devices set a threshold to the number of error chips
between the received chip sequence and the predefined ones. In other words, ZigBee devices tolerate
a few error chips for each received chip sequence. Therefore, even if the ZigBee receiver receives a
signal with a slightly smaller signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), it still can find one predefined chip sequence
and is decoded to the ZigBee symbol that the predefined one represents. However, different from
the regular decoding process, the noise concealed in the eavesdropped signal would propagate to the
signal emulation process at the WiFi attacker, resulting in larger quantization distortion.
As in (2.6), the signal eavesdropped by the WiFi attacker is a noised ZigBee signal z′(n, s).
After the FFT operation, the output is,
Z ′(k, s) = Z(k, s) +NZ(k, s), (2.7)
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where NZ(k, s) is the FFT points of the AWGN in the frequency domain. The WiFi attacker
quantizes the FFT points Z ′(k, s) to the QAM points based on Algorithm 1. Denote the QAM
point corresponding to the FFT point Z ′(k, s) as Q′(k, s). After quantization, the square error
e′(k, s) between the QAM point and the FFT point of raw signal is,
e′(k, s) = (ZRe(k, s)− αQ′Re(m))
2
+ (ZIm(k, s)− αQ′Im(m))
2
However, if the anchor does not emit AWGN noise, the square error e(k, s) for the FFT point Z(k, s)
is,
e(k, s) = (ZRe(k, s)− αQRe(m))2 + (ZIm(k, s)− αQIm(m))2 (2.8)
The noise sent by the anchor tempts the WiFi attacker to quantize the FFT point Z ′(k, s)
to a different QAM point Q′(k, s). The new QAM point is farther to the FFT point Z(k, s) of the
ZigBee signal without the added noise, resulting in larger distortion in the emulated signal. To make
it more clear, we pick up the noisy FFT points with the variance σ2F in the first sample, s = 1 and
draw them in Fig. 2.10 where the optimal scalar is α = 1. σ2F is the variance in the frequency
domain. For the AWGN, variances in the time domain σ2 and frequency domain σ2F form a linear
relationship. The blue marks in Fig. 2.10 denote the FFT points without the anchor whereas the
black marks represent the FFT points with the added AWGN. We take the FFT point k = 34 as an
example, which is amplified at lower left. When there is no added noise, the FFT point is quantized
to the QAM point −7 + j whereas the quantized QAM point becomes −5 + j affected by the noise,
which deviates the FFT point. Such a false quantization results in higher quantization error. The
table in 2.10 further demonstrates our idea: the quantization error becomes larger when the anchor
transmits the AWGN together with the ZigBee transmitter.
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Subcarrier Q(k, s) e(k, s) Q′(k, s) e′(k, s)
29 −1 + j 0.6466 −1− j 2.8371
30 −1− 3j 1.2294 1− 3j 0.8794
31 −1− 5j 0.2995 −1− 5j 0.2995
32 3− j 0.3377 3 + j 2.0649
33 5− 3j 1.0989 5− 3j 1.0989
34 −7 + j 0.3899 −5 + j 2.4421
35 −1− j 0.6528 1− j 5.5319
36 −1 + 5j 0.1200 −1 + 5j 0.1199
Figure 2.10: Constellation Performance under AWGN Effect
Based on the Parseval’s theorem [175], the energy in the time-domain is equalized to that in
frequency-domain. Hence, the larger quantization error in the frequency domain results in the larger
signal distortion. When the ZigBee device receives such a distorted signal, the chip error exceeds the
threshold in DSSS. It discards the received signal. Therefore, the passive defense strategy prevents
the WiFi attacker from controlling the ZigBee devices.
2.7 Proactive Defense Strategy
The major shortage in the previous passive defense strategy is that the added noise level
cannot be too high. Otherwise, the ZigBee receiver cannot decode the valid information from the
ZigBee transmitter neither. Besides, with the strong computation capability, the WiFi attacker can
launch the signal emulation attack via the exhaustive search on its constellation and periodically
checking the current state of the ZigBee receiver. Hence, new defense strategies are needed.
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Figure 2.11: Proactive Defense Strategy
2.7.1 Motivation
As shown in Fig.2.11, the goal of this proactive defense strategy is to distinguish whether
the received signal is from the WiFi attacker or the ZigBee transmitter in a real-time manner. To
achieve it, the anchor will first proactively learn the behavior of both the WiFi attacker and the
ZigBee transmitter from previously received signals. When the new signal is detected, the anchor
classifies the signal source based on the historic learning knowledge.
Note that our proactive approach is different from radio frequency fingerprinting techniques
[26, 46, 118, 141], which leverage the uniqueness in the transmitted signal to localize or identify the
specific source based on the analog properties, particularly the presence of analog components in the
radio transmission chain. However, our proactive scheme does not differentiate devices but instead,
we use features to find differences between protocols. Besides, our used metric will only be evaluated
within each signal (e.g., cosine difference) compared to RF fingerprinting-based approaches applying
metrics for comparison of two same-protocol signals.
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(a) Cosine Distance (b) C40 Difference (c) C42 Difference
(d) Maximum Energy (e) Minimum Energy
Figure 2.12: Time-domain and Frequency-domain Features
2.7.2 Feature Extraction
To identify the differences between the ZigBee signal and emulated signal, the anchor ex-
tracts unique features from received signals on both the time and frequency domain.
2.7.2.1 Time Domain Feature
The cyclic prefix is obtained by prepending a copy of the last 16 complex data from the end
to its beginning for the emulated ZigBee sample. With this being said, a circular signal structure
appears, i.e., the first 16 data and last 16 data should be the same in each emulated sample. However,
the ZigBee signal does not have such property. Therefore, the anchor can check whether the signal
has such a circular structure. In particular, the anchor sends the received signal into the folding
process after signal alignment. Because there are 80 complex data in each emulated sample, the
anchor chooses 80 as the length of each column instead of 64. Denote the folding matrix as F, and
its element F (n, s) is the n-th complex data in the s-th signal sample. To be consistent with the
previous discussion, there are in total of S signal samples. Theoretically, if the signal comes from
the WiFi attacker, the n-th row vector is the same with the (n + 64)-th row vector in the folding
matrix, i = 1, 2, · · · , 16. The cosine distance, which finds the angle between two vectors, is applied
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to measure the similarity between two row vectors. The value of the cosine distance is close to 1 if
the two vectors are similar. To consider the similarity between the first 16 row vectors and the last
16 corresponding ones, we calculated the averaged cosine distance DF as follows,
DF =
1
16
16∑
n=1
∑S
s=1 F (n, s)F
∗(n+ 64, s)√∑S
s=1 F
2(n, s)
√∑S
s=1 F
2(n+ 64, s)
(2.9)
In addition, we simulate the cosine distance of both the eavesdropped signal and the emulated signal
as illustrated in Fig. 2.12a (Fig. 12a-12e are in next page), from which we see that the first 16 row
vectors of the emulated signal and their related vectors in the end are almost the same. Different
from this, the corresponding vectors of the ZigBee signal are negatively correlated.
2.7.2.2 Frequency Domain Features
The largest difference between the eavesdropped and the emulated signal is the constellation
difference as shown in Fig.2.7a. Since the emulated signal is a WiFi signal, its constellation has
a squared structure. However, the constellation of the eavesdropped signal does not have such a
performance. Therefore, the constellation structure of the received signal is considered for detection.
The 64-QAM constellation has constant normalized fourth-order stimulants C40, C41 and
C42 [162]. Given received signal data z(n, s), the anchor estimates them as follows,
C̃40 =
1
N ∗ S
S∑
s=1
N∑
i=n
z4(n, s)− 3C̃220
C̃41 =
1
N ∗ S
S∑
s=1
N∑
i=n
z3(n, s)z∗(n, s)− 3C̃20C̃21
C̃42 =
1
N ∗ S
S∑
s=1
N∑
i=n
|z4(n, s)| − |C̃20|2 − 2C̃221 (2.10)
In addition, the second-order moments C̃20 and C̃21 are estimated,
C̃20 =
1
N ∗ S
S∑
s=1
N∑
i=n
z2(n, s), C̃21 =
1
N ∗ S
S∑
s=1
N∑
i=n
|z(n, s)|2.
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Finally, the normalized second-order moments and fourth-order stimulants are given as,
Ĉ2q = C̃2q/C̃
2
21, q = 0, 1, Ĉ4q = C̃4q/C̃
2
21, q = 0, 1, 2 (2.11)
Their theoretical values are C21 = 1, C20 = 0, C40 = C42 = −0.6190 for the 64-QAM constellation.
By comparing the difference between the estimated second-order/fourth-order stimulants
and their theoretical values, the anchor can roughly estimate the signal source. If the difference is
small, the signal is from the attacker. Otherwise, it is from a ZigBee device. We deploy (C̃20−C20)2,
(|Ĉ40| − |C40|)2 and (C̃42 −C42)2 to represent the above features. The reason for the absolute value
of C40 is to avoid the effect brought by the signal phase rotation in transmission [162]. Their
performance is shown in Fig. 2.12b, and Fig. 2.12c, respectively, where the difference between the
second-order/fourth-order stimulants and their theoretical values in the emulated signal is smaller
than that in the eavesdropped signal.
Besides the features related to stimulants, we consider the energy of the points in the
constellations. By investigating Fig. 2.7a again, we see that the quantization process amplifies the
FFT points with the smallest energy and shrinks the FFT points with the largest energy, resulting
in their energy changes. We show the comparison of the maximum and minimum energy between
the eavesdropped signal and the emulated signal in Fig.2.12d and Fig.2.12e, respectively, all of which
validate our idea. Therefore, the maximum and minimum energy of the points after FFT operation
from the received signal are chosen as the features.
2.7.3 Data Collection
In the training process, the anchor collects the data from both the WiFi attacker and the
ZigBee transmitter based on the following process. As long as it is receiving the signal, the anchor
first checks whether the state of the ZigBee receiver changes. If it is not changed, the anchor regards
the signal as the emulated signal; otherwise, the anchor inquiries the ZigBee transmitter on whether
it has transmitted signal. If it did not send any signal, the anchor likewise regards the signal as the
emulated signal. If the ZigBee transmitter sends the signal, the anchor marks it as the signal source.
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2.7.4 Signal Classification
The anchor deploys the binary logistic regression model [44,135] to distinguish whether the
currently received signal is either from the WiFi attacker (‘1’) or the ZigBee transmitter (‘0’) by
calculating the corresponding probability P (Y = 1|x) and P (Y = 0|x) after extracting the features,
P (Y = 1|x) = exp(ŵ · x+ b̂)
1 + exp(ŵ · x+ b̂)
, P (Y = 0|x) = 1
1 + exp(ŵ · x+ b̂)
where x is a feature vector consisting of all the features described above. It denotes the feature
extracted from the current received signal. If P (Y = 1|x) is larger than P (Y = 0|x), the anchor
decides the signal is from the WiFi attacker; otherwise, the signal is from the ZigBee transmitter.
In particular, ŵ ∈ Rn and b̂ are the estimated parameters learned from the training data
set T = {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), · · · , (xT , yT )}. They are obtained by maximizing logarithm likelihood
L(w, b),
L(w, b) =
∑T
i=1
[yi(w · xi)− log(1 + exp(w · xi))]. (2.12)
2.8 Performance Evaluation
2.8.1 Experiment Settings
We implement the emulation attack and its defense strategies on the USRP testbed and the
Prototype testbed respectively to thoroughly evaluate their performance.
In the USRP testbed, the USRP-N210 is deployed as a WiFi attacker, attempting to control
the ZigBee device CC26x2R Wireless MCU LaunchPad as shown in Fig. 2.13a. Both of them are
centered at 2.405GHz. The distance between them is set to 5m, 10m, 15m, and 20m, respectively.
USRP testbed gives freedom to choose parameters (e.g., transmission power, central frequency, pay-
load length, etc.) for each step in the entire design, which can better simulate different environments.
As assumed in the motivation, we claim the signal emulation attack is severe due to the
ubiquity of WiFi devices, where arbitrary devices with WiFi RF can launch the attack. Hence,
we also implement experiments on a Prototype testbed, where the Nexus 5 smartphone (centered
on 2.412GHz) attempts to control a smart light prototype (centered on 2.412GHz) in both LoS
and NLoS as shown in Fig.2.13c. Nexus 5 whose radio chip is BCM4339 supports the widely used
Nexmon framework which realizes modifications on the WiFi part [5] from a lower level. In Nexmon,
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(a) USRP Testbed
(b) Smart Light Prototype
(c) Prototype Testbed
Figure 2.13: Experiment Settings and Prototype
we only change the WiFi packet length in order to fit the length of the ZigBee’s “TURNING ON”
command. To be specific, the length of a WiFi packet normally is around 1500 bytes. If the data
is greater than that, it will be divided into several packets. Hence, we use Nexmon to ensure that
a larger packet can be transmitted instead of being divided into several packets. In the smart light
prototype in Fig.2.13b, the CC26x2R turns on the common light bulb by triggering a high level to
the I/O output D100 as soon as detecting the “TURNING ON” command. Because the bulb needs a
110V voltage whereas the maximum supply voltage is 5V on CC26x2R, an extra relay is introduced
playing the role of the switch. During the experiment, there are human activities such as walking,
WiFi and Bluetooth signal transmission at the same time.
2.8.2 Signal Emulation Attack Performance
2.8.2.1 USRP Testbed
The attacker USRP sends 100 fixed-length emulated signals to ZigBee device CC26x2R
10 times given each distance. Symbol error rate (SER) denotes the number of symbols that are
mistakenly decoded plus the number of symbols that are not received divided by the number of
total symbols. Packet error rate (PER) represents the number of emulated signal packet being
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received with error over the number of total packets. The packet error happens if at least one
symbol in it is detected with error. It means that the ZigBee device is not controlled by WiFi
attacker. As can be seen in Fig.2.14, both the SER and PER are small even if the distance between
them is long, e.g., 15m and 20m, which demonstrates that WiFi attacker can control the ZigBee
device from a longer distance.
(a) SER (b) PER
Figure 2.14: Signal Emulation Attack Performance
2.8.2.2 Prototype Testbed
The smartphone continuously sends “10000” as the “TURNING ON” commands from different
locations. A USRP is deployed next to the bulb to help analyze the received signal. The result is
illustrated in Table. 2.2. As the distance increases, both the SER and PER decrease. However, even
the distance between the smartphone and the light bulb is beyond 20m, the PER is still very small.
In other words, the smartphone can successfully control the ZigBee device from a longer distance,
which demonstrates the effectiveness of our signal emulation attack.
Table 2.2: Prototype Signal Emulation Attack Performance
Distance 5m 10m 15m 20m 25m
SER 0.94% 3.26% 10.88% 15.93% 14.25%
PER 0.026% 0.082% 0.25% 0.36% 0.32%
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2.8.3 Passive Defense Strategy
To evaluate the passive defense strategy, we deploy another USRP in both testbeds to
perform as the anchor, which transmits the AWGN with the ZigBee signal simultaneously during
the eavesdropping phase. The signal-to-noise ratio is set from −20dB to 30dB. During the attacking
process, we mainly consider the LoS case in USRP testbed and both the LoS and NLoS cases in
Prototype testbed.
2.8.3.1 USRP Testbed
At the above locations, the WiFi attacker transmits 100 emulated noised signal 10 times.
We show the effectiveness of the passive defense strategy from the following aspects.
Effect on the Quantization. We illustrate scalar α and the average square error cor-
responding with it in Fig.2.15a and Fig. 2.15b. When the SNR is under 0dB, a large scalar α is
generated and results in a high average square error. This is because the noise with a high power
brings a negative effect to the constellation quantization of the eavesdropped signal. Each FFT
point of the eavesdropped signal is quantized to the 64-QAM point that is far away from itself.
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Figure 2.15: Quantization Performance
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Figure 2.16: Hamming Distance Performance
Effect on Hamming Distance. In Fig.2.16, we illustrate the Hamming distance distribu-
tion for both the received ZigBee signal and emulated signal when the anchor generates the AWGN
with the high SNR (22dB) and low SNR (2dB). The threshold of Hamming distance is set to 10.
When the SNR is 22dB, most Hamming distance of ZigBee signal is around 0 and 1 whereas that
of emulated signal is distributed among 2 − 9. The ZigBee receiver decodes all the chips correctly.
As the distance increases, the Hamming distance of the emulated signal becomes larger. Due to
noise tolerance, the ZigBee receiver still decodes the emulated signal to correct symbols. However,
when the SNR is 2dB, many chips are incorrectly decoded. The ZigBee receiver cannot recognize
the emulated signal. WiFi attacker cannot control the ZigBee devices.
Effect on SER and PER. We evaluate the SER and PER from the receivers’ perspective.
As we can see in Fig.2.17, the SER and PER of both the ZigBee and emulated signal are very high
when the SNR is below 0dB. The receiver decodes neither of them. When the SNR is above 5dB,
the SER and PER of them approach to 0. The ZigBee receiver decodes both of them. When the
SNR is between 0dB and 5dB, both SER and PER of ZigBee signal approach to 0 while the PER
of the emulated signal is high, especially when the distance is larger. The receiver only decodes the
ZigBee signal. The above analysis demonstrates that our passive defense strategy can effectively
protect the ZigBee device from being attacked by WiFi attackers, particularly those who attempt
to control the ZigBee device from a longer distance.
35
(a) CC26x2R SER (b) CC26x2R PER
Figure 2.17: Effects on Error Rate
2.8.3.2 Prototype Testbed
The smartphone attempts to control the bulb from locations L1 to L7 in the building whose
floor map is shown in Fig.2.18. Specifically, WiFi attacker locates at L1, L2 and L4 attacks the
bulb in LoS. When the smartphone is at L3, L5, L6 or L7, it attempts to turn on the bulb without
being found (NLOS). The SNR increases from −2dB to 30dB during the eavesdropping phase.
Figure 2.18: Building Map 1
The success rate of turning on the bulb is illustrated in Fig. 2.19. When the SNR is low,
e.g., −2dB and 2dB, WiFi attacker only turns on the bulb in LoS case. As the SNR increases,
indicating the added AWGN is decreasing, the success rate also increases. When it increases to
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26dB and 30dB, the noise variance is so small that it cannot bring any trouble to the WiFi attacker.
WiFi attacker turns on the prototype at all the marked locations, including many NLoS locations.
The above observation also echos the effectiveness of our signal emulation attack in both LoS and
NLoS case.
Figure 2.19: Defensive Performance on Prototype
2.8.4 Proactive Defense Strategy
In our proactive strategy, a USRP, as the anchor, is put next to ZigBee devices to help
distinguish the signal source. Note that we consider the normalized maximum energy and minimized
energy instead of extracting them directly.
(a) ROC Curve (b) Recall and Precision
Figure 2.20: Detection Performance in USRP Testbed
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2.8.4.1 USRP Testbed
We randomly generate 1000 ZigBee signal, which are eavesdropped by the WiFi attacker.
Then, it generates the corresponding emulated signal. The original ZigBee signal and the emulated
ones are sent to the ZigBee device respectively. Half of the received emulated signal is put into the
training set and the others are to be classified. The operation of the ZigBee signal is the same. The
experimental results are shown as a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve in Fig.2.20a.
The false positive rate represents that the emulated signal is mistakenly considered to be from the
ZigBee transmitter whereas the false negative rate denotes that the ZigBee signal is regarded as from
the WiFi attacker. In the LoS case, both the false positive rate and false negative rate approach to
0 due to the existence of the powerful anchor. In addition, we demonstrate the recall and precision
performance in Fig.2.20b. The recall value represents the capability of identifying the WiFi attacker
whereas the precision value denotes the capability of recognizing the ZigBee transmitter from the
received signal. When the detection threshold is set to around 0.7, both the recall and precision
value are near to 1, in the sense that the anchor effectively identifies both the WiFi attacker and
ZigBee transmitter.
(a) ROC Curve (b) Recall and Precision
Figure 2.21: Detection Performance in Prototype Testbed
2.8.4.2 Prototype Testbed
The WiFi attacker attempts to control the bulb from the LoS locations L1 and L2 together
with NLoS locations C1, C2 and C3. The USRP receives 500 emulated signals and ZigBee original
signal, respectively. Half of both received signals are put into the training set and the others are
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going to be classified. As we can see from Fig.2.21, when the detection threshold is set to 0.5, both
false positive and negative rates approach to 0.2 while the precision is near to 0. The anchor can
effectively identify the received signal source.
2.8.5 Results from Field Experiments
2.8.5.1 Experiment Settings
To further verify the effectiveness of emulation attack and defense strategies, we conduct
field experiments in a larger space, where the end-to-end distance is more than two times of the
previous building. Due to the complicated floor plan as given in Fig. 2.22, we can carry out more
experiments in the extreme NLoS case.
R
1
R2
C2C1
Second floor
R3
R4
R5
Figure 2.22: Building Map 2 – Second Floor
Specifically, we test the results on emulation attack to the commodity Sylvania ZigBee LED.
The launchpad CC26x2R is always placed close to LED to show the symbol/packet level performance.
A USRP is placed at location C1 on the second floor. For the LoS case, we move LED from USRP
location to the end of the hallway C2. The distance from C1 to C2 is 80m. For the NLoS, we place
the LED in room R1, R2, R3, and the end of the hallway on the first floor C2′. The distance between
R2 and C1 is around 60m. The emulation signal has to pass through other rooms, e.g., R3, R4, R5,
before being received at R1. The USRP sends the “TURNING ON” command that includes 49 ZigBee
symbols 500 times to turn on the LED. As an attacker, the USRP sends the emulated command
with the gain value 20dB, which indicates the amplification factor in hardware before sending the
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signal out [6]. As a ZigBee transmitter, the USRP transmits the received ZigBee command with the
gain value 12dB. Since the maximum power of WiFi transmission on the smartphone (e.g., Samsung
Galaxy series) is 13dBm whereas that on ZigBee devices is 5dBm, gain value settings are to ensure
the maximum power ratio between WiFi and ZigBee.
2.8.5.2 Signal Emulation Attack Performance
In the field experiment, the LED is turned on after receiving either emulated or ZigBee
“TURNING ON” command in LoS case. In NLoS case, the LED is on for the above four locations
only when the USRP sends emulated signals. The signal performance on CC26x2R gives similar
results. As in Table.2.3, when the USRP sends the emulated command, the signals received by
CC26x2R have a lower SER. The received packet is supposed to be incorrect if one of the symbols
is not correctly received. Hence, the PER is relatively high. However, it is much smaller than that
when the USRP sends the ZigBee. Even worse, being placed at R2, the CC26xR even cannot receive
the ZigBee signal. The above results validate our intuition that ZigBee devices are more easily
controlled by WiFi devices from NLoS locations.
Table 2.3: Symbol/Packet Level Performance
Location C2 C2′ R1 R2 R3
SER (WiFi) 16.09% 9.15% 34.25% 23.09% 11.78%
PER (WiFi) 44.60% 44.30% 62.70% 57.60% 36.50%
SER (ZigBee) 16.07% 6.06% 53.81% N/A 11.12%
PER (ZigBee) 44.30% 19.10% 83.20% N/A 32.90%
2.8.5.3 Proactive Defense Strategy
To distinguish the signal source, a USRP is deployed next to the Smart LED. Similarly, it
receives 500 emulated signals and original ZigBee signals (including both LoS and NLoS), respec-
tively. The result is shown in Fig.2.23. When the detection threshold is lower than 0.8, the anchor
would not ignore the emulated signal, but it is possible that the anchor mistakenly regards the
ZigBee source as WiFi attacker. When the detection threshold is set above 0.8, the distinguishing
result is reversed. When the threshold is set to around 0.8, the anchor gets a balance between the
false positive rate and the false negative rate. Shown in Fig.2.23b, the recall and precision value
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approaches to 0.8 simultaneously when the threshold is set between 0.8 and 0.9, in the sense that
the anchor can effectively identify both the ZigBee receiver and WiFi attacker.
(a) ROC Curve (b) Recall and Precision
Figure 2.23: Detection Performance in Field Experiments
2.9 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we identify a new physical-layer based attack, cross-technology signal em-
ulation attack, where the WiFi attacker controls the ZigBee device by emulating the eavesdropped
ZigBee signal. To combat this attack, we introduce an anchor to safeguard the ZigBee communica-
tion. In the passive defense strategy, the anchor transmits the AWGN to prevent the WiFi attacker
from successfully emulating the perfect ZigBee signal. Whereas in the proactive defense strategy,
the anchor receives the signal and identifies the signal source in real time. We implement our design
on real-world testbeds and the commodity smart LED together with our self-designed prototype.
Extensive experiments are performed, demonstrating both the feasibility of signal emulation attack
and the effectiveness of the defense strategies.
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Chapter 3
Incentivizing Relay Participation
for Securing Internet of Things
Communication
3.1 Chapter Overview
Internet of Things (IoT) is expected to enable ubiquitous connectivity and information
exchange among billions of everyday necessities. Although the use of such smart connected objects
has become a reality in our daily activities, serious concerns are raised as follows. On the one
hand, over 60% of IoT applications are required to achieve low power consumption, long battery
life, high data rate, and wide coverage simultaneously [114]. Although the newly proposed NB-IoT
and LoRa protocols would be able to address some of the above requirements, the low data rate
(approx. 50-250 kbps) becomes the main bottleneck to hinder their widely deployment in many
applications. For some existing wireless technologies, such as Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) and
802.15.4/ZigBee, the low power feature limits the communication range, and thus they are unable
to be deployed in industrial applications, such as environmental sensing and machinery weakness
monitoring. On the other hand, the disclosure of sensitive information collected by many IoT
applications is unacceptable, such as machinery data, patients’ health data, financial files, etc.
Unfortunately, data communication is de facto vulnerable to the eavesdropping attack due to the
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heterogeneous wireless environment in the IoT system [179,182].
Cooperative communication is a perfect fit to tackle the above challenges with its advan-
tages on wide coverage, energy efficiency, and high interference mitigation capability. While being
thoroughly investigated in the Wireless Sensor Network (WSN), it could play a more significant role
in the IoT system on enhancing the reliability and security. Specifically, the cooperative communi-
cation will introduce inherent randomness of wireless channels, which could prevent eavesdroppers
from intercepting the transmitted message. However, the major challenge that deters the deploy-
ment of cooperative communication on improving the security level is the limited battery life of
wireless sensors. In this chapter, we propose a novel cooperative IoT system consisting of multi-
ple relay IoT nodes to enhance the reliability and security, where the shortage of device energy is
conquered by leveraging energy harvesting techniques on IoT devices. In particular, many Commer-
cial off-the-shelf (COTS) IoT nodes are able to collect energy from renewable resources in ambient
environments, such as vibration, solar and, wind energy [100]. In our proposed system, the newly
introduced relay IoT node mainly plays two roles: 1) forwarding the data from each source node
to the destination node to ensure the reliable communication; 2) preventing data information from
being intercepted by the eavesdroppers to secure the IoT communication. Although the proposed
paradigm enlightens a new methodology for reliable IoT communication, how to incentivize relay
IoT nodes to help the data forwarding becomes a challenging issue, because each relay IoT node
has to consume its own harvested energy for relaying. Therefore, we propose a game-theoretical
solution to motivate the participation of relay IoT nodes with joint consideration on both channel
state information (CSI) and energy consumption. We highlight our contributions as follows,
• We propose a novel cooperative IoT system to ensure the reliability and security of data
communication specifically for IoT applications.
• Leveraging energy harvesting techniques, relay IoT nodes can help improve the secrecy capacity
by participating in the cooperative communication continuously.
• To demonstrate the practicality, two two-stage Stackelberg games under both the wiretap-link
CSI unknown and known cases are formulated between the source and relay IoT nodes.
• Simulations and the experiments using real-world dataset show the feasibility of the proposed
scheme.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We briefly review related work in Section
3.2. Detailed description of the system model and the Stackelberg game formulation are given in
Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we introduce the proposed Stackelberg game in the wiretap-link CSI
unknown case in detail. An extension to the wiretap link CSI known case, which is more complex,
is discussed in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6, complexity is analyzed and performance evaluation is
demonstrated for both cases, followed with a conclusion in Section 3.7.
3.2 Related Work
3.2.1 Cooperative Communication in IoT
Cooperative communication aims at improving energy efficiency, overall throughput, power
control, and resource allocation in wireless networks [81,160]. It has been widely deployed in many
IoT applications. Omar et al. in [139] use cooperative communications in a smart metering system
to relay data in a multi-hop fashion to far-off aggregation points. The experimental results verify
cooperative communication can increase network range, prolong network lifetime, and reduce energy
consumption. It is also deployed in cluster-based industrial IoT network to optimize both energy
efficiency and QoS in [159, 160]. In the context of large-scale IoT, Bader et al. in [18] use blind
cooperative transmission in conjunction with multi-hop networking to minimize underlying protocol
overhead and therefore allows for scalability. However, securing cooperative IoT system receives less
attention.
3.2.2 Physical-layer Security
Physical-layer security mechanism exploits the property of the wireless channel for secure
communication [53,177]. It has shown great potential in providing information-theoretically unbreak-
able secrecy [182]. Many transmission strategies, such as cooperative transmission [201], artificial
noise [124], and secure beamforming [120], are proposed to enhance physical layer security. Among
all those strategies, cooperative communication is of great significance to the IoT communication
due to its low power and wide coverage requirements. A comprehensive overview of physical layer
security in wireless cooperative relay networks is provided in [152]. The performance of secure
transmission is improved by employing multiple cooperative relays in [201, 202]. Specifically, Xu et
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al. in [182] prove that the proper use of relay transmission enhances the secrecy throughput and
extends the secure coverage range for IoT communications. However, without proper benefits, relay
IoT nodes will not participate in the cooperative communication.
3.2.3 Stackelberg Game
Stackelberg game [48] models and analyzes the interactions among independent decision
makers, which has been applied in a broad field of wireless communications and networks [90].
Particularly, A single-leader single-follower Stackelberg game is proposed in [52] for physical layer
security and energy efficiency enhancement. However, it does not support multiple relay nodes
case. A single-leader multiple-followers Stackelberg game is deployed to coordinate multiple relays
for physical-layer security improvement in [53], where the fairness among relay nodes is considered.
However, due to the different CSIs on the wiretap link between the eavesdropper and each relay
node, each relay node contributes differently to physical layer security. The EWS-based algorithm
in [53] is also not a proper method for physical-layer security enhancement.
R1
S1 D
E
R2
R3
S2
S2
S4
R4
Source Device Relay Device Gateway Eavesdropper
Cooperative Link Eavesdropping Link
E
Figure 3.1: System Model
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3.3 System Overview
3.3.1 System Model
An industrial IoT application shown in Fig.3.1 describes our system model. Assume K
energy constrained source nodes S = {S1, S2, · · · , SK} to transmit data to a distant destination
node D (e.g., IoT gateway) through orthogonal channels in the presence of an eavesdropper E near
the destination node D. Nodes D and E are out of the transmission range of the source nodes. To
enable data transmission and prevent them from being intercepted, an amplified-and-forward (AF)
cooperative protocol is employed with the help of N mobile relay IoT nodes R = {R1, R2, · · · , RN}.
Each Ri can collect extra energy from the ambient environment when it does not work for S. Besides,
all the nodes including the eavesdropper are assumed to know the existence of the relay nodes and
the cooperative protocol, which is a common assumption in the physical-layer security protocols [52].
Since the eavesdropper cannot receive data information from S, it monitors the data transmission
from Ri to D and attempts to interpret the data.
3.3.2 Cooperative IoT System
We consider a flat Rayleigh fading channel in the proposed cooperative IoT system. The
fading amplitude between Sk and Ri is denoted hSki, whereas that between Ri and D is represented
by hid. Meanwhile, we denote the fading amplitude between Ri and E as hie. Without loss of
generality, nki, nid and nie are the corresponding additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with the
same distribution CN (0, σ2), where σ2 is one-sided power spectral density. Similar to [53], we assume
that source nodes can get global CSI of the main links, and the local information can be obtained
by the relay nodes. Generally, data transmission is divided into two steps:
Step 1: Sk broadcasts its encoded signal sk (E
(
|sk|2
)
= 1) with the power PSk . The signal received
at Ri is,
ySki =
√
PSkhSkisk + nki. (3.1)
Step 2: Ri normalizes and amplifies the received signal ySki with the power PiSk and sends to D.
Then, D receives,
ySkid =
√
PiSkhid
ySki
|ySki|
+ nid, (3.2)
46
where the power PiSk consists of two parts: the power provided by the relay IoT node itself and
harvested from the ambient environments. Similarly, Sk’ signal forwarded by Ri can also be received
by E, where
yie =
√
PiSkhie
ySki
|ySki|
+ nie. (3.3)
Substitute (3.1) into (3.2), the signal-to-noise radio (SNR) ΓSkid on the main link (Sk-Ri-D)
becomes,
ΓSkid(PiSk) =
PSkPiSkγSkiγid
1 + PSkγSki + PiSkγid
, (3.4)
where γSki = |hSki|2/σ2 and γid = |hid|2/σ2.
Similarly, based on (3.1) and (3.3), the SNR ΓSkie on the wiretap link (Sk-Ri-E) related to
the relay node Ri is,
ΓSkie(PiSk) =
PSkPiSkγSkiγie
1 + PSkγSki + PiSkγie
, (3.5)
in which γie = |hie|2/σ2, i = 1, 2, · · · , N .
To maximize the receiving SNR, we deploy Maximum Radio Combination (MRC) at both
D and E, representing the theoretically optimal combiner over fading channels [63]. As a result, the
corresponding channel capacities on the main link and wiretap link are,
Cdk(Prk) = W log2(1 +
∑N
i=1
ΓSkid) (3.6)
and
Cek(Prk) = W log2(1 +
∑N
i=1
ΓSkie) (3.7)
respectively, where Prk = {P1Sk , P2Sk , · · · , PNSk} denotes the power each relay node consumes to
forward the signal.
DEFINITION 1. (Secrecy Capacity) The secrecy capacity [76] related to Sk, defined as the dif-
ference between the capacity of the main link (Sk-R-D) and that of the wiretap link (Sk-R-E), is
written as,
Csec,k(Prk) = max{Cd(Prk)− Ce(Prk), 0} (3.8)
It represents the maximum transmission rate of the main link that the eavesdropper is unable to
decode any information.
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Therefore, in order to enhance the IoT system security, it is necessary to maximize the
secrecy capacity of Sk with the help of multiple relay IoT nodes given the source node power PSk
and the CSI of both the main link and the wiretap link,
maxPrk Csec,k(Prk) (3.9)
s.t. 0 ≤
∑K
k=1 PiSk ≤ Pi,max, i = 1, 2, · · · , N. (3.10)
where Pi,max is the maximized power the relay node Ri can use to forward the data.
3.3.3 Stackelberg Game Formulation
To incentivize the relay participation, we propose a game-theoretical approach to choosing
proper relay IoT nodes for data forwarding. In contrast to treating source nodes equally from
relay IoT nodes’ perspectives, Si intends to select the most beneficial Ri because Ri has different
performance on enhancing the secrecy capacity due to the different CSIs and available power. To
maximize the benefits of both the source nodes and the relay nodes, we formulate their interactions
as a two-stage multi-buyer multi-seller Stackelberg game. Particularly, we discuss the Stackelberg
game under the wiretap-link CSI unknown and know cases, named as the CUS game and the CKS
game, respectively.
3.3.3.1 CSI-Unknown Model (CUS Game)
Assuming the eavesdropper only listens without transmitting, the CSI on the wiretap link
hie, i = 1, 2, · · · , N, is unknown. The source node Sk cannot select qualified relay IoT nodes and
purchases power to enhance the secrecy performance. Motivated by [53], we replace the capacity on
the wiretap link with its supremum Csupe , which can be obtained based on a period of monitoring.
We define the multi-buyers multi-sellers Stackelberg game as,
DEFINITION 2. (CUS Game)
• Stage I (Unit Pricing) Each relay IoT node Ri ∈ R sells a unit price q∗i of its power to
maximize its benefit Ui,
q∗i = arg max
∑
i∈N
(qi − ci)PiSk , i = 1, 2, · · · , N (3.11)
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• Stage II (Power Purchased) Each Sk ∈ S buys an amount of power PiSk from Ri, Ri ∈ N
to maximize its utility given the power and secrecy capacity constraints.
Prk
∗ = arg maxUSk(Prk ,q), k = 1, 2, · · · ,K (3.12)
In the CUS game, each Ri sells the power to S with the unit price qi to maximize its utility,
Ui(PiS1 , PiS2 , · · · , PiSK , qi) = (qi − ci)
∑K
k=1
PiSk (3.13)
with its current power constraint (3.10). ci denotes its own cost. The unit price of each relay node
composes a price vector q = {q1, q2, · · · , qN}. As for each Sk, when Ri, i ∈ N helps forward the
data, it gets the utility,
USk(Prk ,q) = α(Cdk(Prk)− C
sup
e )−
∑N
i=1
qiPiSk (3.14)
where α denotes the gain per unit of secrecy capacity.
3.3.3.2 CSI-known Model (CKS Game)
In an IoT system, a receiving node can play as a legitimate destination node for some data
transmission while still performing as an eavesdropper for others. Therefore, the CSI on the wiretap
link can be obtained, and we extend the above CUS game to the CKS game. At this time, the utility
of each source node becomes,
USk(Prk ,q) = αCsec,k(Prk)−
∑N
i=1
qiPiSk (3.15)
In addition, a secrecy capacity constraint is added to ensure data transmission security,
Csec,k(Prk) > C0 (3.16)
The Stackelberg game formulation and utility with power constraint for each relay node keeps
unchanged.
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3.4 Utility Maximization in CUS Game
In the proposed CUS game, we deploy the backward induction [58] to find the optimal power
strategies that no source node deviates based on the unit price each relay node charges. For each
relay node in Stage I, we are interested in the pricing strategy that maximizes its benefit given the
source nodes’ optimal strategies of in Stage II, which yields the concept of power equilibrium,
DEFINITION 3. (Power Equilibrium) For any price pi given in Stage I, the power equilibrium
(PE) in Stage II is a strategy profile P ∗iSk such that Sk cannot improve its utility by unilaterally
changing the power purchased from Ri, i.e.,
P ∗iSk = arg maxPrk USk(Prk ,q), i = 1, 2, · · · , N (3.17)
3.4.1 Stage II: Power Equilibrium
Since source nodes transmit the data on the orthogonal channels and are equally treated by
each relay node, we consider the power equilibrium for an Sk. Based on (3.4), (3.6) and (3.14), its
utility becomes,
USk(Prk ,q) = αW log2(1 +
∑N
i=1
PSkPiSkγSkiγid
1+PSkγSki+PiSkγid
)
−Csupe −
∑N
i=1 qiPiSk
= αW log2(1 +
N∑
i=1
AkiPiSk
Bki+PiSk
)− Csupe −
N∑
i=1
qiPiSk (3.18)
where Aki = PSkγSki and Bki = 1 + PSkγSki/γid. The constant C
sup
e transforms the utility maxi-
mization problem on the secrecy capacity to that on the channel capacity on the main link. Such
transformation is an approximation to the original problem. Only when the supreme secrecy capac-
ity equals to the channel capacity on the wiretap link are the two utility maximization problems
equal [90].
Using the utility function (3.18), by setting the derivative ∂USk(Prk ,q)/PiSk = 0 as the
first-order condition and solving the equation set, we get the optimal power strategies,
P ∗iSk =
√
AkiBki
qi
Yk +
√
Y 2k + 4Xk
αW
In2
2Xk
−Bki (3.19)
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where Xk = 1 +
∑N
i=1Aki and Yk =
∑N
i=1
√
qiAkiBki. Meanwhile, since the utility function (3.18)
is joint concave in {PiSk}N1 , P ∗iSk is the power equilibrium purchased from Ri given its unit price pi.
3.4.2 Stage I: Optimal Pricing
Different to the scenario in [58], CUS game is played between multiple source nodes and
relay nodes. From (3.13), we see that the utility of each relay IoT node depends on the power sold
to all the source nodes. To obtain the optimal price of Ri, we set the derivative ∂USki/∂qi = 0 and
obtain,
qi = Ii(q) = ci −
∑K
k=1 P
∗
iSk
∂
∑K
k=1 P
∗
iSk
/∂qi
(3.20)
Denote I(q) = {I1(q), I2(q), · · · , IN (q)}. We have,
Theorem 1. The optimal price is obtained by continuously updating the price of each relay node as
follows,
q = I(q). (3.21)
Proof: To prove the convergence, we show that I(q) is a standard function [186], which means
that I(q) needs to satisfy positivity, scalability, and monotonicity.
Positivity: I(q) > 0. From (3.19), for each relay node,
∂
∑K
k=1 P
∗
iSk
∂qi
= − 1
2qi
K∑
k=1
√AkiBki
qi
Yk +
√
Y 2k + 4Xk
αW
In2
2Xk
×
1− √qiAkiBki√
Y 2k + 4Xk
αW
In2
 < 0
Hence, Ii(q) in (3.20) is positive under the condition that both ci and
∑K
k=1 P
∗
iSk
are larger than 0.
Scalability: We show that for all ϑ > 1, ϑI(q) > I(ϑq).
ϑI(q)− I(ϑq) = (ϑ− 1)ci + ϑ
( ∑K
k=1 P
∗
iSk
(ϑq)
∂
∑K
k=1 P
∗
iSk
(ϑq)/∂qi
−
∑K
k=1 P
∗
iSk
(q)
∂
∑K
k=1 P
∗
iSk
(q)/∂qi
)
> 0 (3.22)
where the key is to see whether the second part in (3.22) is positive. Denote Zi(W ) =
∑K
k=1 P
∗
iSk
(q)
∂
∑K
k=1 P
∗
iSk
(q)/∂qi
.
Based on (3.19),
P ∗iSk(ϑq) =
√
AkiBki
ϑqi
√
ϑYk +
√
ϑY 2k + 4Xk
αW
In2
2Xk
−Bki =
√
AkiBki
qi
Yk +
√
Y 2k + 4Xk
αW
ϑIn2
2Xk
−Bki
(3.23)
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Instead of q, ϑ puts an effect to W in (3.23). Hence,
∑K
k=1 P
∗
iSk
(ϑq)
∂
∑K
k=1 P
∗
iSk
(ϑq)/∂qi
= Zi(W/ϑ) (3.24)
The scalability problem becomes to see whether Zi(W/ϑ)− Zi(W ) is positive, where Zi(W ) equals
to
−2qi
∑K
k=1
(√
AkiBki
qi
Yk+
√
Y 2k +4Xk
αW
In2
2Xk
−Bki
)
∑K
k=1
(
1−
√
qiAkiBki√
Y 2k +4Xk
αW
In2
)(√
AkiBki
qi
Yk+
√
Y 2k +4Xk
αW
In2
2Xk
) (3.25)
Through deduction, we conclude that Zi(W ) in (3.25) is monotonic decreasing. Zi(W/ϑ) > Zi(W/ϑ)
for i = 1, 2, · · · , N , the scalability of I(q) is proved.
Monotonicity: If q ≥ q′ , I(q) ≥ I(q′). q ≥ q′ denotes that there at least exists an Ri such that
qi ≥ q
′
i. For any j 6= i,
Ii(qi,q−i) ≥ Ii(q
′
i,q−i) (3.26)
and
Ij(qi,q−i) ≥ Ij(q
′
i,q−i) (3.27)
where q−i denotes the price of other relay nodes except Ri. From (3.26) and (3.27), we see that
the problem becomes to show that ∂Ii(q)/∂qi ≥ 0 and ∂Ij(q)/∂qi ≥ 0. We conclude that above
inequalities are satisfied after deduction process. Therefore, monotonicity property is proved.
Based on the above discussion, we describe the utility maximization process for both the
source and relay nodes in Algorithm 2, which is convergent according to Theorem 1.
Algorithm 2: Utility Maximization in CUS Game
Input: convergence threshold ξ
Output: P∗rk ,q
∗
1 Set the initial price qi(0) = ci, i = 1, 2, · · · , N ;
2 Set the initial power PiSk = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , N, k = 1, 2, · · · ,K;
3 while 1T |q(n+1) − q(n)| ≤ ξ do
4 Compute PiSk based on (3.19) for k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, i = 1, 2, · · · , N ;
5 Update q(n+1) according to (3.21);
6 end
7 Compute PiSk given q(n);
8 return q∗ = q(n), P
∗
rk = Prk ;
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3.5 Utility Maximization in CKS GAME
In this section, we consider the CKS game. According to (3.8), instead of being a constant,
the capacity of the wiretap link is affected by the power PiSk . Therefore, the algorithm applied in
CUS game cannot be used here to get the optimal strategies for the source and relay nodes.
3.5.1 Relay Selection
Since relay nodes have different local CSIs and ask for different unit prices for helping the
same source node, each source node has its own preference on the relay nodes.
Denote θi = |hid|2/|hie|2 = γid/γie as the ratio of the power gain between the Ri-D and
Ri-E links. When the secrecy capacity is positive, Csec,k in (3.8) is rewritten as,
Csec,k = W log2(1 +
N∑
i=1
PSkPiSkγSkiθiγie
1 + PSkγSki + PiSkθiγie
)−W log2(1 +
N∑
i=1
PSkPiSkγSkiγie
1 + PSkγSki + PiSkγie
) (3.28)
By setting the Csec,k’s derivative with respect to θi,
∂Csec,k
∂θi
=
W
ln2
1
(1 +
∑N
i=1
PSkPiSkγSkiθiγie
1+PSkγSki+PiSkθiγie
)
× PSkPiSkγSkiγie(1 + PSkγSki)
(1 + PSkγSki + PiSkθiγie)
2
> 0. (3.29)
We see Csec,k is increasing with θi and Csec,k = 0 only if θi = 1, i = 1, 2, · · · , N . Thus, to secure the
data transmission, relay IoT nodes with a higher power gain on the wiretap link will be discarded.
The remaining relay IoT nodes forms a new set L = {R1, R2, · · · RL}.
3.5.2 Stage II: Power Equilibrium
Similar to that in CUS game, the source node Sk is considered. Its secrecy capacity is
ensured to be positive with selected feasible relay IoT nodes. Given their unit price q, the utility
maximization problem (3.15) in State II becomes,
max
Prk
αCsec,k(Prk)−
∑L
i=1
qiPiSk
s.t. 0 ≤ PiSk ≤ Pi,max/K, i = 1, 2, · · · , L (3.30)
Csec,k(Prk) > C0 (3.31)
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Motivated by [171], we combine the penalty function method and the differential convex program-
ming (DC programming) to maximize (3.30), which is equivalent to,
minPrk
∑L
i=1
qiPiSk − αCsec(Prk) (3.32)
3.5.2.1 Obtaining Exact Penalty
To simplify the minimization, penalty function method [20] is deployed to merge the con-
straint (3.31) into the objective function, which transforms the original problem to,
minPrk
∑N
i=1
qiPiSk − αCsec(Prk) + βmC+(Prk)
0 ≤ PiSk ≤ Pi,max/K, i = 1, 2, · · · , L (3.33)
where the penalty function C+(Prk) is constructed as,
C+(Prk) = max{−Csec(Prk) + C0, 0} (3.34)
where βm is a suitable penalty factor. Based on [171], there exists β > 0 such that for every βm > β
the problem in (3.32) is equivalent to the penalty problem in (3.33), which can be solved given βm
using DC programming. Since a larger βm may increase the difficulty to solve the penalty problem,
we start βm with a small value and scale it up by a scaling factor d > 1 to make the problems (3.32)
and (3.33) equivalent. The algorithm to obtain the exact penalty factor is as follows.
Algorithm 3: Obtaining Exact Penalty
Input: Pricing q, convergence threshold ε, the index of update m, and the maximum allowed
number of m, Mε
Output: Prk(q)
1 Choose an initial value β0, set m = 0 and C
+(Prk)
(β0) = R0;
2 while βmC
+(Prk)
(βm) < ε or n > Nξ do
3 Given βm, using DC Programing algorithm to solve (3.33) to otain the optimal Prk
(βm);
4 Calculate βmC
+(Prk)
(βm);
5 βm+1 = dβm;
6 m = m+ 1;
7 end
8 return Prk(q) = Prk
(βm);
Theorem 2. Algorithm 3 is convergent.
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Proof: Assume (3.33) is solvable. Then Prk
(βm) and Prk
(βm+1) are the optimal solutions of (3.33)
given βm and βm+1, respectively. We have:
L∑
i=1
qiP
(βm)
iSk
− αCsec(Prk)(βm) + βmC+(Prk)(βm) ≤
L∑
i=1
qiP
(βm+1)
iSk
− αCsec(Prk)(βm+1) + βmC+(Prk)(βm+1),
and
L∑
i=1
qiP
(βm+1)
iSk
− αCsec(Prk)(βm+1) + βm+1C+(Prk)(βm+1)
≤
L∑
i=1
qiP
(βm)
iSk
− αCsec(Prk)(βm) + βm+1C+(Prk)(βm)
respectively. By adding the above two inequalities, we get,
C+(Prk)
(βm+1) ≤ C+(Prk)(βm) (3.35)
Since C+(Prk) is decreasing, Algorithm 3 is convergent.
3.5.2.2 Solving Penalty Problem
Given the penalty factor βm, we introduce an auxiliary variable t ∈ R and reformulate as,
min
Prk
U
′
Sk
(Prk) =
N∑
i=1
qiPiSk − αCsec,k(Prk) + βm(t+ Cek(Prk))
s.t.− Cdk(Prk) + C0 ≤ t
− Cek(Prk) ≤ t
0 ≤ PiSk ≤ Pi,max/K, i = 1, 2, · · · , L
For convenience, we denote the feasible set as
S = {(Prk , t) : −Cdk(Prk) + C0 ≤ t,−Cek(Prk) ≤ t,Prk ∈ S, t ∈ R} (3.36)
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By dividing the objective function into two convex functions,
U
′
Sk
(Prk , t) = US1(Prk , t)− US2(Prk) (3.37)
where
US1(Prk , t) =
N∑
i=1
qiPiSk − αCdk(Prk) + βmt (3.38)
and
US2(Prk) = −(βm + α)Cek(Prk) (3.39)
The problem in (3.33) is a standard DC programming problem now. We solve it iteratively with a
sequential convex program,
min
(Prk ,t)∈S
US1(Prk , t)− US2(Prk (n))− < ∇US2(Prk (n)),Prk −Prk (n) > (3.40)
In particular, ∇US2(Prk) =
(
∂US2
∂Pr1
, ∂US2∂Pr2 , · · · ,
∂US2
∂PrN
)
in (3.40) represents the gradient with respect
to Prk , where
∂US2
∂PiSk
= −W (βm + α)
ln 2
γSkiγiePSk (1+γSkiPSk )
(1+γSkiPSk+γiePiSk )
2(
1 +
∑i=L
i=1
PSkPiSkγSkiγie
1+PSkγSki+PiSkγie
)2 (3.41)
We propose Algorithm 4 to minimize the objective function in (3.40). According to [143], the
U
′
Sk
(Prk (n+1)) obtained is decreasing, and thus Algorithm 4 is convergent.
Algorithm 4: DC Programing Algorithm
Input: PSk , βm, convergence threshold ξ,Nξ
Output: Prk
(βm)
1 Set the initial value Prk (n) = c and n = 0;
2 Compute U
′
Sk
(Prk (0)) ;
3 while |U
′
Sk
(Prk (n+1))− U
′
Sk
(Prk (n))| ≤ ξ or n > Nξ do
4 Based on U
′
Sk
(Prk (n)), solving (3.40) to obtain Prk (n+1) using convex programming;
5 Calculate U
′
Sk
(Prk (n+1));
6 n = n+ 1;
7 end
8 return Prk
(βm) = Prk (n);
Since both Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4 are convergent, the power equilibrium for each
source node is obtained given the price of relay nodes.
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3.5.3 Stage I: Optimal Pricing
Similar to that in the CUS game, we update the price of each relay node as in (3.20). In
practice, each selected relay node Ri listens to the instantaneous feedback information about P
∗
iSk
and ∂P ∗iSk/∂pi from the source node. In addition, it is natural for each relay node to regulate the
unit price of its power as qi = ci, because a lower price qi will result in a negative utility Ui while a
higher price qi would be at the risk of being excluded by the source node at the beginning.
3.6 Performance Analysis and Evaluation
In this section, we analyze the complexity for both the CUS and CKS game and evaluate
their performance by both the simulations and experiments using real-world dataset.
3.6.1 Complexity Analysis
3.6.1.1 CUS Game (CUSG)
The problem of obtaining the strategies for both the source nodes and relay IoT nodes can
be divided into two subproblems iteratively. First, for the utility maximization of source nodes, the
optimal power is easily obtained according to Algorithm 2. Second, for the utility maximization of
relay IoT nodes, the key to the price update is to calculate the partial derivative with respect to
the unit price. Even if there are multiple relay IoT nodes, the source node updates the price for
relay IoT nodes at one time and does not have to interact with each relay IoT node individually [90].
Hence, the expense of the communication between the source and relay IoT nodes is largely reduced.
3.6.1.2 CKS Game (CKSG)
The problem of obtaining the strategies for both the source and relay nodes is divided
into three subproblems hierarchically. From Algorithm 3, Algorithm 4, and the Eq (3.20), the
computational complexity of the proposed utility maximization method heavily depends on the
DC programming and the derivatives with respect to the unit price of each relay IoT node. Since
the convex subproblem in DC programming can be solved by many standard convex optimization
methods, the utility maximization problem for the source node given the unit price can be easily
solved.
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3.6.2 Performance Evaluation Settings
To demonstrate the feasibility of our proposed game-theoretical approaches, we conduct
both simulations and experiments using real-world datasets under both wiretap-link CSI known
and unknown cases. In the wiretap-link CSI known case, we mainly consider the secrecy capacity
performance, while the price, the power, and utilities of the source/relay nodes are focused in the
wiretap-link CSI unknown case.
3.6.2.1 Simulation Setting
We mainly consider the following three cases, Single-Source Single-Relay (SSSR), Single-
Source Multiple-Relay (SSMR), and Multiple-Source Multiple-Relay (MSMR), where we choose 2
nodes in the multiple source/relay cases. Note that these can be easily extended into the scenario
with more than two source/relay nodes. The simulation settings are give in Fig. 3.3a and Tab. 3.2.
Simulation Parameter Values
maximum power of the source node 10mW
maximum power of the relay IoT node 100mW
variance of the noise σ2 10−8
path loss of the static Rayleigh channel 2
transmission bandwidth W 1 (Normalization)
gain per unit of secrecy capacity α 0.01
unit cost of transmission power ci 0.01
secrecy capacity constraint in CKSG 0.01bit/s/Hz
supreme secrecy capacity in CUSG 1bit/s/Hz
Figure 3.2: System Parameters in Simulation
3.6.2.2 Experiment Setting
We use the data from 54 sensors deployed in the Intel Berkeley Research lab [1] as shown in
Fig. 3.3b. These sensors collect timestamped topology information, along with humidity, tempera-
ture, light and voltage values once every 31 seconds. We consider one of the circles surrounded by 26
nodes (No.3, No.6, and No.10-33). In addition, we assume there is a destination node located at the
center of the circle (10m, 15m). An eavesdropper (12m, 18m) near the destination node attempts to
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intercept the sensed data information from all the source nodes.
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Figure 3.3: System Settings
3.6.3 Security Performance in CKSG
The secrecy capacity performance in the CKSG simulation is demonstrated in Fig.3.4, where
‘x-coordinate’ and ‘y-coordinate’ in Fig.3.4a and Fig. 3.4b denote the location of relay nodes. The
‘Distance’ represents the horizontal location difference between the source node S1 and relay nodes.
For SSSR scenario, S1 is fixed and R2 is moving in the red area in Fig.3.3a. For SSMR scenario, a
new relay IoT node R1 is introduced, which is fixed at the location (50m, 0m). Extending to MSMR
scenario, the source node S2 is added and fixed at the location (0m, 50m).
3.6.3.1 Effect of Multiple Relay Nodes
The location of R2 has a strong effect on the secrecy capacity as shown in Fig.3.4a and
Fig.3.4b. Particularly, when R2 is near the destination node, the secrecy capacity is largely improved.
This is because the power gain ratio between the relay-destination link and the relay-eavesdropper
link increases as R2 moves to the destination node. Besides, the comparison between Fig.3.4a and
Fig.3.4b demonstrates that the introduction of R1 increases the total secrecy capacity. Since R1
close to the destination node D instead of the eavesdropper E, it can help forward the data from
S1 while preventing it from being intercepted by the eavesdropper. The security performance is
improved.
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3.6.3.2 Effect of Multiple Source Nodes
Fig.3.4c compares the secrecy capacity performance under the SSMR and MSMR scenarios,
which shows that bringing in extra source nodes deteriorates the security performance. When the
relay node R2 moves from the source node to the destination node, the total secrecy capacity MSMR
is first smaller then surpasses that in SSMR. This is because the power gain on the S2-R1-D link
is less than that on the S2-R1-E link. When R2 gets over to the (50m, 0m), the power gain on the
S2-R1-D link is larger than that on the S2-R1-E link. The total secrecy capacity begins to increase.
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Figure 3.4: Security Performance in CKSG
3.6.3.3 Main-to-Eavesdropper Link Ratio Effect
We draw the relationship between the utility of the source node and the power gain ratio in
SSMR scenario in Fig.3.4d, where y-coordinate of the relay node R2 is assumed to be 0. In Fig.3.4d,
the power gain ratio θ brings a positive effect to the source node utility. When θ ≤ 1, the utility
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of the source node keeps 0, which shows that the relay selection in the CKS game is infeasible. In
addition, the source node’ utility is still 0 even if θ > 1. Since the source node has to purchase the
power from each relay node, it has to get a larger secrecy capacity in order to ensure its utility. In
contrast to that in Fig.3.4b, the source node’s utility gets maximized when R2 is in the middle of
the source and destination node. When R2 is near to the destination node, it uses less power to
forward the data. To get more benefits, R2 requests a higher unit price, which decreases the utility
of the source node. When R2 is near the source node, it has to use more power for transmission.
According to Eq.(3.15), the source node’s utility is thus decreased.
3.6.4 Utility Performance in CUSG
In this subsection, we demonstrate the utility performance for both the source and relays
nodes in CUSG. In particular, we keep the location of S1, D and E while changing the location
of S2 and R1 to (0m, 25m) and (50m, 25m), respectively, in both SSMR and MSMR scenarios.
Meanwhile, we suppose R1 in SSSR scenario and R2 in other scenarios are moving from (20m, 25m)
to (80m, 25m) in a straight line to see the changes on the price, power and utility of both source
and relay nodes.
3.6.4.1 Effect of Multiple Relay Nodes
Fig.3.5 compares the performance in all ways between SSSR and SSMR scenarios. Particu-
larly, we show the effect brought by the moving relay node R2 in SSMR scenarios. Specifically, due
to competition, introducing a new relay IoT node lowers the power unit price obviously as shown
in Fig.3.5a. In the SSSR scenario, the source node purchases a smaller amount of power from the
relay IoT node since the power is too expensive. Whereas in the SSMR and MSMR scenarios, the
low power unit price stimulates the source nodes to purchase more power. Meanwhile, owing to
the energy harvesting, the relay IoT nodes can use their power to forward the data from the source
nodes as much as possible as shown in Fig.3.5b. As a result, the power unit price and power quantity
co-determine the utility of the source and relay nodes shown in Fig.3.5c and Fig.3.5d, where the
introduction of the relay nodes increases the utility of source nodes and brings a slightly negative
effect on other relay IoT nodes.
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(a) Power Unit Price (b) Total Power Quantity
(c) Total Source Node Utility (d) Total Relay Node Utility
Figure 3.5: Comparison between SSSR and SSMR in CUSG
3.6.4.2 Mutual Effect among Relay Nodes
We mainly consider the SSMR scenarios, where R1 is fixed at (50m, 25m) and R2 is moving.
When R2 is close to S1, it uses more power to forward the S1’s data. Thus, a low power unit price
is enough to get a high utility for R2. Since S1 buys less power from R1, R1 has to increase its unit
price to maximize its utility. However, as R2 is moving far away from S1, it sells less power to S1.
R2 has to increase the power unit price. Seeing that R2 increases its unit price, R1 also increases its
own price as shown in Fig.3.6a. As a result, both R1’ power unit price and the power quantity sold
to S1 change even if it does not move as reflected in Fig.3.6a and Fig.3.6b. Obviously, the utility of
R2 is increasing when it is close to S1 while becoming less as it is moving to D as shown in Fig.3.6c.
Given less power and more unit price, the utility of the source node decreases as demonstrated in
Fig.3.6d.
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3.6.4.3 Effect of Multiple Source Nodes
The performance in all ways between SSMR and MSMR scenarios is compared in Fig.3.6,
where Fig.3.6a and 3.6b show the changes of power unit price and quantity when introducing a new
source node S2. Suppose each relay node has enough harvested energy to forward the source nodes’
data. Compared to the distance to S1, R2 is always close to S2. R2 sells more power to S2 than to
S1. As R2 continues moving, such distance difference becomes less. The power sold to S1 and S2 is
almost the same. That is why the power quantity sold to S1 and S2 is similar for R1. With more
source nodes, the competition between relay IoT nodes becomes more fierce. Both relay nodes would
like to sell more power to source nodes, which benefits source nodes’ utilities. As shown in Fig.3.6d,
the utility of each source node is more in MSMR scenario compared to that in SSMR scenario. Since
each relay node sells more power with almost the same unit price, they get more utilities as shown
in Fig.3.6c.
(a) Power Unit Price (b) Total Power Quantity
(c) Total Relay Node Utility (d) Total Source Node Utility
Figure 3.6: Comparison between SSMR and MSMR in CUSG
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3.6.5 Real-world Experimental Results
To show the performance of CKSG and CUSG, we conduct the experiment using real-world
dataset as shown in Fig.3.7. We first verify the effect brought by multiple relay IoT nodes in
CKSG. The total secrecy capacity of all the 26 participating source nodes is illustrated in Fig.3.7a.
Obviously, the introduction of more relay nodes indeed improves the security performance when the
wire-tap link CSI is known. Note that we assume at most 10 relay IoT nodes help forward data.
With more relay nodes, the interference among them would deteriorate the data transmission. In
CUSG, the competition among relay nodes increases the power unit price as given in Fig.3.7b. As
power unit price becomes larger, the source nodes will not purchase more power. Thus, the average
source node utility is increasing and then decreasing as more relay IoT nodes help forward the data
as shown in Fig.3.7c.
(a) Secrecy Capacity in CKSG (b) Power Unit Price (CUSG) (c) Source Node Utility (CUSG)
Figure 3.7: Experimental Results
3.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we design a cooperative IoT system for ensuring the communication security.
To benefit the relays in forwarding the data for defending the eavesdropping attack, we propose two
Stackelberg games, namely CUS game and CKS game, working under the wiretap-link CSI unknown
and known cases, respectively. Our simulation and experiment results show that the game-theoretical
approach will improve the utility of source nodes and defend against the eavesdropping attack, and
thus enhances the security for IoT systems.
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Chapter 4
Motivating Human-enabled Mobile
Participation for Data Offloading
4.1 Chapter Overview
The soaring popularity of mobile devices enables people to communicate with their social
ties at any time and from anywhere. People use mobile apps to create and exchange a huge amount
of data with their social interactions in cyberspace. Reports warn that monthly global mobile data
traffic will surpass 48.3 EB per month by 2021 [37]. Although cellular network operators exploit
their efforts to provide better services in terms of higher data rate and lower costs, users are still
facing poor performance in their daily life, especially in some crowded areas, such as football stadi-
ums, theme parks, and airports. However, the above crowded areas are the places that highly need
reliable wireless communication, e.g., broadcasting evacuation information for safety purpose. As a
promising solution, mobile data offloading takes advantages of small cell, Wi-Fi, and opportunistic
communication to pro-actively reduce the data traffic targeted for cellular networks [89]. Unfortu-
nately, although various types of mobile offloading schemes have been proposed in both academia
and industry, we are still lacking effective methods. For example, utilizing small cells is not an
effective method due to the scarcity of licensed spectrum bandwidths. Even worse, deploying more
small cells will incur significant costs. Regarding Wi-Fi offloading, the service provider has access to
much larger free spectrum to cater the Wi-Fi deployment. However, Wi-Fi offloading cannot pro-
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vide guaranteed QoS, and Wi-Fi-enabled devices may experience increased battery drainage since
it has to operate on two different radio interfaces [11]. To perform mobile offloading, opportunistic
communication has been identified as another approach, which increases communication chances
by utilizing the potential social connections among users and thus is beneficial to deliver contents.
In particular, some works [61, 87] apply social-based approaches to help data dissemination among
social ties or users with similar social profiles. Apparently, the opportunistic communication is not
reliable for data delivery in an ad hoc mode because there is lack of incentives for source users to
coordinate the data dissemination. Clearly, mobile offloading has not been well developed nor widely
applied.
Facing these challenges and existing solutions, we take a step further to reconsider the
human-enabled approach for mobile offloading, which takes human social behaviors and human ac-
tivities into consideration. Intuitively, users with similar social interests often group together at
certain location [158], which potentially results in similar content requests. For example, users
gathered in specific attractions in the Disneyland may request the similar contents related to those
attractions. When they request similar contents, network congestion would be caused due to limited
bandwidth. Such congestion potentially prevents users from getting their requested contents. The
above phenomenon leads us to consider how to avoid repeated requests/retrievals in order to reduce
the number of accesses to the service provider (SP). A possible solution is to leverage users’ similar
social attributes to design a human-enabled data offloading scheme. In sociology [134], homophily
phenomenon describes that people with more similar attributes contact more frequently than com-
plete strangers. The interactions between users with more contacts bring more social effect, which
captures the advantages of word-of-mouth communication [29]. Specifically, users typically form
their opinions about the quality of the contents based on the information they obtain from other
users. Thus, when a user demands more contents, his social friends would also request more contents
due to the similarity of their interests. Meanwhile, users with identical attributes could share their
contents with each other using free device-to-device (D2D) communication. As for human activities,
an observation is that users in crowded areas either walk around or go to their interested attractions.
Hence, we can take advantage of the mobility of users to alleviate the congestion.
In this work, we propose a human-enabled mobile participation approach in data
offloading by introducing a mobile caching user (MCU), who bridges the gap between the SP and
users when the above congestion happens. Qur approach is mainly divided into two steps. In
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the first step, we consider the data offloading between the MCU and the representing users (RUs)
with similar content requests in crowded areas. Specifically, an MCU pre-caches a number of large
volume contents in advance. After receiving congestion information (e.g., congestion area, requested
contents, .etc) from the SP, the MCU chooses a specific crowded area where requested contents are
similar with his own interests and is near to his current location, physically moves to the RUs in the
chosen area and transfers the contents to them. In the second step, the RUs with obtained contents
further disseminate content copies via D2D communication to other users opportunistically, who have
the identical content requests with them. We mainly consider the first step, where delay-tolerant
scenario and delay-sensitive scenario are discussed. In the delay-tolerant scenario, RUs would like to
wait until they download the requested contents. Whereas in the delay-sensitive scenario, RUs are
urgent to get the requested contents. They will be more dissatisfied with the increasing of the waiting
time. Compared to traditional data offloading approaches, the proposed approach is significantly
cheaper than the small cell build-out. Moreover, by physically moving to the crowd, the MCU makes
data transmission more reliable and flexible than either Wi-Fi or pure D2D communication.
To motivate above human-enabled mobile participation, we design an incentive mechanism.
While participating in human-enabled data offloading, the MCU spends a few time in moving and
consumes his own resources such as battery and storage. Hence, he would not be interested in
it unless he receives a satisfying revenue. As for RUs, they not only get the originally requested
contents, but also harvest additional contents they may be interested in due to the similarity of
their interests with other RUs, which largely improves their satisfactions. Since RUs request similar
contents and pay for them individually, it is reasonable to assume that RUs are selfish and rational.
Hence, each RU only wants to maximize his own satisfaction. To increase the MCU’s total revenue
and provide RUs’ satisfaction, we will thoroughly investigate RUs‘ content requests, social effect,
delay effect, and unit payment strategy for both the MCU and RUs in the proposed incentive
mechanism.
Our Contributions: We highlight our major contributions as follows,
• We propose a new data offloading scheme that takes advantages of both homophily phe-
nomenon and mobile participation to greatly reduce the congestion in crowded areas where
users with similar interests are normally grouped together.
• Specifically, we consider two system models: the delay-tolerant model and the delay-sensitive
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model. In both models, by considering RUs’ interactions, we formulate the communication
between the MCU and RUs as a two-stage Stackelberg game. In Stage I, the MCU chooses a
unit payment to maximize his total revenue. In Stage II, each RU chooses a requested content
level given the unit payment to maximize his satisfaction on the received contents.
• For the delay-tolerant scenario, the interactions between RUs bring social effect. We first give
an assumption under which we show the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in
Stage II. Then, we present an effective algorithm to compute the unique Stackelberg equilib-
rium in Stage I, at which the revenue of the MCU is maximized, and none of the RUs continue
requesting contents by unilaterally deviating from his current strategy
• For the delay-sensitive scenario, the interactions between RUs not only bring social effect but
also delay effect. We extend the Stakelberg game to the delay-sensitive model. To alleviate
the serious delay effect, we propose two improved delay-sensitive models by further taking
advantages of users’ mobility, where the first one considers the queueing delay and the other
introduces multiple MCUs.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.2, we briefly review the existing
data offloading approaches, economical incentives for performing data offloading and the social effect
due to similar interests between RUs based on their social relationship. In Section 4.3, we explain
our motivations of leveraging the homophily phenomenon and the mobile participation. Following
with that, a detailed description of our proposed data offloading system models is given in Section
4.4, which are formulated as two-stage Stackelberg games respectively. In Section 4.5, we study the
proposed Stackelberg game in the delay-tolerant scenario. To better adapt to the practical situation,
we extend the Stackelberg game to the delay-sensitive scenario in Section 4.6. In Section 4.7, the
performance of our data offloading approach is evaluated, followed by a conclusion in Section 4.8.
4.2 Related Work
4.2.1 Mobile Data Offloading
Mobile data offloading [11] is a promising way to alleviate traffic congestion and reduce the
energy and bandwidth consumption. For example, Liang et al. in [180] offload their applications
and data from mobile devices to the cloud to improve users’ experience in terms of longer battery
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lifetime, larger data storage, faster processing speed and more powerful security services. Zhang et
al. in [196] offload mobile users’ applications to nearby mobile resource-rich devices (i.e., cloudlets)
in an intermittently connected system to reduce energy consumption and improve performance. In
this chapter, we generally discuss the mobile offloading for cellular networks, which is classified into
two categories [78]. Infrastructure-based mobile data offloading [16] refers to deploying small cell
base stations and Wi-Fi hotspots for mobile users [79, 134]. The connection between mobile users
and the base station is proposed to achieve flow level load balancing under spatially heterogeneous
traffic distributions in [19, 108] . However, the lack of cost-effective backhaul associations for base
station often impairs their performance in terms of offloading mobile traffic. The second category
is the ad-hoc-based mobile traffic offloading, which refers to applying short range communication as
the underlay to offload mobile traffic [61,87,125,164,200].
4.2.2 Economic Incentives for Data Offloading
The above works mainly focus on the technical perspective adoption of data offloading
without considering economic incentives. The incentive issue is significant for the case where Wi-Fi
or small cell is privately owned by third-party entities, who are expected to be reluctant to admit
non-registered users’ traffic without proper incentives [60]. The incentive framework for the so-called
user-initiated data offloading is considered in [86, 140], where users initiate the offloading process
and offer necessary incentives in order to obtain their contents. Gao et.al. in [60] consider the
network-initiated data offloading, where cellular networks initiate the offloading process, and hence
the network operators are responsible for incentivizing Wi-Fi.
4.2.3 Attribute-based Social Effect
The above works do not consider homophily phenomenon [134]. Reingen et al. in [148]
conduct a survey of the members of a sorority in which they measure brand preference congruity as
a function of whether they live in the sorority house. They find that those who live together as a
group have more congruent brand preferences than those who do not. Presumably, living together
provides more opportunities for interaction and communication. Taking a further step, they note
that information obtained from social tie connections will influence in decision making in [28].
The above observations and inference are deployed in several works. In [68,70,71], different
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privacy-preserving authentication schemes for mobile health networks are designed from a social
perspective view. Users in online social networks apply their attributes to find matched friends
and establish social relationships with strangers in [69]. Gong et al. in [65] study users’ behaviors
by jointly considering congestion effect in the physical wireless domain and social effect based on
users’ social relationship. In [34,64], a social group utility maximization framework, which captures
the impact of mobile users’ diverse social ties, is studied. Considering the social effect brought by
social ties among users, different pricing strategies of a monopolist have been studied in [30]. In our
previous work [190], the social effect brought by users’ similar social attributes is deployed to assist
data offloading. However, the introduction of the MCU brings severe delay effect, which negatively
affects the data offloading performance. To alleviate delay effect, we take the queue and multi-leader
Stackelberg game into consideration now, which differentiates our chapter with [65]. We focus on
incentive mechanisms to motivate human-enabled mobile participation for data offloading under
both social effect and severe delay effect.
4.3 Motivations and Preliminaries
4.3.1 Social Enabled Data Offloading
Given a pair of strangers, one cannot push another to help recommend/forward his contents
if they do not have any pre-established relationship. However, comparing with complete strangers,
people may intend to help the one that shares some similarities in terms of attributes, e.g., language,
nationality, affiliation, etc. As discussed in [107], it is a well-accepted nature of human interaction
that people like to interact with those who are similar to themselves, which is often termed the ”like
me” principle. In [72,73], the authors conduct an experiment based on the trace file collected during
the INFOCOM 2006 [154], which analyzes the relationship between the contact rate and the number
of identical attributes. The result shows that the contact rate in terms of the number of contacts
between two users increases with the increment of identical attributes, which further validates the
”like-me” principle. Therefore, a potential social tie can be set up based on the attribute similarity.
Furthermore, Reingen et al. in [28] find that information obtained from strong tie connections are
more influential in decision making than weak tie connections at a micro level (information flows
within dyads or small groups). Motivated by it, content dissemination would be more efficient given
the assumption that more attribute similarities exist between users. In addition, users who share
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similar interests intend to form a group and they can forward messages to others in the group more
efficiently according to [85]. Hence, we infer that the social-enabled content dissemination would be
much more efficient if users apply attribute similarity to form the attribute-similar group.
Motivated by the above discussions, we consider human’s similar social attributes. In the
scenarios where users group together based on their similar social attributes, such as interests, their
requested contents have a higher probability to be similar even identical due to their influence on each
other. Hence, we could select RUs to request contents and further disseminate them to other users
via D2D communication. Thus, users can obtain more interested contents and their satisfactions
are improved.
(a) Potential location in Real Trace (b) Disney Map
Figure 4.1: Potential Location of the MCU
(a) Potential Location vs. Time (b) Locations in Different Time Slot
Figure 4.2: Time Changes vs. Potential Location
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4.3.2 Mobile Participation
We conduct an experiment analyzing human mobility traces using the real data trace file
[151] in order to show the feasibility of mobile participation. The human traces are obtained every 30
seconds from 40 volunteers who spent their Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays in Disney World,
Florida, US. We describe all the locations the volunteers have gone to as shown in Fig.4.1a, in which
we circle the locations that are visited most. By comparing it with the real Disney World map [2] in
Fig.4.1b, we find that those circled locations are exactly the crowded attraction areas, where users
with similar interests get together and request similar contents. For example, at the Rock ’n’ Roller
Coaster Starring Aerosmith attraction, many young visitors who enjoy the trilling feelings group
together and they are more interested in exciting contents. In addition, we draw 17 volunteers’
mobile traces as time changes in Fig.4.2a, which verifies the mobility of volunteers. Meanwhile,
we illustrate volunteers’ locations in different time-slots in Fig.4.2b,where we see that volunteers
are distributed in all crowded attraction areas in each time-slot. Inferring from the observations in
Fig.4.1 and Fig.4.2, we conclude that: 1). volunteers move as time changes; 2), there always exist
volunteers in each attraction in each time-slot. Therefore, leveraging mobile participation is feasible
to achieve content delivery and dissemination.
4.4 System Model and Problem formulation
4.4.1 Overview
To assist the description, we continue the example in Disney World as shown in Fig. 4.3,
where the yellow area is denoted as the Rock ’n’ Roller Coaster Starring Aerosmith attraction. It is
divided into two time-slots. In time-slot 1, no congestion exists in the yellow area. David downloads
numbers of contents and continues to visit other attractions. In time-slot 2, an increasing number
of users with similar interests group together and request for contents related to the attraction,
which results in severe congestion. As a result, users cannot get the requested contents from the
SP. The SP asks David for help via transmitting him the short message related to the congestion
information. Since David is interested in the same attraction and can obtain extra revenue, he
moves back to disseminate the contents after checking the distance availability between himself and
the chosen attraction. He first announces the unit payment for the requested contents. Each RU
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chooses a requested content quantity to maximize his satisfaction based on the unit payment and
other RU’s choices, which is submitted to David. David maximizes the total revenue and computes
the corresponding unit payment which is returned to RUs. Such communication between David
and RUs is processed iteratively until David and RUs reach an agreement, in which David gets the
maximized revenue and RUs satisfy the content obtaining experience. Finally, RUs disseminate their
contents to other users in the crowd via D2D communication.
Time-slot 1 Time-slot 2
 
 
 
Content retrieve
Instruction  transmission
Moving trajectory
Non-congested Subarea
Congested Subarea
Contents
Mobile Caching User
Users
1
2
3
4
5
Access Point
 Content delivery
Figure 4.3: System Model of Mobile Participation
4.4.2 System Model
Depending on RUs’ sensitiveness to the waiting time for the requested contents, two models
are considered: delay-tolerant model and delay-sensitive model.
4.4.2.1 Delay-Tolerant Model
In the delay-tolerant model, RUs do not care their waiting time. Assume a set of RUs
N = {1, 2, · · · , i, · · ·N} group together and cannot get their requested contents from the SP directly,
where N denotes the total number of RUs. Their corresponding requested content level profile is
represented as x = {x1, x2, · · · , xi, · · · , xN}T ∈ [0,∞)N , which quantifies the contents they request
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from the MCU. Let xi ∈ [0,∞) denote the requested content level of the RU i and x−i denote the
requested content levels of other RUs except for the RU i. According to [30], the RU i’s satisfaction
consists of the following two parts: 1), internal characteristics, represented by the maximum internal
demand rate ai > 0 and the internal demand elasticity factor bi > 0. The internal demand rate
represents the maximum satisfaction that each RU gets given unit content level whereas the elasticity
factor measures the sensitivity of the RU’s satisfaction to changes in content levels [31]. 2), external
characteristics, represented by social effect that RU j brings to RU i, quantified by gij > 0, ∀j ∈ N
and j 6= i. Since utility is a terminology in game theory and economics to represent the satisfaction
experienced by the consumer of a good [176], the satisfaction of each RU is quantified by utility
hereinafter. Given the unit payment p the MCU charges RUs, the utility of RU i is quantified as,
ui(xi,x−i, p) = aixi −
1
2
bix
2
i +
∑
j 6=i
gijxixj − pxi,∀i (4.1)
The quadratic form in (4.1) not only allows for tractable analysis but also serves a good
second-order approximation for a broad class of concave utility functions [30].
Given RUs’ requested content levels, the total revenue of the MCU is,
R (x, p) =
∑
i∈N
(p− c)xi (4.2)
where c is the unit cost the MCU spends when transmitting contents to RUs, including energy and
move consumption.
4.4.2.2 Intuitive Delay-Sensitive Model
Due to the difference of RUs’ requested contents, the MCU moves to RUs and delivers
contents to them one by one. As a result, each RU has to wait for the content transmission from
the MCU when multiple RUs request contents. If they are urgent to obtain the requested contents,
their utilities would be lowered due to long waiting time.
Assume RUs do not know the transmission order of the MCU in advance. Each RU would
consider the worst case that he is the last one to receive the contents. To clearly show the time
delay effect, we assume the transmission rates between the MCU and RUs are normalized and the
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same. The utility of the RU i in the delay-sensitive model is,
ui (xi,x−i, p) = aixi −
1
2
bixi
2 +
∑
j∈N
gijxixj −
1
2
d
(∑
j∈N
xj
)2
− pxi,∀i (4.3)
where d is the delay effect coefficient determined by the SP. Compared (4.3) with (4.1), the social
relationship between RUs brings not only positive social effect but also severe delay effect in the
intuitive delay-sensitive model.
The total revenue of the MCU keeps unchanged,
R (x, p) =
∑
i∈N
(p− c)xi. (4.4)
4.4.2.3 Queue Delay-Sensitive Model
The potential assumption in the above intuitive delay-sensitive model is that the MCU
begins transmission after the SP receives content requests from all RUs. If the SP can predict the
potential congestion effect at some locations, it could arrange the MCU to move to these locations
in advance instead of asking the MCU for help after congestion effect appears. Because the SP keeps
the historical data monitoring records, the above assumption is easily satisfied. Thus, when an RU
broadcasts a content request, the MCU could transmit the content to him on time. Simultaneously,
the content requests from other RUs continuously arrive at the MCU. Content transmission from
the MCU to RUs forms a First In First Out (FIFO) queue model in Fig. 4.4. The notations are
listed in Table. 4.1.
Waiting
Data 
Transmitting
nR
1nR  1nU 
2nU 2nR
1nR nC
1n nC R 
nU
1nU 
Leaving 
User
(Time)
nt
n nt T(                 )
(                 )
1
Figure 4.4: M/G/1 Queue in Delay-Sensitive Model
In the queue delay-sensitive model, we assume the levels of newly arrival requested contents
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Table 4.1: Notations in M/G/1 Queue
Symbols Meaning
Rn
the remaining requested content levels in the queue
after the content delivery to user n
Tn the content transmission period for user n
Cn
the content requests newly coming to the queue
while user n+ 1 is receving the requested contents
tn the time at which the content transmission for user n is finished
tn + Tn the time at which the content transmission for user n+ 1 is finished
Cn in a finite interval of length t follows the Poisson distribution with mean arrival rate λ: P{Cn =
j|Tn = t} = (λt)
j
j! e
−λt. The Poisson process is a viable model when contents originate from a large
population of independent RUs. Due to the similar interests of RUs at the same location, most of
their requested content levels distribute in the same interval. Given unit content transmission speed,
the content transmission time is modeled to follow the Gaussian distribution with mean µ 0 and
variance σ2. Assume the traffic intensity ρ = λ/µ < 1 for stability. Based on Pollaczek-Khinchin
(P-K) formula [17], the expected RU waiting time Wq for each RU is,
Wq =
ρ2 + λ2σ2
2λ(1− ρ)
(4.5)
Considering the waiting time, each RU’s utility becomes,
ûi (x̂i, x̂−i, p̂) = aix̂i −
1
2
bix̂
2
i +
∑
j∈N
gij x̂ix̂j − k
ρ2 + λ2σ2
2λ(1− ρ)
− p̂x̂i,∀i (4.6)
where k is the congestion coefficient. According to the historical records, the SP can predict the
traffic mean arrival rate λ. One observation is that contents related to each attraction are time-
invariant. Thus, the SP could also evaluate the current traffic intensity ρ. Since different RUs
request contents when congestion effect happens, the variance σ2 is unknown. Point estimation [43]
is applied to estimate σ2,
σ̂2 =
1
N − 1
∑
j∈N
(
x̂j −
1
N
∑
m∈N
x̂m
)2
(4.7)
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Substitute (4.7) into (4.6), the utility becomes,
ûi (x̂i, x̂−i, p̂) = aix̂i−
1
2
bix̂
2
i+
∑
j∈N
gij x̂ix̂j−k
ρ2
2λ(1− ρ)
−k λ
2(1− ρ)
1
N − 1
∑
j∈N
(
x̂j −
1
N
∑
m∈N
x̂m
)2
−p̂x̂i,∀i
(4.8)
The total revenue of the MCU is the same as that in the intuitive delay-sensitive model.
4.4.2.4 Multi-leader Delay-Sensitive Model
Another observation in the intuitive delay-sensitive model is that only a single MCU satisfies
RUs’ content requests. If multiple MCUs cooperatively transmit contents to RUs simultaneously,
the waiting time for each RU is reduced. Therefore, we extend to the case where multiple MCUs
assist content transmission.
Assume there are M MCUs denoted by M = {m1,m2, · · · ,mM}. Each RU is assigned to
the nearest MCU. Denote Ii,m = 0, 1, i ∈ N ,m ∈ M as the connection indicator between RU i and
MCU m. In particular, Ii,m = 1 implicits MCU m transmits contents to RU i. Otherwise, there is
no connection between them. Meanwhile, each RU is restricted to connect one MCU whereas each
MCU serves multiple RUs,
∑
m∈M Ii,m = 1. All the Ii,m compose a indicator matrix I. Given the
locations of both RUs and MCUs, the indicator matrix is known. Denote the number of RUs served
by the MCU mi, i = 1, 2, · · · ,M as nmi . To ease the description, we put the RUs served by the same
MCU together and reorder the RU set as N = {x1, · · · , xnm1 , xnm1+1, · · · , xnm1+nm2 , · · · , xN} with∑
mi∈M nmi = N .
Because the introduction of multiple MCUs divides RUs into smaller piles whereas the
M/G/1 queue model adapts to the case with a large number of RUs better. Taking the indicator
matrix I into consideration, we model the utilities based on the intuitive delay-sensitive model
instead of the queue model. The utility of each RU is,
ũi (x̃i, x̃−i, p̃) = aix̃i−
1
2
bix̃
2
i +
∑
j∈N
gij x̃ix̃j−
1
2
d̃
M∑
m=1
Ii,m
(∑
j∈N
Ij,mx̃j
)2
−
M∑
m=1
p̃mx̃i,∀i (4.9)
where p̃ = {p11Tnm1 , p21
T
nm2
, · · · , pM1TnmM }
T is the unit payment vector corresponding to each RU.
Specifically, 1nmi represents nmi × 1 vector with 1s, and p̃m is the unit payment at the MCU m.
Since MCUs serve different RU piles, their unit payments are different.
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Accordingly, the revenue of each MCU is,
R̃m (x̃, p̃m) =
∑
i∈N
(p̃m − c) Ii,mx̃i,∀m ∈M (4.10)
Because all MCUs cooperate to offload data, they aim to achieve the maximum total revenue,
R̃ (x̃, p̃) =
∑
m∈M
∑
i∈N
(p̃m − c) Ii,mx̃i. (4.11)
4.5 Utility Maximization in Delay-tolerant Model
4.5.1 Overview
In game theory, Stackelberg game [58] is a tool to model the scenario where a hierarchy of
actions exists between two types of players: one is the leader, and the other is the follower. The
leader makes its move first. After the leader chooses a strategy, the follower always chooses the best
response strategy that maximizes its utility. Knowing this reaction from the follower, the leader
strategically chooses a strategy to maximize its utility. This optimal strategy of the leader, together
with the corresponding best response strategy of the follower, constitutes a Stackelberg equilibrium.
At a Stackelberg equilibrium, no follower has an incentive to adjust its strategy unilaterally.
The communication between the MCU and RUs in the delay-tolerant scenario can be formu-
lated as such a two-stage Stackelberg game, named as Utility Maximization game in delay-tolerant
(UMDT).
Stage I (Unit Payment) The MCU chooses a unit payment p∗ to maximize the total
revenue R,
p∗ = arg max
p∈[0,∞)
∑
i∈N
xi(p− c)
Stage II (Requested Content Level) Each RU i ∈ N chooses a requested content level
xi to maximize the utility ui (xi,x−i, p) given the unit payment p and the requested content levels
of others x−i,
x∗i = arg max
xi∈[0,∞)
ui (xi,x−i, p) ,∀i
In the UMDT game, the MCU is the leader with the unit payment p∗ as the strategy and
RUs are the followers. The strategy of RU i is the requested content level x∗i , ∀i. Due to each
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RU is selfish, the game in Stage II is considered as a non-cooperative game, which we call Request
Level Determination (RLD) game. Given the UMDT formulation, we are interested in the following
questions:
• Q1: For a given unit payment p, is there a profile of stable strategies in the RLD game such
that no RU can increase the utility by unilaterally changing his current strategy?
• Q2: If the answer to Q1 is affirmative, is the stable strategy profile unique? When it is unique,
RUs will be guaranteed to select the strategies in the same stable strategy profile.
• Q3: How can the MCU select the value of p to maximize the total revenue?
The stable strategy profile in Q1 corresponds to the concept of Nash equilibrium [58].
DEFINITION 4. Nash equilibrium: A profile of strategies x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the RLD
game if for any mobile RU i
ui(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i, p) ≥ ui(xi,x∗−i, p) (4.12)
for any xi ≥ 0, where ui is defined in (4.1).
The existence (Q1) and uniqueness (Q2) of a stable Nash equilibrium strategy profile not
only ensure that no RU has an incentive to make a change unilaterally but also allow the MCU
to predict the behaviors of RUs and thus to select the optimal unit payment. The answer to Q3
depends heavily on those to Q1 and Q2. Stackelberg equilibrium, which is the final solution to the
UMDT game, consists of the optimal solution computed in Q3 and the corresponding strategies at
the Nash equilibrium in the RLD game.
4.5.2 RU Utility Maximization
Backward reduction methods [58] are deployed to maximize the utilities of both RUs and
MCUs. We answer above Q1 and Q2 first, followed by an algorithm to find the RUs’ best response
strategies in the RLD game.
DEFINITION 5. Best Response Strategy: Given p and x−i, a strategy is RU i’s best response
strategy, denoted by βi(x−i), if it maximizes the utility function ui(xi,x−i, p) in (4.1), over all
xi ≥ 0.
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Based on the definition of Nash equilibrium, every RU plays his best response strategy at
a Nash equilibrium. By setting the derivative ∂ui(xi,x−i,pi)∂xi = 0 as the first order condition in (4.1),
we obtain the RU i’s best response strategy,
βi (x−i) = max
{
0,
ai − p
bi
+
∑
j 6=i
gij
bi
xj
}
,∀i (4.13)
in which the max operation is to ensure RU i’s strategy non-negative. Each RU’s best response
strategy consists of two parts: internal demand (ai − p)/bi which is independent of other RUs,
and external demand
∑
j 6=i
gij
bi
xj indicating the social effect other RUs bring to the RU i. The
coefficient gij/bi represents the marginal increase of RU i’s requested content level when RU j’s
requested content level increases. It implies that the increase of other RUs’ strategies has a positive
impact on the RU i’s strategy.
4.5.2.1 Existence and Uniqueness of RUs’ Best Response Strategies — the Answers
to Q1 and Q2
Since each RU has a great incentive to unboundedly increase the requested content levels
provided other RUs’ request levels are sufficiently large, the Nash equilibrium cannot be ensured to
exist. To circumvent such situation, we give a general assumption under which a Nash equilibrium
exists.
Assumption 1.
∑
j 6=i
gij
bi
< 1,∀i.
The Assumption 1 is a sufficient condition for the existence of RUs‘ best response strategies.
Assume that the maximum requested content level among all the other RUs is x
′
j . Under the
Assumption 1, the external demand is
∑
j 6=i
gij
bi
xj ≤
∑
j 6=i
gij
bi
x
′
j < x
′
j . It implies that the social
effect experienced by an RU from others is limited to the largest effect this RU can experience from
an individual of the other RUs.
Theorem 3. Under Assumption 1, the RLD game in Stage II always admits a Nash equilibrium
for RUs.
To prove Theorem 3, the main idea is to show that our RLD game with unbounded content
levels is equivalent to a game with bounded content levels that admits a Nash equilibrium. We prove
it in the following.
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Proof: In the RLD game G =
{
N , {ui}i∈N , [0,∞]N
}
, we denote x∗ as a strategy profile and x∗i
as the largest requested content level in it, i.e., x∗i > x
∗
j ,∀j 6= i. Based on (4.13), when x∗i > 0,
x∗i =
ai − p
bi
+
∑
j 6=i
gij
bi
x∗j ≤
|ai − p|
bi
+
∑
j 6=i
gij
bi
x∗i
from which we get x∗i ≤ |ai − p| /(bi−
∑
j 6=i gij) ≤ x̃. x̃ is any number that satisfies x̃ ≥ maxi∈N |ai − p| /(bi−∑
j 6=i gij). Since x
∗
i is the largest content level, all the content levels in game G are bounded, i.e.,
x∗j ∈ [0, x̃], j ∈ N . Therefore, our game G is equivalent to a new game G̃ =
{
N , {ui}i∈N , [0, x̃]N
}
that has the same Nash equilbium stategy profile.
Taking the game G̃ into consideration, the strategy space [0, x̃]N is compact and convex.
The utility function ui (xi,x−i, p) is continuous in xi and x−i. The second-order derivative of RU
i’s utility function ∂
2ui(xi,x−i,p)
∂2xi
= −bi is negative. Therefore, it is a concave game and admits a
Nash equilibrium [50,153]. Hence, the Nash equilibrium for our RLD game G exists.
Theorem 4. Under Assumption 1, the RLD game in Stage II has a unique best response strategy.
According to [153], to prove Theorem 4, we try to demonstrate that the RLD game is a
concave game.
Proof: The Jacobian matrix ∇u(x) of RUs’ utility profile u(x) ∆= {u1(x), u2(x), · · · , uN (x)} is
given by ∇u (x) = −(Λ−G),
where Λ = diag(b1, b2, · · · , bN ) and G =

0 g12 · · · g1N
g21 0 · · · g2N
...
...
. . .
...
gN1 gN2 · · · 0

. The ij-th element in
G, denoted by gij , represents the social effect that RU j brings to RU i, j 6= i. According to
Assumption 1,
[Λ−G]ii >
∑
j 6=i
∣∣∣[Λ−G]ij∣∣∣ ,∀i
where [Λ−G]ij denotes the element in the ith row and jth column in the matrix [Λ−G]. Hence,
[Λ−G] is strictly diagonal dominant. Assume social effect between RUs is symmetric, gij =
gji,∀i, j ∈ N , [Λ−G]T is also strictly diagonal dominant. Therefore,∇u (x)+∇uT (x) = − [Λ−G]−
[Λ−G]T is strictly diagonal dominant and symmetric. According to [82], a symmetric matrix that
is strictly diagonally dominant with real nonnegative diagonal elements is positive definite. Thus,
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− [Λ−G]− [Λ−G]T is negative definite since the elements in it are negative. ∇u(x) is diagonally
strictly concave [153]. The RLD game has a unique Nash equilibrium.
4.5.2.2 Calculation of RUs’ Best Response Strategies
We propose an algorithm to calculate RUs’ best response strategies as shown in Algorithm
5.
Algorithm 5: Calculate the RUs’ Best Response Strategies
Input: precision threshold ε
Output: x∗
1 x
(0)
i ← 0, ∀i ∈ N ; n← 1;
2 for j = 1; j ≤ N do
3 x
(n)
i = max
{
0, ai−p
bi
+
∑
j 6=i
gij
bi
x
(n−1)
j
}
;
4 end
5 if ||x(n) − x(n−1)|| < ε then
6 x∗ = x(n);
7 break;
8 else
9 n = n+ 1;
10 go back to 2;
11 end
12 return x∗;
Theorem 5. Algorithm 5 calculates the Nash equilibrium in the RLD game.
To prove Theorem 5, the key is to prove that the best response strategy for each user is
converged.
Proof: Let ∆x
(n)
i , x
(n)
i − x∗i ,∀i. According to step 3 in Algorithm 5,
|∆x(n)i | ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=i
gij
bi
∆x
(n−1)
j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
j 6=i
gij
bi
∣∣∣∆x(n−1)j ∣∣∣ ,∀i (4.14)
Denote ||∆x(n)i ||∞ as the l∞-norm of vector (∆x
(n)
1 ,∆x
(n)
2 , · · · ,∆x
(n)
N ), ||∆x
(n)
i ||∞ = max
i∈N
(∆x
(n)
1 ,∆x
(n)
2 , · · · ,∆x
(n)
N ).
According to (12), ||∆x(n)i ||∞ ≤ max
i∈N
∑
j 6=i
gij
bi
∣∣∣∆x(n−1)j ∣∣∣ ≤ (max
i∈N
∑
j 6=i
gij
bi
)
||∆x(n−1)i ||∞. Since
max
i∈N
∑
j 6=i
gij
bi
< 1, ||∆x(n)i ||∞ ≤ ||∆x
(n−1)
i ||∞. It implies that Algorithm 5 results in a contraction
mapping of ||∆x(n−1)i ||∞ and thus converges to the Nash equilibrium.
To ease the description, we express the best response strategies in a matrix format.
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Lemma 1. Denote S as the set of RUs with positive strategies and N − S as the set of other RUs:
S = {i|x∗i > 0} and N − S = {i|x∗i = 0}, the best response strategies are:
x∗S = (ΛS −GS)
−1
(aS − p1S) (4.15)
x∗N−S = 0N−S (4.16)
where x∗S = {x∗i |i ∈ S}, x∗N−S = {x∗i |i ∈ N − S} and aS = {ai|i ∈ S}. The matrices ΛS ,GS are
|S| × |S| matrices with elements in Λ,G with indices in S × S, respectively. The vectors 1S and
0N−S are |S| × 1 and |N − S| × 1 vectors with 1s and 0s, respectively.
To prove Lemma 1, the important part is to show that (ΛS −GS)−1 is invertible.
Proof: According to (4.13) and Algorithm 5,
x∗i =
ai − p
bi
+
∑
j 6=i
gij
bi
x∗j , i, j ∈ S (4.17)
The matrix format of (4.17) is,
(ΛS −GS) x∗S = (aS − p1S) (4.18)
Because ΛS is a positive diagonal matrix, it is invertible. Denote any eigenvalue and the correspond-
ing eigenvector of Λ−1S GS as λ and µ, respectively. Mathematically,
(
Λ−1S GS
)
µ = λµ. Assume µi
is the largest element in absolute value, |µi| ≥ |µj | ,∀j 6= i,
|λµi| =
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑j∈N [Λ−1S GS]ij µj
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∑j∈N
∣∣∣[Λ−1S GS]ij∣∣∣ |µj |
≤ |µi|
∑
j∈N
|gij |
bi
< |µi| (4.19)
From (4.19), the absolute values of all eigenvalues of Λ−1S GS are less than 1. Since the eigenvalue
values of the matrix I − Λ−1S GS are equaled to 1 − λ, the matrix I − Λ
−1
S GS does not have 0
eigenvalues. Thus, ΛS −GS = ΛS
(
I−Λ−1S G
)
is invertible and xS
∗ = (ΛS −GS)−1 (aS − p1S).
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4.5.2.3 Discussion on social effect
Proposition 1. For the RLD game, when ai = a > p and the social effect is symmetric, gij =
gji,∀i 6= j, the social relationship between RUs brings a positive effect to Nash equilibrium.
To prove Proposition 1, the main idea is to show that the total requested content level at
the Nash equilibrium increases when gij increases. In addition, the performance under asymmetric
social effect will be shown to be similar with that under symmetric social effect.
Proof: From (4.17), we find that RUs’ strategies at the Nash equilibrium is a continuous function
of the matrix GS . Thus, we can find a matrix G
′
S , in which g
′
ij ≥ gij , g
′
ij ∈ G
′
S , gij ∈ GS and at least
one strictly inequality exists, such that RUs with positive strategies x∗
′
S at the Nash equilibrium
under G
′
S are also in the set S. According to (4.18),
(ΛS −GS) x∗S = (aS − p1S) (4.20)
(
ΛS −G
′
S
)
x∗
′
S = (aS − p1S) (4.21)
Subtract (4.20) from (4.21),
x∗
′
S − x∗S = (ΛS −GS)
−1
∆GSx
∗′
S (4.22)
where ∆GS = G
′
S −GS . Thus, the total difference between x∗
′
S and x
∗
S is
1TS
(
x∗
′
S − x∗S
)
= 1TS (ΛS −GS)
−1
∆GSx
∗′
S (4.23)
According to x∗S = (ΛS −GS)
−1
(a− p)1S in (4.15), it follows that,
1TS (ΛS −GS)
−1
=
(
(ΛS −GS)−1 1S
)T
=
1
a− p
x∗TS (4.24)
Substitute (4.24) into (4.23), we get the total difference as,
1TS
(
x∗
′
S − x∗S
)
=
1
a− p
x∗TS ∆GSx
∗′
S (4.25)
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Because a > p, x∗
′
S ,x
∗
S  0 and ∆GS  0, the total difference between x∗
′
S and x
∗
S , 1
T
S
(
x∗
′
S − x∗S
)
>
0, which implies that the total requested content levels at the Nash equilibrium increase when gij
increases. The Proposition 1 verifies that the social effect between RUs with similar social attributes
makes RUs get more interested contents.
4.5.3 The MCU Revenue Maximization
According to the above analysis, the MCU, as a leader, knows there exists the unique Nash
equilibrium for the RUs given any unit payment. Hence, he can maximize the total revenue by
choosing the optimal unit payment.
4.5.3.1 The Impact of Unit payment
We first take the case with two RUs as an example. Without loss of generality, assume
a1 > a2. Intuitively, in (4.13), both RU 1 and RU 2 have positive strategies when the unit payment
p is in a low price regime. Their strategies are,

x1 =
a1 − p
b1
+
g12
b1
x2 (4.26a)
x2 =
a2 − p
b2
+
g21
b2
x1 (4.26b)
By solving above equations, we get the value of x1 and x2,
x1 =
(a1 − p)b2 + (a2 − p)g12
b1b2 − g12g21
(4.27)
x2 =
(a2 − p)b1 + (a1 − p)g21
b1b2 − g12g21
(4.28)
which show that the strategies of both RU 1 and RU 2 decrease as p increases. Based on the
Assumption 1, x1 > x2. Thus, when increasing p, the strategy of RU 2, x2, first decreases to 0.
Denote the unit payment as pth at which RU 2’s best response strategy is decreased to 0. According
to (4.28), pth =
a2b1+a1g21
b1+g21
. Continuing to increase p, the strategy of RU 1 then decreases to 0.
Therefore, we have the Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. In RLD game, the impact that p brings to the two RUs’ best response strategies x∗1
and x∗2 is as follows
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• When we set p in a low regime: 0 ≤ p < pth, the best response strategies of two RUs are listed
in (4.27) and (4.28);
• When we set p in a medium regime: pth ≤ p < a1, x1 = a1−pb1 and x2 = 0;
• When we set p in a high regime; p ≥ a1, RUs will not pick up their strategies: x1 = x2 = 0.
Based on the Assumption 1, pth =
a2b1+a1g21
b1+g21
> a2. It implies that RU 2 would like to take
part in the game (x2 ∈ 0) although the unit payment he has to pay is larger than the internal effect.
This gives the credits to the social effect that RU 1 brings to, which verifies that social effect brings
benefits in our scheme.
Next, we extend our discussion on the impact of p to a general case where more RUs request
contents.
Proposition 3. In RLD game, the impact that p brings to the RUs’ best response strategies x∗ is
as follows
• When we set p in a low regime 0 ≤ p ≤ max
i∈M
ai: there is a set of prices p0 , 0 < p1 < p2 <
· · · < pM < pM+1 , max
i∈N
ai. For each k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · ,M}, there is a set Sk ⊆ N such that for
any p ∈ [pk, pk+1] such that x∗i =
[
(ΛSk −GSk)
−1
(aSk − p1Sk)
]
i
,∀i ∈ Sk and x∗i = 0,∀i /∈ Sk
• When we set p in a high regime p ≥ max
i∈N
ai, x
∗
i = 0,∀i
We prove Proposition 3 in the following. It shows that each RU’ best response strategy is
a piecewise linear function of the price, which motivates us to propose the Algorithm 6 to calculate
the MCU’s optimal revenue.
Proof: For any unit payment p ∈ [0,maxi∈N ai], the requested content levels of the set of RUs S
with positive strategies are given in (4.15). Meanwhile, according to (4.13), RU i’s the requested
content level x∗i =
ai−p
bi
+
∑
j 6=i
gij
bi
x∗j is continuous in p and RU j’s requested content level x
∗
j , j 6= i.
When the unit payment p increases a small amount to p
′
, the set of RUs with positive strategies at
the Nash equilibrium does not change and their strategies are still given by (4.15) except that p is
replaced by p
′
. Hence, the set of RUs with positive strategies is the same at any unit payment in a
continuous unit payment interval. However, when the unit payment p increases a large amount to
p′′, some RUs’ strategies decrease to 0 and thus they would not request any contents as shown in
above two-RU example. Therefore, the interval of the unit payment is piecewise.
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Assuming RU i has a maximized strategy x∗i > 0 when p ≥ max
i∈N
. According to (4.13),
x∗i =
ai−p
bi
+
∑
j 6=i
gij
bi
x∗j ≤
∑
j 6=i
gij
bi
x∗j ≤
∑
j 6=i
gij
bi
x∗i < x
∗
i , which is a contradiction. Therefore,
x∗i = 0,∀i when p ≥ max
i∈N
.
4.5.3.2 Calculation of the MCU’s Optimal Revenue — the Answer to Q3
Based on the Lemma 1, the piecewise unit payment p is linear with the total best response
strategies 1Tx∗ at the Nash equilibrium. Hence, the total revenue of the MCU (p − c)1Tx∗ is a
quadratic function with the unit payment p according to (4.2). Given above characteristics, we
propose the Algorithm 6. Inspired by PROPOSITION 3, we first determine the unit payment
interval in which the set of RUs with positive strategies does not change when the unit payment
increases or decreases. Within each determined unit payment interval, we calculate the optimal unit
payment to maximize the total revenue of the MCU. Finally, by comparing total revenues in each
interval, we obtain the final unit payment, which makes largest total revenue for the MCU. The
final unit payment, together with the corresponding RUs’ requested content levels, composes the
Stackelberg equilibrium.
Specifically, the Algorithm 6 is initialized by calculating the RUs’ best response strategies
when the unit payment p = 0, as shown in Step 1. From Step 3 to Step 7, it finds the set S composed
of RUs with positive strategies, which serves the initial conditions in the following steps. As the
unit payment p increases from 0 to max
i∈N
ai, it iteratively finds the critical unit payment at which the
set S changes as illustrated from Step 10 to Step 22. Because the change of the set means either
adding or dropping an eligible RU, the process of finding the critical unit payment can be divided
into the following three parts:
• Step 10 to Step 15 investigates the critical unit payment in the set S, which makes at least
one RU’s positive strategy decreases to 0. Since RU i is in the set S, according to (4.15), his
positive strategy xi is,
xi =
[
(ΛS −GS)−1
]
i,S (aS − p1S) > 0 (4.29)
where
[
(ΛS −GS)−1
]
i,S denotes a 1 × |S| vector with elements in the ith row of the matrix
(ΛS − GS)−1 and the columns with indices in S. If
[
(ΛS −GS)−1
]
i,S 1S > 0, the RU i’s
positive strategy decreases as p increases. Assuming when the unit payment increases to p̂i,
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Algorithm 6: Calculate the MCU’s Optimal Revenue
Input: none
Output: p∗, x∗,r∗
1 calculate the Nash equilibrium x∗
′
using Algorithm 5 when the unit payment is 0;
2 p← 0; p∗ ← 0; r∗ ← 0; S ← ∅;
3 for i = 1, i ≤ N do
4 if x∗
′
i > 0 then
5 S ← S
⋃
{i} ;
6 end
7 end
8 while p ≤ max
i∈N
ai and S 6= ∅ do
9 S1 ← ∅; S2 ← ∅;
10 foreach i ∈ S do
11 if
[
(ΛS −GS)−1
]
i
1S > 0 then
12 S1 ← S1
⋃
{i};
13 p̂i ←
[(ΛS−GS)−1]iaS
[(ΛS−GS)−1]i1S
;
14 end
15 end
16 foreach i ∈ N − S do
17 if [G]i,S (ΛS −GS)
−1 1S < −1 then
18 S2 ← S2
⋃
{i};
19 p̂i ←
[G]i,S(ΛS−GS)
−1aS+ai
[G]i,S(ΛS−GS)−11S+1
;
20 end
21 end
22 p = min
i∈S1∪S2
p̂i;
23 k = argi∈S1∪S2 p;
24 p
′
=
1TS (ΛS−GS)
−1aS+c1
T
S (ΛS−GS)
−11S
21TS (ΛS−GS)
−11S
;
25 if p
′
∈
[
p, p
]
then
26 p̃ = p
′
;
27 else if p
′
< p then
28 p̃ = p;
29 else
30 p̃ = p;
31 end
32 r̃ = (p̃− c)1TS (ΛS −GS)−1 (aS − p̃1S);
33 if r̃ > r∗ then
34 p∗ ← p̃;r∗ ← r̃; x∗S = (ΛS −GS)−1 (aS − p∗1S); x∗N−S = 0N−S , x∗ = x∗S
⋃
x∗N−S;
35 end
36 p← p̃;
37 if k ∈ S then
38 S = S\{k};
39 else
40 S = S ∪ {k};
41 end
42 end
43 return p∗,x∗, r∗
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the RU i’s positive strategy xi decreases to 0. We have,
[
(ΛS −GS)−1
]
i,S aS = p̂i
[
(ΛS −GS)−1
]
i,S 1S
p̂i =
[
(ΛS −GS)−1
]
i,S aS
[(ΛS −GS)−1]i,S 1S
(4.30)
• Step 16 to 21 investigates the critical unit payment in the set N − S, which makes at least one
RU’s strategy become positive When RU i is in the set N − S, xi = 0 > ai−pbi +
∑
j 6=i
gij
bi
xj . If
xj > 0, xj =
[
(ΛS −GS)−1
]
j,S (aS − p1S). Denote Gi,S as a 1× |S| vector composed of the
element of the ith row of the matrix G with column indices in S,
xi = 0 >
ai−p
bi
+ 1bi [G]i,S (ΛS −GS)
−1
(aS − p1S)
= 1bi [G]i,S (ΛS −GS)
−1
aS +
ai
bi
− pbi
(
[G]i,S (ΛS −GS)
−1
1S + 1
)
If [G]i,S (ΛS −GS)
−1
1S < −1, ai−pbi +
1
bi
[G]i,S (ΛS −GS)
−1
(aS − p1S) increases as p de-
creases. It becomes positive when the unit payment decreases to,
p̂i =
[G]i,S (ΛS −GS)
−1
aS + ai
[G]i,S (ΛS −GS)
−1
1S + 1
(4.31)
• By comparing both the critical unit payments in set S and N − S, we choose the minimized
one as the final critical unit payment as illustrated in Step 22.
From Step 24 to Step 31, we calculate the unit payment p̃ ∈
[
p, p
]
such that the MCU’s rev-
enueR (x, p) is maximized, in whichR (x, p) = R (xS , p) =
∑
i∈S
xi(p− c) = (p−c)1TS (ΛS −GS)
−1
(aS − p1S) , p ∈[
p, p
]
. By setting the first order derivative of R (x, p) to 0, we find the potential optimal unit payment
p
′
in the interval
[
p, p
]
.
p
′
=
1TS (ΛS −GS)
−1
aS + c1
T
S (ΛS −GS)
−1
1S
21TS (ΛS −GS)
−1
1S
(4.32)
if p
′ ∈
[
p, p
]
, the optimal unit revenue p̃ = p
′
. Otherwise, the optimal unit payment is p̃ = p if
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p
′
<= p, or p̃ = p if p
′
<= p. The local optimal revenue r
′
is,
r
′
= (p̃− c)1TS (ΛS −GS)
−1
(aS − p̃1S) , p̃ ∈
[
p, p
]
(4.33)
Meanwhile, the set S is updated as shown from Step 37 to Step 41 by adding or deleting the RU
k found in Step 23. The renewed set S is deployed to continue finding another local optimal unit
payment.
Finally, by comparing the local optimal revenues in each unit payment interval, we find the
global optimal revenue r∗ and its corresponding unit payment p∗ as illustrated in Step 32 to Step
35. The related RUs’ best response strategies x∗ are calculated.
4.6 Utility Maximization in delay-sensitive Model
In this section, we model the delay-sensitive cases as three two-stage Stackelberg games to
maximize the utilities of RUs and MCUs, respectively. Specifically, the delay effect considered in the
intuitive delay-sensitive model is essentially a specific form of the congestion effect studied in [65].
Therefore, we mainly discuss the other two delay-sensitive models.
4.6.1 Intuitive Delay-Sensitive Model
Refering to [64], the RU i’s best response strategy is,
βi (x−i) = max
{
0,
ai − p
bi + d
+
∑
j 6=i
gij − d
bi + d
xj
}
,∀i (4.34)
By comparing (4.13) and (4.34), each RU suffers both positive social effect and negative delay effect
brought by other RUs. When gij < d, the RU j even brings negative external effect to the RU
i. Otherwise, the RU j puts positive external effect. Under the assumption
∑
j 6=i
|gij−d|
(bi+d)
< 1,∀i, the
utility maximization is obtained according to Algorithm 3 in [64].
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4.6.2 Queueing Delay-Sensitive Model
By setting the derivative ∂ûi(x̂i,x̂−i,p̂)∂x̂i = 0 in (4.8), the RU i’s best response strategy is
obtained as,
βi (x̂−i) = max
0, ai − p̂bi + d̂ +
∑
j 6=i,j∈N
gij − d̂N−1
bi + d̂
xj
 (4.35)
where d̂ = kλN(1−ρ) is assumed as a system parameter estimated by the SP. Comparing (4.34) and
(4.35), given d̂ = d, the delay effect in the queueing delay-sensitive model is relieved from d to dN−1 ,
which theoretically proves that our queue model lowers the delay effect. Meanwhile, the content
mean arrival rate λ brings a negative effect to RUs’ utilities. It is because larger λ increases the
queue length given the fixed average content transmission time and thus puts RUs to the longer
waiting time. Similarly, the traffic intensity ρ puts a negative delay effect to RUs’ utilities.
Since each RU’s utility in (4.35) is similar to that in (4.13) and the MCU’s utility keeps
unchanged, we could simply apply the Algorithm 6 to obtaining the best strategies for both RUs
and MCU under the following assumption:
Assumption 2.
∑
j 6=i
|gij− d̂N−1 |
(bi+d̂)
< 1,∀i.
4.6.3 Multi-leader Delay-Sensitive Model
Due to the participation of multiple MCUs, the previous single-leader Stackelberg game is
extended to a multi-leader two-stage Stackelberg game as follows:
Stage I (Unit Payment) Each MCU announces its unit payment p̃m to maximize their
total revenues,
p̃∗ = arg max
p̃∈[0,∞)M
R̃ (x̃, p̃)
Stage II (Requested Content Level) Each RU i ∈ N strategies the required content
level x̃i to maximize his own utility given the price p̃ and the requested content levels of others x̃−i,
x̃∗i = arg max
x̃i∈[0,∞)
ũi (x̃i, x̃−i, p̃) ,∀i.
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4.6.3.1 Utility Maximization for RUs
Similar with (4.13), the best response strategy for RU i is:
βi (x̃−i, p̃) = max
0,
ai −
M∑
m=1
Ii,mp̃m
bi + d̃
+
∑
j 6=i,j∈N
gij − d̃
M∑
m=1
Ii,mIj,m
bi + d̃
xj

Formula (4.36) shows that the introduction of multiple MCUs reduces each RU’s delay effect by
serving them locally whereas does not affect their global positive social effect. With known indicator
matrix, (4.36) is similar with (4.3). Therefore, if we have the following assumption, the existence
and uniqueness can be proved referring to the previous proof.
Assumption 3.
∑
j 6=i
|gij−d̃
M∑
m=1
Ii,mIj,m|
(bi+d̃)
< 1,∀i
Meanwhile, under the Assumption 3, the best response strategies for all RUs given the unit
payment vector are
x̃∗S =
(
Λ̃S − G̃S
)−1
(aS − p̃S) (4.36)
x̃∗N−S = 0N−S (4.37)
The corresponding matrices Λ̃ = diag(b1 + d̃, b2 + d̃, · · · , bN + d̃) and G̃ = G − D, where D =
d̃

0
∑
m∈M
I1,mI2,m · · ·
∑
m∈M
I1,mIN,m∑
m∈M
I2,mI1,m 0 · · ·
∑
m∈M
I2,mIN,m
...
...
. . .
...∑
m∈M
IN,mI1,m
∑
m∈M
IN,mI2,m · · · 0

. The implication for S has been ex-
plained previously.
4.6.3.2 Utility Maximization for MCUs
Due to the globally positive social effect and locally negative delay effect, we cannot simply
deploy the Algorithm 6 to solve the Stackelberg game for each pile of RUs. However, owing to the
existence and uniqueness of all RUs’ best response strategies x̃∗, MCUs can correctly predict the
behaviors of all RUs given the unit price p̃, which gives them opportunities to maximize their total
revenues.
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To ease the description, we consider the case where all RUs receive their requested data
x̃∗S = x̃
∗. The case in which some RUs receive no contents can be easily extended. With the known
indicator matrix, (4.11) is rewritten as,
R̃ (x̃, p̃) = (p̃− c1N )T x̃∗ (4.38)
Substitute (4.36) into (4.38), we have,
R̃ (x̃, p̃) = (p̃− c1N )T
(
Λ̃− G̃
)−1
(a− p̃)
= −p̃T
(
Λ̃− G̃
)−1
p̃ + p̃T
(
Λ̃− G̃
)−1
a + c1TN
(
Λ̃− G̃
)−1
p̃− c1TN
(
Λ̃− G̃
)−1
a (4.39)
We ignore the last term in (4.39) since it has nothing to do with p̃ in the following. To obtain the
strategies for each MCU, we have the total utilities maximization problem as,
max
p̃1,··· ,p̃M
R̃ (x̃, p̃)
′
= −p̃TAp̃ + p̃TAa + c1TNAp̃
s.t. 0 ≤ p̃m ≤ max
i∈N
ai,∀m (4.40)
where A =
(
Λ̃− G̃
)−1
. The constraints in (4.40) is to restrict each MCU’s unit payment. Oth-
erwise, RUs would not receive any contents from MCUs as shown in (4.36) and (4.37). Since p̃ is
piecewise, we divide the matrix A into blocks,
A =

A11 A12 · · · A1M
A21 A22 · · · A2M
...
...
. . .
...
AM1 AM2 · · · AMM

(4.41)
where
Auv =

ai−1∑
u=1
nmu+1,
j−1∑
v=1
nmv+1
· · · ai−1∑
u=1
nmu+1,
j∑
v=1
nmv
...
. . .
...
a i∑
u=1
nmu ,
j−1∑
v=1
nmv+1
· · · a i∑
u=1
nmu ,
j∑
v=1
nmv

a = {a1, · · · , anm1 , anm1+1, · · · , anm1+nm2 , · · · , aN}
T = {a′T1 ,a
′T
2 , · · · ,a
′T
M}T is rewritten, where
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a
′
i = {a∑nmi−1+1, · · · , a∑nmi}T . Substituting (4.41) into (4.40),
R̃ (x̃, p̃)
′
=
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
p̃ip̃j1
T
nmi
Aij1nmj +
M∑
i=1
p̃i
M∑
j=1
(
(1Tnmi
Aij1nmj )
T + 1Tnmi
Aija
′
j
)
= p̃
′TA
′
p̃
′
+
M∑
i=1
p̃i
M∑
j=1
(
(1Tnmi
Aij1nmj )
T + 1Tnmi
Aija
′
j
)
where p̃
′
= [p̃1, p̃2, · · · , p̃M ] and A
′
is a new matrix with the ijth element 1
T
nmi
Aij1nmj . According
to [82] and [25], the total utilities maximization is a convex optimization problem as long as A
′
+A
′T
is positive semidefinite. Therefore, we can use convex toolbox cvx [66] to obtain the strategies of
MCUs under the positive semidefinite assumption.
4.7 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the data offloading approaches in both the
delay-tolerant scenario and the delay-sensitive scenario.
4.7.1 Simulation Settings
We consider a scenario with N = 10 RUs served by MCUs. Their internal characteristics
follow a Gaussian distribution, where ai ∼ N (µa, 2) and bi ∼ N (µb, 2) ,∀i. To show the social effect
brought by RUs’ social relationship, we deploy the Erdős-Rényi (ER) graph [49] model, in which
a social edge between RUs exists with probability PS in a group. If a social edge indeed exists, it
is assumed to follow a normal distribution N (µg, 2). To ensure the assumptions proposed in the
chapter, we set µa = µb = 30. In addition, the MCU’s unit cost when delivering contents to RUs is
constant, c = 5.
4.7.2 Simulation Results
In our simulations, we mainly compare the performance of the following cases: (1) No
relationship case (NSR), in which there are no interactions between RUs, gij = 0, i, j ∈ N , d =
d̂ = d̃ = 0. (2) Delay-tolerant case (UMDT), in which the social effect exists among RUs due to
their similar social attributes gij 6= 0,∃i, j ∈ N , d = d̂ = d̃ = 0. (3) Intuitive Delay-sensitive
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case (iUMDS). (4) Queue Delay-sensitive case (qUMDS), and (5) Multi-leader Delay-sensitive case
(mUMDS). Note that we normalize most simulation performance based on the NSR case, which
means the performance value is divided by the corresponding value in the NSR case. In what
follows, we show the impacts to which the social effect and delay effect will bring respectively.
4.7.2.1 The Impact of the Probability of Social Edge
To investigate the impact of social effect, we first consider the UMDT case in Fig.4.5. Since
two RUs in a social relationship could have different interests, we want to find whether such an
asymmetry impacts RUs’ utilities. Fig.4.5a shows that it does not play an important role on RUs.
Therefore, we choose the asymmetric social relationship in the followings as gij 6= gji to be close to
reality. Fig.4.5a also tells us that the probability of the social relationship between RUs has a large
impact. This is because the probability implies the contact opportunities between RUs, which would
bring more social effects. Fig.4.5b further demonstrates the above observation, which shows that
the total utility of RUs increases as the increasing of the probability of social relationship. Hence,
our motivation is verified that the homophily phenomenon truly brings positive social effects to data
offloading scheme.
(a) Asymmetry Effect (b) Social Effect
Figure 4.5: UMDT Case
4.7.2.2 The Impact of Delay Effect
In iUMDS case, we consider the intuitive delay effect. From Fig.4.6b, we find that such
delay effect puts a serious negative impact on the MCU’s total revenue. Specifically, when the delay
effect is large, it could even cancel out the benefits brought by the social effect. When RUs are eager
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to obtain their requested contents, they have to wait for a long time. Thus, they would not request
more contents even if the unit payment is low. The low unit payment and few contents decrease the
total revenue of the MCU.
(a) Total Levels vs. Number of RUs (b) Intuitive Delay Effect (c) Queue Effect
Figure 4.6: Delay Effect
4.7.2.3 The Benefits brought by Improved Models
In order to show the benefits in the qUMDS and mUMDS cases, we compare the MCU’s
total revenue as shown in Fig. 4.6a. The worst situation is considered that the intuitive delay effect
cancels the benefits brought by social effect completely, where µg = d = 3. Fig. 4.6a demonstrates
that the introduction of the queue and multiple MCUs indeed helps increase the total revenue.
qUMDS Case. We discuss the impact of the mean arrival rate shown in Fig. 4.6c. It
impacts RUs’ content levels negatively. Higher mean arrival rate indicates that more content requests
come to the MCU while it is delivering contents, which would increase the content queue length.
RUs have to wait for a longer time to obtain their contents and thus dissatisfy with the content
transmission. Therefore, their requested content levels would decrease.
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(a) Total Revenue (b) Total Utility
Figure 4.7: Effect from MCUs
mUMDS Case. In Fig. 4.7, we draw the impacts to both MCUs and RUs’ utilities brought
by the number of MCUs. Assume there are N = 25 RUs requesting contents. As can be seen from
Fig.4.7a and Fig.4.7b, more MCUs not only increase the utilities of RUs but also improve the total
revenue of themselves. Fig.4.8 shows an interesting phenomenon. Given the number of MCUs, each
RU’s waiting time will increase as the number of RUs becomes large, and thus their own utilities
reduce. In the worst case, the total utilities of a larger number of RUs are lower than those of a
smaller number of RUs as shown in Fig.4.8b. However, since the number of RUs is large, the total
avenue obtained from them can still be as high as shown in Fig. 4.8a. Both Fig. 4.7 and Fig. 4.8
demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed multiple MCU delay sensitive model.
(a) Total Revenue (b) Total Utility
Figure 4.8: Effect from RUs
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4.8 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we propose a data offloading approach by leveraging human’s social behavior
and human activities. To motivate the participation of MCUs, a two-stage Stackelberg game is
deployed considering the interactions between RUs. In the delay-tolerant scenario, the interactions
bring social effect owing to RUs’ similar social attributes. We prove that the Stackelberg game has
a unique Nash equilibrium and design an effective algorithm to compute the RUs’ best response
strategies. This enables the MCU to maximize the revenue. In the delay-sensitive scenario, by
further taking advantages of RUs’ mobility, we propose two improved approaches to lower RUs’
delay effect due to their long waiting time, which introduces queue and extends the single-leader
Stackelberg game to the multi-leader scheme, respectively. Based on the simulation results, we have
shown the feasibility and effectiveness of our proposed approaches.
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Chapter 5
Social-aware Energy-efficient Data
Offloading with Strong Stability
5.1 Chapter Overview
With the rapid growth of the popularity of mobile devices and Internet services, people enjoy
more benefits than ever before. For example, communicating with friends and watching videos at
any time and anywhere become a reality. However, such operations generate a huge amount of data
traffic. According to the report from the Cisco, global mobile data traffic will increase sevenfold
between 2016 and 2021, reaching 48.3 EB per month by 2021 [37]. On the one hand, the explosively
increasing data traffic burdens mobile operators with large operational expenditure [199]. On the
other hand, it leads to a significant increase in energy consumption and thus puts an adverse effect
to the environment [188]. As shown in [59], the amount of CO2 emissions from the cellular networks
will be 345 million tons by 2020. As a result, it is critical to investigate effective solutions to reduce
energy consumption while adapting to the ever-increasing data traffic demands.
Mobile data offloading is a promising paradigm to address the above challenge by utilizing
complementary and revolutionary networking approaches (e.g., small cell, WiFi offloading, and
opportunistic communication) to deliver mobile data originally planned for cellular networks [199].
Instead of requesting data from base stations, users either access data from other users or offload
data to other requested users with the help of the Device-to-Device (D2D) communication. Hence,
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energy consumption at base stations is largely reduced. Taking a step further, incorporating mobile
users’ social behaviors into consideration facilities the above idea in real life. Specifically, users with
similar social interests often group together in a region, which potentially results in similar content
requests. For example, users gathered in specific attractions, such as Disneyland, may request
similar contents related to those attractions. Such a characteristic is also reflected in social networks,
where socially-related data shared among social ties are similar or even identical (e.g., similar photo
updates on Facebook). The above observation leads us to consider whether we can avoid duplicated
requests/retrievals in order to reduce the number of accesses to the cellular network. Having the
offloaded data, similar social interests among users will motivate them using D2D communication
for further data dissemination [15], which would greatly relieve the traffic burden at base stations
and thus free energy consumption.
However, energy consumption in D2D communication becomes one of the most critical
challenges for the deployment. Frequently transceiving data between battery-powered mobile devices
could quickly drain their energy [174, 187]. Meanwhile, arbitrarily caching data in their buffer will
bring trouble due to limited buffer size. Even worse, the stability of the entire network suffers
from break-off users [110,168]. In our chapter, we leverage users’ social preference to reduce energy
consumption on mobile devices, and keep the stability of the entire system while satisfying users’
traffic demands. Specifically, we mainly focus on the following problems:
• Whether to cache or offload data? It relies on the current caching queue size and the
underlying wireless environment. When the channel condition is poor, transmitting the same
amount of data results in higher energy consumption. Rather than forwarding the data to the
next hop, the user keeps them in a queue and waits for a better channel condition. However,
the cumulative queuing data may surpass the buffer size and further affect network stability.
Therefore, each user has to make a decision on whether to forward the data or queue it for
energy saving purpose.
• How much data to be cached or offloaded? Since the energy and the queue size are
limited, each user sets different preferences over caching and offloading data for others, which
is addressed by allocating different queue sizes and data transmission rates according to their
social interests to offloaded data.
• Who will cache and offload data? In a wireless environment, the same data can be cached
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at different users and one user can cache for multiple data. If more users help cache and offload
data, the overall system-wide energy consumption is reduced by decreasing the transmission
ranges between users. However, these users inevitably increase energy consumption at their
own sides. Hence, users who cache and offload data should be selected.
• How does social preference work? Users have different interests in different kinds of data.
They could affect the data offloading according to their preferences. For example, when the
channel condition is poor, they assign a larger buffer size for the interested data. Thus, the
energy consumption is decreased. Based on their preferences, users can flexibly allocate buffer
size to data, which will guarantee network stability.
Obviously, energy consumption, channel condition, and network capacity in social-aware
data offloading are tightly coupled. To answer those questions, we present a cross-layer optimization
framework. An offline energy optimization problem P1 is formulated aiming at minimizing the time-
averaged value of energy consumption at all users by jointly considering the correlation between
random channel conditions, users’ social preferences, network capacity and transmission scheduling,
which turns out to be a time-coupling stochastic Mixed-Integer Non-Linear Programming (MINLP)
problem. Previous approaches applying Dynamic Programming (DP) always suffer from the “curse
of dimensionality” problem [22]. Besides, solutions using DP require detailed statistical information
on system random variables, which are difficult to obtain in practice. Therefore, based on deploying
Lyapunov optimization theory [137], we reformulate an equivalent problem P2 and propose an
online energy approximation problem P3. Different with the offline energy optimization requiring
the knowledge of the network statistics, the online energy approximation problem P3 does not
require any statistic knowledge of the random process. However, P3 is still a MINLP which is
NP-hard and needs to be solved in each time slot. By introducing a virtual queue, we decompose
P3 into three subproblems: link scheduling and power allocation (S1), content allocation (S2), and
routing (S3). Three algorithms are developed to solve them based on the current network states
only respectively. Finally, we demonstrate the network stability by proving all the queues are finite
(Theorem 1). Meanwhile, we prove that the proposed algorithm leads to an upper and lower bound
(Theorem 2 and Theorem 3) to the original problem, where φ∗P3 − BV ≤ φ
∗
P1 ≤ φ∗P3. φ∗P1 and φ∗P3
are the optimal results of P1 and P3, respectively. B is a constant and V represents the weight on
how much we emphasize on the energy consumption minimization in P3. As we can see, BV goes to
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0 as V increases, in which the minimized time-averaged expected energy is obtained in P1.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 briefly reviews the existing D2D
enabled data offloading schemes and studies the effect brought by social characteristics, together
with Lyapunov optimization techniques applied in wireless networks. In Section 5.3, we introduce
our system architecture and network model. The formulation of an offline energy minimization
optimization problem is given in Section 5.4. In Section 5.5, based on Lyapunov optimization theory,
we formulate an online finite-queue-aware energy minimization problem and design a decomposition
based approximation algorithm to solve it. We prove that the proposed approximation algorithm
guarantees network strong stability, and derive both a lower and upper bound on the optimal result
of the offline optimization problem in Section 5.6, followed by the simulation results. Finally, we
conclude our work in Section 5.7.
5.2 Related Work
5.2.1 D2D Enabled Data Offloading
In D2D enabled data offloading framework, some users are chosen as helpers/relays [80,96,
183, 192] to receive the data via cellular networks. Then, those users further propagate the data
among all the users through D2D communications. It is further classified into two categories: in-band
offloading and out-of-band offloading [147], where the direct communication between users occupies
the licensed cellular spectrum and unlicensed spectrum (e.g., WiFi-Direct, Bluetooth) respectively.
In-band offloading may improve the resource utilization by reusing the spectrum for the users that
are physically in close proximity to communicate with each other at a high rate and low power
consumption. The developments in the 3GPP LTE Standard (Rel-12) have proposed integrating
direct in-band communication capabilities into the future cellular architecture [123]. Li et al. in [116]
study the realistic bound of an offloading strategy exploiting LTE-D2D in a large-scale scenario.
Their simulation results confirm that augmenting the number of users in the cell largely benefits to
offloading, increasing its efficiency. In that case, D2D transmissions account for up to 50% of the
traffic, which shows the feasibility of in-band offloading.
Since direct transmissions take place in the same band as the cellular transmissions, in-band
offloading provides additional flexibility to the network but raises issues on mutual interference and
resource allocation. Thus, previous works mainly focus on interference management and transmission
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coordination problems. In [145], the radio resource allocation is optimized to help decrease the
mutual interference between D2D communications and the primary cellular network. Xu et al.
propose a reverse iterative combinatorial auction mechanism to allocate spectrum resources between
cellular users and D2D pairs [181]. Doppler et al. in [47] limit the maximum transmission power of
D2D peers to alleviate the interference. With the explosive increase of data traffic, power allocation
puts an effect on not only the interference management but also device battery. However, how to
improve energy efficiency at mobile users receives little attention in D2D enabled data offloading.
Meanwhile, social-characteristics, which play an important role in other offloading schemes [77,173],
are not considered.
5.2.2 Social-enabled Data Offloading
The “like-me” principle [107] describes a well-accepted nature of human interaction that
people like to interact with those who are similar to themselves. An experiment analyzing the
relationship between the contact rate and the number of identical attributes is conducted in [72,73]
based on the trace file collected during the INFOCOM 2006 [154]. Its result shows that the contact
rate in terms of the number of contacts between two users increases with the increment of identical
attributes, which further validates the “like-me” principle. In addition to that, Hsu et al. in [85] show
that users who share similar interests intend to form a group and they forward messages to others in
the group more efficiently. From the above phenomena, in the scenario where users with attribute
similarities form the attribute-similar group, we infer that the content dissemination is much more
efficient when the social characteristics are considered. As in our previous work [190, 191], users
are more satisfied with the data offloading process when we take into consideration the social effect
brought by users’ similar attributes.
The deployment of the above social characteristics has been addressed in data offloading. Li
et al. in [117] demonstrate that we can leverage the social behaviors to assist D2D communication in
order to enhance the achievable system performance. In [77], social participation and interaction are
exploited to help select the target users in order to minimize the mobile data traffic over the cellular
network. Zhang et al. and Wang et al. exploit social network characteristics for assisting the ad
hoc peer discovery in [189] and [172], respectively. Social characteristics are also applied to resource
allocation in D2D communication. In [172], a two-step coalition game is formulated to achieve
optimal spectrum allocation by deploying social times in human-formed social networks. Although
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the social characteristics are utilized to improve the energy efficiency in [88], they do not consider
the randomness in D2D communication, e.g., channel condition and cellular users. However, such
randomness would result in serious changes in the network. In our chapter, we investigate how to
minimize the energy consumption at mobile users (D2D users) while satisfying their traffic demands
and network stability under the varying channel condition.
5.2.3 Lyapunov Optimization Method
Lyapunov optimization theory has been adopted to investigate stochastic optimization prob-
lems in communication and queuing systems [93,110,136–138,168,184]. However, the queues are not
guaranteed to be finite in [110,168,184], which destroys the network stability. Although finite queue
sizes are maintained in [136,138,184], some packets are dropped as a cost in opportunistic scheduling
scheme. Hence, network utility is lowered. Based on Lyapunov optimization framework, the authors
in [110] address social preference of users and apply back-pressure based transmission scheduling
to achieve guaranteed utility optimality. Li et al. in [111] employ Lyapunov optimization theory
to develop online crowdsourcing algorithms. Liao et al. in [122] propose an online finite-queue-
aware energy cost minimization problem with the help of Lyapunov optimization theory. The above
two works guarantee both network stability and utility. However, they do not consider the social
characteristics among nodes. Besides, the work [122] deploys a fixed modulation scheme whereas
the simulation results in [112] demonstrate the effectiveness on the users’ utility using an adaptive
modulation scheme. Motivated by the above work, we try to minimize the energy consumption in
D2D data offloading by taking social characteristics and adaptive modulation into accounts based
on Lyapunov optimization theory in our chapter.
5.3 System Models
5.3.1 System Architecture
We take data dissemination in the Disney World as an example, where users with similar
social interests group together in the same place, e.g., Rock ‘n’ Roller Coaster Starring Aerosmith
attraction. They request the same contents, e.g., videos related to the attraction, whereas WiFi is
not accessible. As shown in Fig.5.1, instead of getting the requested contents from the base station
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Figure 5.1: System Model
(BS) directly, D2D offloading is deployed to satisfy users’ requests. Specifically, users with the largest
cache are chosen as the representative users to get the contents from the BS, which are further
transmitted among the crowd via D2D communication. To reuse the network resource, all the D2D
communications occur on the fixed spectrum bands, whi ch introduces possible interference between
different D2D communications and hence would affect the achievable communication rate. In order
to prevent interference and improve the energy efficiency at mobile users, the cellular network takes
charge of the whole process including network management, link scheduling and resource allocation
taking advantage of the social relationships among users.
5.3.2 Network Model
As described in Fig. 5.1, a set of users U = {1, 2, · · · , U} with the common interests
request new contents from the service provider. We represent the above contents using a set
L = {1, 2, · · · , L}. Since these users are in close proximity, they get the requested contents ei-
ther from the BS via cellular communication or from others having common interests via D2D
communication. Each content l is further denoted as a tuple {f lij(t), i, j}, indicating the amount of
content l offloaded from the caching user i to the requesting user j in time slot t. Because users have
different communication interfaces and locate at different positions, they occupy different spectrum
bands. Let Mi denote the set of available spectrum bands the user i has. Mi might be different
from Mj , i.e., Mi 6=Mj for i 6= j, i, j ∈ U . All the available spectrum bands compose a spectrum
setM = {1, 2, · · · ,M} andMi ⊂M for each user i. In addition, we assume the bandwidth of band
m is an i.i.d. random process denoted by {Wm(t)}∞t=0, which is observed at the beginning of each
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time slot.
Table 5.1 summarizes the main notations for ease of reference, where t denotes in the time
slot t.
Table 5.1: Notation Table
U user set
L content set
C modulation order set
Pmij (t) power of transmission from user i to user j on band m
P revi (t) receiving power at user i
ei(t) total energy consumption at user i
∆t duration for one time slot
Qli(t) data queue for content l at user i
Yij(t) virtual link-layer queue from user i to user j
ρli(t) user i’s interest in content l
pli buffer size for data queue Q
l
i(t)
f lij(t) amount of content l offloaded from user i to user j
clij(t) content l’s maximum transmission rate from user i to user j on band m
cmaxij content l’s maximum transmission rate from user i to user j
smij (t) Binary Var: band m is assigned for transmission from user i to user j
smcij (t)
Binary Var: band m is assigned for transmission from user i to user j
with modulation order 2c
vl(t) amount of content l, maximum: v
max
vmax maximum amount of content received from BS
λ parameter determined by system controller
V weight on importance on energy minimization
5.3.3 Network rate stable and strongly stable
We first introduce definitions and theorems of Lyapunov optimization [137]. We denote
those theorems as lemmas used for scheme design and analysis later.
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DEFINITION 6. The time average of a random process a(t), denoted by a, is a = limT→∞
∑T
t=0
1
T E [a(t)].
DEFINITION 7. A discrete time process a(t) is rate stable if limt→∞sup
a(t)
t = 0 with probability
1, and strongly stable if limT→∞sup
1
T
∑T
t=0 E [a(t)] <∞.
Lemma 2. Queue Rate Stability [137]
Let Q(t) denote the queue length of a single-user discrete time queuing system, whose initial
state Q(0) is a non-negative real-valued random variable, and future states are driven by stochastic
arrival and transmission processes a(t) and b(t) according to the following dynamic equation:
Q(t+ 1) = max {Q(t)− b(t), 0}+ a(t), t ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · }
Then Q(t) is rate stable if and only if a ≤ b.
Lemma 3. Necessity for Queue Strong Stability [137]
If a queue Q(t) is strongly stable, and there is a finite constant c such that either a(t) +
b−(t) ≤ c with probability 1 for all t, where b−(t) ∆= −min {b(t), 0}1, or b(t)−a(t) ≤ c with probability
1 for all t, then Q(t) is rate stable, i.e., a ≤ b.
Besides, we say that a network is rate stable or strongly stable if all queues in this network
are rate stable or strong stable as described above.
5.4 Energy Consumption Optimization
In this section, we investigate the energy consumption optimization problem given cross-
layer constraints in D2D data offloading.
5.4.1 Energy Consumption
For each offloading user, he consumes the energy when he either transmits the contents or
receives the requested contents. Denote the energy consumed at user i as Ei(t), i ∈ U , in time slot
t,
Ei(t) =
∑
j∈U,j 6=i
∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
Pmij (t)s
m
ij (t)∆t+ P
rev
i s
m
ji(t)∆t, (5.1)
1Based on [137], the value of a(t) is assumed to be non-negative. For most physical queuing systems, b(t) assumed
to be non-negative, although it is sometimes convenient to allow b(t) to take negative values.
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where the user i consumes the power Pmij (t) to transmit the contents to the user j using band m.
P revi , a constant, denotes the power the user i spends receiving the contents. We suppose ∆t to be
the time duration in each time slot, and smij (t) is a binary transmission indicator where s
m
ij (t) = 1
means that user i transmits to user j on band m in time slot t. Otherwise, smij (t) = 0.
5.4.2 Interference Constraints
To mitigate the interference and improve the throughput when different users offload con-
tents simultaneously, we investigate the constraints from the physical layer.
Based on a widely applied model [55,63,84], the power propagation gain from user i to user
j, denoted by gij , is,
gij = d(i, j)
−γ , (5.2)
where d(i, j) is the Euclidean distance between user i and j and γ represents the path loss exponent.
Here we assume that the coherence bandwidth of each band is larger than the bandwidth itself so
that each band is flat. Meanwhile, the coherence time of the channel is larger than the duration of
a time slot so that the fading remains constant in each time slot. In addition, users are assumed to
be in the same location during content transmission.
Given the propagation gain in (5.2), according to [63], the signal-to-interference-plus-noise
ratio (SINR) of the signal received at j from i on band m becomes,
SINRmij (t) =
gijP
m
ij (t)
ηjWm(t) +
∑
k 6=i,v 6=j gkjP
m
kv(t)
, (5.3)
in which we denote ηj as the thermal noise power density at user j. W
m(t),m ∈ M represents the
bandwidth of the current spectrum being occupied. We simulate the changes of the current channel
condition by changing Wm(t). As in [75, 113], the content transmission is successful only if the
received SINR at user j satisfies,
SINRmij (t) ≥ Γ, (5.4)
where Γ is a threshold that depends on the current modulation scheme and the target bit error rate
(BER) Pb [63]. To adapt the current channel condition, we deploy an adaptive M-order quadratic
amplitude modulation (M-QAM) scheme, where the modulation order O is chosen from a order set
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C = {21, 22, · · · , 2C}. Hence, we have different possible thresholds as,
Γlog2 O = −
(O − 1) ln(5Pb)
1.5
, O = 21, 22, · · · , 2C . (5.5)
Suppose that ideal Nyquist data pulse is applied on modulation. The spectrum efficiency of M-QAM
is log2O bps/Hz [63]. Let ΓC+1 =∞. When Γlog2 O ≤ SINR
m
ij (t) ≤ Γlog2 O+1, the achievable data
rate from user i to user j on band m is,
cmij (t) = W
m(t) log2O(t). (5.6)
5.4.3 Network Layer Constraints
It is an efficient way to improve the energy efficiency by considering the channel condition
changes. Instead of offloading the contents to other users when the channel condition is poor, each
user would like to keep the contents until that channel condition becomes better. Hence, each user
maintains a content queue Qli(t), i ∈ U , l ∈ L for his received content at the network layer. For every
queue Qli at each user, it is updated in the following,
Qli(t+ 1) = max
Qli(t)− ∑
j∈U,j 6=i
f lij(t), 0
+ ( ∑
{j|i 6=j}
f lji(t) + vl(t)1i=Sl). (5.7)
If Qli(t) = 0, the user i is not on the offloading path for the content l in the current time slot. In
(5.7), the binary variable 1i∈sl(i ∈ U) indicates whether the user i is the representative user who
receives the content l from the BS. We use vl(t) to denote its amount in the unit of the number
of bits, vl(t) ≤ vmax, where the constant vmax denotes the maximum amount of content received
from base station. Note that we suppose the value of vl(t) is known at the beginning of each time
slot. Because there is no incoming data from other users at the source user of session l, we have the
following constraint, ∑
{j 6=i|i}
f lji(t) = 0,∀i = sl, l ∈ L. (5.8)
5.4.4 Social Preference in Queue
We define a rational number ρli ∈ [0, 1] to denote user i’s social interests on content l. The
more interesting to the contents, the larger ρli is. Our social preference in queue is reflected on the
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maximum queue size to the contents. To be specific, pli = F (ρ
l
i), i ∈ U denotes the maximum queue
size user i provides for by-passing content l ∈ L. F (·) is a positive function that differentiates the
queue size allocated to contents with different social preferences ρli of user i. We suppose F (·) is
an increasing function with users’ social preference ρli. It means users would like to provide larger
queues for caching their interested contents. Specifically, we denote pli = (1+αρ
l
i)p
l
sl
, where plsl is the
maximum queue size user sl provides for content l from base station and α is the weight to strengthen
the social preference’s effect to the maximum buffer size. The reason for 1 is to ensure that user still
participates the data offloading process even he is not interested in the content. Otherwise, in the
worst case that no user is interested in the contents, they all keep the contents to themselves and
thus data offloading is stopped. In addition, we assume α = 1.
5.4.5 Link Scheduling Constraints
In this subsection, we illustrate the power allocation and link scheduling on content dissem-
ination. Since each user is unable to transmit to or receive from multiple users on the same band,
given the binary transmission indicator smij (t) mentioned above, we have,
∑
j∈U,j 6=i
smij (t) ≤ 1, and
∑
i∈U,i6=j
smij (t) ≤ 1. (5.9)
Besides, due to “self-interference” at the physical layer, a user cannot use the same frequency band
for both transmission and receiving at the same time. Hence,
∑
i∈U,i6=j
smij (t) +
∑
q∈U,q 6=j
smjq(t) ≤ 1. (5.10)
Meanwhile, we suppose that each user is equipped with a single radio, in the case that he cannot
occupy more spectrum bands in each time slot. Taking (5.9) and (5.10) into consideration, one of
the constraints in the link scheduling finally becomes,
∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
∑
i6=j
smij (t) +
∑
n∈Mj∩Mq
∑
q 6=j
snjq(t) ≤ 1. (5.11)
In addition to the above constraints at a certain user, there are also power constraints due to potential
interferences among different users. Denote smcij (t) as a binary indicator that describes whether the
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content transmission from user i to user j on band m satisfies Γc ≤ SINRmij (t) ≤ Γc+1(1 ≤ c ≤ C),
where c = log2O,
C∑
c=1
smcij (t) ≤ 1. (5.12)
Moreover, since each available transmission’s SINR must be above one of the thresholds in {Γ1,Γ2, · · · ,ΓC},
we get,
smij (t) =
C∑
c=1
smcij (t). (5.13)
Considering (5.3) and (5.4), under an adaptive M-QAM schemes, the constraint on the power Pmij
is,
gijP
m
ij (t) ≥
(
C∑
c=1
smcij (t)Γc
)(
ηjW
m(t) +
∑
k 6=i,v 6=j
gkjP
m
kv(t)
)
, (5.14)
The other constraint on the transmission power Pmij is,
0 ≤ Pmij (t) ≤ Pmaxi ,∀i, j ∈ U ,m ∈Mi ∩Mj , (5.15)
where Pmaxi is the maximum transmission power of user i.
Besides, the amount of contents transmitted from user i to user j on band m in each time
slot cannot exceed the achievable data rate multiplied by the duration of the time slot,
∑
l∈L
f lij(t) ≤
∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
cmij (t)s
m
ij (t)∆t. (5.16)
5.4.6 Offline Energy Consumption Minimization
In offline energy consumption minimization, we aim to minimize the time-averaged ex-
pected energy consumption given the interference and link scheduling constraints while guaranteeing
the strong stability of the network. We formulate offline energy consumption minimization problem,
P1: minimize lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i∈U
E[Ei(t)]
s.t. Constraints (5.8), (5.11), (5.13)-(5.16)
Q(t) is strongly stable. (5.17)
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In (5.17), Q(t) =
{
Qli(t),∀i ∈ U , l ∈ L
}
. We denote the optimal result of P1 by φ∗P1. Without the
constraint (5.17), P1 is a time-coupling stochastic MINLP problem, which is already expensive to
solve. Previous approaches usually solve such problems based on Dynamic Programming [22] and
suffer from the “curse of dimensionality” problem. They also require detailed statistical information
on the random variables in the problem, which may be difficult to obtain in practice. In addition, the
constraint (5.17) makes P1 an even more complicated problem. Hence, we reformulate this problem
into an online energy consumption optimization problem using Lyapunov optimization theory to
break the time-coupling in P1 and find a feasible solution based on the current network condition.
5.5 Online Energy Consumption Minimization
In this section, Lyapunov optimization theory is applied to design a drift-plus-penalty online
energy consumption minimization problem P3 without requiring any prior knowledge of the network
parameters while guaranteeing the network stability. The solution to P3 depends on the current
channel conditions and the current queue backlogs.
5.5.1 Equivalent Offline Optimization Problem
Before moving forward, we reformulate the offline optimization problem P1 into a new one
denoted as P2 to help ensure the strong stability of the network. We will show it later. Generally,
two changes have been made as follows.
To adapt to the Lyapunov optimization framework , the objective function in P1 is replaced
by:
E = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
(∑
i∈U
E[Ei(t)]− λ
∑
i∈U
∑
l∈L
vl(t)1i=sl
)
, (5.18)
in which λ is a parameter determined by the system controller.
Besides, we add another constraint in the following,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E
[∑
l∈L
f lij(t)
]
≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E
 ∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
cmij (t)s
m
ij (t)∆t
 , (5.19)
which is obtained by summing the inequality (5.16), taking expectation and limitation of both sides.
112
The complete formulation of P2 is as follows,
P2: minimize E
s.t. Constraints (5.8), (5.11), (5.13)-(5.17), (5.19) .
We denote the optimal result of P2 by φ∗P2.
Since λ and vl(t) in (5.18) are neither related to the constraints (5.8), (5.11), (5.13)-(5.16)
nor the energy consumption, the new adding item λ
∑
i∈U
∑
l∈L
vl(t)1i=sl does not affect the optimal
solution to P1. Meanwhile, if the constraint (5.16) is satisfied, the constraint (5.19) is satisfied
spontaneously. Therefore, we say that the new proposed optimization problem P2 is equivalent to
the problem P1. The same with P1, P2 is also a time-coupling stochastic MINLP problem which
requires the prior knowledge of the network parameters. Besides, the requirement of the network
stability (5.17) further increases its difficulty. In the following, we formulate a drift-plus-penalty
problem P3 based on P2.
5.5.2 Modeling Virtual Queues
To satisfy the constraint (5.19), we first introduce a virtual queue Yij(t) complying with the
following queue law,
Yij(t+ 1) = max{Yij(t)−
∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
cmij (t)s
m
ij (t)∆t, 0}+
∑
l∈L
f lij(t). (5.20)
It is understood as the link-layer queue for the link from user i to his neighbor user j, describing
the total amount of contents stored at user i to be transmitted to the user j at the beginning of the
time slot t. Since each user transmits to at most one neighbor on one band in each time slot, the
following inequality is satisfied,
∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
cmij (t)s
m
ij (t)∆t−
∑
l∈L
f lij(t) ≤ cmaxij ∆t. (5.21)
Therefore, according to Lemma 3, if we guarantee the strong stability of the queue Yij(t), we ensure
the rate stability, i.e., constraint (5.16).
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5.5.3 Online Finite-queue-aware Energy Minimization
In this subsection, we formulate an online finite-queue-aware energy consumption minimiza-
tion problem. A new queue Θ(t) = {Q(t),Y(t)} is introduced which is composed of the network-
layer queue Q(t) =
{
Qli(t),∀i ∈ U , l ∈ L
}
and the link-layer queue Y(t) = {Yij(t),∀i, j ∈ U}. Sup-
pose Q(0) = 0 and Y(0) = 0, we define a Lyapunov function for Θ(t),
L (Θ(t)) = L (Q(t)) + L (Y(t))
∆
=
1
2
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈U
plsl
pli
Qli(t)
2 +
∑
i∈U
∑
j 6=i
Yij(t)
2
 , (5.22)
where 1
pli
Qli(t)
2 can be roughly understood as the buffer occupancy ratio of content l at user i.
We multiply it by plsl is to eliminate the parameters’ effect on L (Q(t)) (We will prove that p
l
sl
=
λV + vmax).
In (5.22), L (Θ(t)) being small implies that all queue backlogs are small, while L (Θ(t))
being large implies that at least one queue backlog is large. Since all queue backlogs change with
time, a key idea to push queue backlogs towards a lower congestion state is to make the queue
backlogs change as small as possible. Hence, we define the one-slot conditional Lyapunov drift as,
∆ (Θ(t))
∆
=E [L (Θ(t+ 1))− L (Θ(t)) |Q(t)] , (5.23)
where the expectation E(·) is with respect to the random channel condition and depends on the
control policy in reaction to these channel conditions. However, a lower queue congestion state
cannot ensure limited energy consumption at users. We revise the conditional Lyapunov drift to the
following drift-plus-penalty expression,
∆ (Θ(t)) + V E
[∑
i∈U
Ei(t)− λ
∑
i∈U
∑
l∈L
vl(t)1i=sl |Θ(t)
]
, (5.24)
in which V is a positive control parameter to represent a weight on how much we emphasize on
the energy consumption minimization. According to the drift-plus-penalty framework in Lyapunov
optimization [137], an upper bound for (5.24) should be minimized in each time slot to achieve
network stability while improving energy efficiency at users with the observation of the queue states
Θ(t), and the channel condition cmij (t) and W
m(t). Specifically, the upper bound on L (Θ(t+ 1))−
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L (Θ(t)) in (5.23) is:
L (Θ(t+ 1))− L (Θ(t)) = 1
2
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈U
plsl
pli
(
Qli(t+ 1)
2 −Qli(t)2
)
+
1
2
∑
i∈U
∑
j 6=i
(
Yij(t+ 1)
2 − Yij(t)2
)
=
1
2
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈U
plsl
pli

max{Qli(t)− ∑
j∈U,j 6=i
f lij(t), 0}+ (
∑
{j|i 6=j}
f lji(t) + vl(t)1i=Sl)
2 −Qli(t)2

+
1
2
∑
i∈U
∑
j 6=i

max{Yij(t)− ∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
cmij (t)s
m
ij (t)∆t, 0}+
∑
l∈L
f lij(t)
2 − Yij(t)2

≤ 1
2
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈U
plsl
pli
( ∑
{j|i 6=j}
f lji(t) + vl(t)1i=Sl)
2 + (
∑
j∈U,i6=j
f lij(t))
2
+
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈U
plsl
pli
Qli(t)
 ∑
{j|i 6=j}
f lji(t) + vl(t)1i=Sl −
∑
j∈U,j 6=i
f lij(t)
+ 1
2
∑
i∈U
∑
j 6=i
 ∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
cmij (t)s
m
ij (t)∆t
2 +
1
2
∑
i∈U
∑
j 6=i
(∑
l∈L
f lij(t)
)2
+
∑
i∈U
∑
j 6=i
Yij(t)
∑
l∈L
f lij(t)−
∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
cmij (t)s
m
ij (t)∆t

≤ 1
2
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈U
plsl
pli
( max
j∈U,j 6=i
cmaxij ∆t)
2 +
1
2
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈U
plsl
pli
( max
{j|i 6=j}
cmaxji ∆t+ v
max
l )
2 +
∑
i∈U
∑
j 6=i
(
cmaxij ∆t
)2
+
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈U
plsl
pli
Qli(t)
 ∑
{j|i 6=j}
f lji(t) + vl(t)1i=Sl −
∑
j∈U,j 6=i
f lij(t)
+∑
i∈U
∑
j 6=i
Yij(t)
∑
l∈L
f lij(t)−
∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
cmij (t)s
m
ij (t)∆t

= B +
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈U
plsl
pli
Qli(t)
 ∑
{j|i 6=j}
f lji(t) + vl(t)1i=Sl −
∑
j∈U,j 6=i
f lij(t)
+
∑
i∈U
∑
j 6=i
Yij(t)
∑
l∈L
f lij(t)−
∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
cmij (t)s
m
ij (t)∆t

(5.25)
where B = 12
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈U
plsl
pli
(
max
j∈U,j 6=i
cmaxij ∆t
)2
+ 12
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈U
plsl
pli
(
max
{j|i 6=j}
cmaxji ∆t+ v
max
l
)2
+∑
i∈U
∑
j 6=i
(
cmaxij ∆t
)2
. cmaxij = W
max log2O
max denotes the maximum capacity on the link from
user i to user j. Wmax is the maximized transmission bandwidth and Omax is the maximized modu-
lation order. In the first inequality, we use the fact that (max{Q−b, 0}+a)2 ≤ Q2+a2+b2+2Q(a−b)
for any Q ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, and a ≥ 0.
According to (5.16), we have
∑
j∈U,j 6=i
f lij(t) ≤
∑
j∈U,j 6=i
∑
l∈L
f lij(t) ≤
∑
j∈U,j 6=i
∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
cmij (t)s
m
ij (t)∆t.
Since one user can transmit to at most one neighbor on at most one band in each time slot, we get
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∑
j∈U,j 6=i
f lij(t) ≤ max
j∈U,j 6=i
cmaxij ∆t. The above explains the second inequality. Substitute (5.25) into
(5.23) and (5.24), we have,
∆ (Θ(t)) + V E
[∑
i∈U
Ei(t)− λ
∑
i∈U
∑
l∈L
vl(t)1i=sl |Θ(t)
]
≤ B + ψ1(t) + ψ2(t) + ψ3(t), (5.26)
where:
ψ1(t): related to link scheduling variables s
mc
ij (t) and transmission power P
m
ij (t),
ψ1(t) = E
[∑
l∈L
∑
i∈U
plsl
pli
Qli(t)vl(t)1i=Sl |Q(t)
]
+ E
[∑
i∈U
∑
j∈U,j 6=i
(Yij(t)
∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
cmij (t)s
m
ij (t)∆t)|Y(t)
]
+V E
[∑
i∈U
∑
j∈U,j 6=i
∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
Pmij (t)s
m
ij (t)∆t|Θ(t)
]
. (5.27)
ψ2(t): related to amount of the contents obtained from the BS vl(t),
ψ2(t) = E
[∑
l∈L
∑
i∈U
(
plsl
pli
Qli(t)− λV )vl(t)1i=Sl |Q(t)
]
.
(5.28)
ψ3(t): related to the amount of contents transmitted between users f
l
ij(t),
ψ3(t) = E
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈U
plsl
pli
Qli(t)(
∑
{j|i 6=j}
f lji(t)−
∑
j 6=i
f lij(t))|Q(t)
+E
∑
i∈U
∑
j∈U,j 6=i
(
Yij(t)
∑
l∈L
f lij(t)
)
|Y(t)
 .
(5.29)
Because B is a constant, we minimize ψ1(t) + ψ2(t) + ψ3(t) instead of minimizing the right-hand-
side of (5.26), where ψ1(t), ψ2(t) and ψ3(t) are conditional expectations. By using the concept of
opportunistically minimizing an expectation, we minimize ψ
′
1(t) + ψ
′
2(t) + ψ
′
3(t) instead, where,
ψ
′
1(t) = −
∑
i∈U
∑
j∈U,j 6=i
Yij(t)
∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
cmij (t)s
m
ij (t)∆t+ V
∑
i∈U
∑
j∈U,j 6=i
∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
(Pmij (t)s
m
ij (t))∆t,
(5.30)
ψ
′
2(t) =
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈U
(
plsl
pli
Qli(t)− λV )vl(t)1i=Sl , (5.31)
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and
ψ
′
3(t) =
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈U
plsl
pli
Qli(t)(
∑
{j|i6=j}
f lji(t)−
∑
j 6=i
f lij(t)) +
∑
i∈U
∑
j∈U,j 6=i
(Yij(t)
∑
l∈L
f lij(t)). (5.32)
The final optimization problem P3 is,
P3: minimize ψ
′
1(t) + ψ
′
2(t) + ψ
′
3(t)
s.t. Constraints (5.8), (5.11), (5.13)-(5.16)
Q(t) and Y(t) are stable . (5.33)
5.5.4 A Decomposition Based Approximation Algorithm
In this subsection, we decompose P3 into three subproblems and solve them individually to
obtain a suboptimal and feasible solution.
5.5.4.1 Link Schedule and Power Allocation
We minimize ψ
′
1(t) as follows by finding the optimal link scheduling and power allocation
policy, determined by the variables smij (t) and P
m
ij (t).
S1: minimize ψ
′
1(t)
s.t. Constraints (5.11), (5.13)-(5.15). (5.34)
S1 is a mixed integer quadratically constrained quadratic programming problem, which is
also difficult to solve. We propose an iterative method in Algorithm 7. Generally, as shown in the
while iteration (Line 3-11), we update power allocation profiles Pmij (t) and link scheduling variables
smcij (t) for any ∀i, j ∈ U ,m ∈M, 2c ∈ C iteratively until the objective function in S1 does not change
or the maximum number of iterations is reached. We explain it in detail next.
• Fix smcij (t). The main idea is to fix the values of smcij (t) sequentially through a series of relaxed
linear programming problems. To be specific, given Pmij (t),∀i, j ∈ U ,m ∈ M, S1 becomes a
binary integer programming problem. As shown in Line 4-8, a greedy algorithm is proposed.
We first relax all the 0-1 integer constraints on smcij (t) to 0 ≤ smcij (t) ≤ 1, transforming the
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problem to a linear programming problem. Line 5 solves the linear programming problem to
obtain an optimal solution with each smcij (t) between 0 and 1. Among them, the largest s
mc
ij (t)
is set to 1, denoted as sm
∗c∗
i∗j∗ (t) = 1. Due to
∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
∑
i6=j
smij (t) +
∑
n∈Mj∩Mq
∑
q 6=j
sjq ≤ 1 in the
constraint (5.11), all the sncpj∗(t) = 0 and s
mc
j∗p(t) = 0 for n,m ∈M, 2c ∈ C and p, q ∈ U are set
to 0. The above is what Line 6 does. We remove those already fixed smcij (t) from the objective
functions and constraints as illustrated in Line 7. The process in Line 5-8 is repeated until all
the smcij (t) is obtained.
• Fix Pmij (t). After obtaining the values of smcij (t),∀i, j ∈ U ,m ∈ M, S1 becomes a linear
programming problem with constraints (5.14)-(5.15), which can be easily solved.
• Update ψ′1(t)(n+1) given all Pmij (t)(n+1) and smcij (t)(n).
As in Line 6, band m is allocated to one transmission link in time slot t, say, from user i∗ to
user j∗. All the other users who want to offload contents to user i∗ and j∗ or request contents
from user i∗ and j∗ on band m are not allowed. Since we get a number of the smcij (t) values in
each “inside” while iteration, Line 6 simplifies the solving process for S1. In addition, due to the
interference constraints, allowing many user pairs (e.g., user i to user j, user k to user v) to occupy
the same band is impossible in order to ensure the successful transmission. Hence, the complexity
of Algorithm 7 does not increase as the number of users increases. It does not suffer from the issue
“curse of dimensionality”. The complexity of Algorithm 7 is the same as the complexity of linear
programming. Whereas previous approaches applying Dynamic Programming always suffers from
the “curse of dimensionality” problem [22].
Algorithm 7: Link Scheduling and Power Allocation
Input: cmij (t), Y(t), V , ε, Num
Output: smcij (t), P
m
ij (t) for m ∈ M, 2
c ∈ C and i, j ∈ U
1 Choose an initial value for ψ
′
1(t)
(0), ψ
′
1(t)
(1) and Pmij (t)
(0);
2 Set n = 0
3 while |ψ
′
1(t)
(n+1) − ψ
′
1(t)
(n)| < ε or n+ 1 > Num do
4 while there exists one smcij (t)
(n) that is not fixed as 0 or 1 do
5 Solving S1 by relaxing all smcij (t)
(n) as 0 ≤ smcij (t)
(n) ≤ 1 for any m ∈ M, 2c ∈ C and i, j ∈ U given
Pmij (t)
(n).
6 Set the largest smcij (t)
(n) to 1. Denote as sm
∗c∗
i∗j∗ (t)
(n) = 1 Based on (5.11), set sncpj∗ (t)
(n) = 0 and
smcj∗p(t)
(n) = 0 for any n,m ∈ M, 2c ∈ C and p, q ∈ U
7 Given already fixed smcij (t)
(n) for m ∈ M, 2c ∈ C and i, j ∈ U , update S1.
8 end
9 Calculate Pmij (t)
(n+1) by solving S1 given all smcij (t)
(n).
10 Calculate ψ
′
1(t)
(n+1) given all Pmij (t)
(n+1) and smcij (t)
(n).
11 end
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5.5.4.2 Content Allocation
We minimize ψ
′
2(t) by finding representative users together with the amount of the contents
they obtain from the BS,
S2: minimize ψ
′
2(t)
s.t. Constraints 0 ≤ vl(t) ≤ vmax. (5.35)
A search algorithm is developed to achieve the content allocation. To be specific, at the beginning
of each time slot, given the queue backlogs Qli(t) for each content l, the user with the smallest queue
backlog is chosen as the representative. When there are multiple users with the same smallest queue
backlog, we randomly pick one of them as the representative user. Therefore, the amount of contents
he can get is determined by,
vl(t) =

vmax if Qlsl(t)− λV ≤ 0
0 otherwise.
(5.36)
5.5.4.3 Routing
In this subsection, we minimize ψ
′
3(t) by finding the optimal routing policy, i.e., determining
the variables f lij(t). By reorganizing (5.32), we have,
ψ
′
3(t) =
∑
l∈L
∑
i∈U
∑
j∈U
(
−
plsl
pli
Qli(t) +
plsl
plj
Qlj(t) + Yij(t)
)
f lij(t). (5.37)
Hence, the optimization problem becomes,
S3: minimize ψ
′
3(t)
s.t. Constraints (5.8), (5.16). (5.38)
The objective function of S3 can be viewed as a weighted sum of the variables f lij(t). Hence,
we can determine f lij(t) at user i locally based on the current queue backlogs
plsl
pli
Qli(t),
plsl
plj
Qlj(t) and
Y lij(t). An algorithm is proposed described in Algorithm 8.
In Line 1, the variables f lij(t) (∀j = sl, l ∈ L) are set to 0 according to constraint (5.8).
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Line 2-9 and line 11 are to set the variables f lij(t) (∀i, j ∈ U , l ∈ L). Specifically, the variables
f lij(t) (∀j ∈ U , l ∈ L) with non-negative coefficients are set to 0 in line 3-4. The variable f lij(t)
with the smallest coefficient is found in Line 9. The value for f lij(t) is fixed in line 10-14. Because
it is possible that
∑
m∈Mi∩Mj c
m
ij (t)s
m
ij (t)∆t is equal to 0 if
∑
m∈Mi∩Mj s
m
ij (t) = 0. In that case,
the corresponding variable f lij(t) is set to 0. Otherwise, f
l
ij(t) with the smallest coefficient is set to∑
m∈Mi∩Mj c
m
ij (t)s
m
ij (t)∆t. It means that the transmission link from user i to user j is fully utilized
to deliver the requested contents. Note that if there are multiple variables f lij(t) with the same
smallest coefficients, the user i randomly picks one of them and sets it to
∑
m∈Mi∩Mj c
m
ij (t)s
m
ij (t)∆t.
Algorithm 8: Routing
Input: Q(t), Y(t), pli for any l ∈ L and i ∈ U
Output: f lij(t) for any l ∈ L and i, j ∈ U
1 Set f ljsl
(t) = 0 for any j ∈ U
2 foreach l ∈ L and i, j ∈ U do
3 if
(
−
plsl
pl
i
Qli(t) +
plsl
pl
j
Qlj(t) + Yij(t)
)
≥ 0 then
4 f lij(t) = 0
5 else
6 Calculate coelij(t) =
(
−
plsl
pl
i
Qli(t) +
plsl
pl
j
Qlj(t) + Yij(t)
)
.
7 end
8 end
9 Find the smallest coelij(t). Denote corresponding f
l
ij(t) as f
l∗
i∗j∗ (t)
10 if
∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
smi∗j∗ (t) = 0 then
11 Set f l
∗
i∗j∗ (t) = 0
12 else
13 Set f l
∗
i∗j∗ (t) =
∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
cmi∗j∗ (t)s
m
i∗j∗ (t)∆t
14 end
15 Set other f lij(t) = 0 for any l ∈ L and i ∈ U
In each time slot, the online finite-queue-aware energy consumption minimization problem
is solved after S1, S2 and S3 are solved respectively. The queues Q(t) and Y(t) are then updated
according to (5.7) and (5.20), respectively. We denote the corresponding time-averaged expected
total energy consumption by φ∗P3.
5.6 Performance Analysis
In this section, we prove that the proposed approximation algorithm guarantees network
strong stability. Following that, we derive both the lower and upper bounds on the optimal result
of P1. Finally, we give some simulation results based on our proposed approach.
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5.6.1 Network Strong Stability
Our proposed approach finds an approximation solution to P3 which satisfies the constraints
(5.8), (5.11), (5.13)-(5.16). However, we do not consider the network strong stability, which is an
important and challenging problem.
Theorem 6. Our proposed approximation problem guarantees that the queues Q(t) and Y(t) are
all strongly stable.
Proof: First, we demonstrate the strong stability of Q(t) by considering an arbitrary queue Qli(t).
In particular, the induction method is deployed to prove that Qli(t) ≤ pli, where plsl = λV + v
max
and pli = (1 + αρ
l
i)p
l
sl
.
When t = 0, we have Qli(0) = 0 ≤ pli.
When t = t′(t′ ≥ 0), we suppose Qli(t′) ≤ pli. We prove that Qli(t′+ 1) ≤ pli in the following.
Situation 1: i = sl. The queuing law (5.7) becomes,
Qlsl(t+ 1) = max{Q
l
sl
(t)−
∑
j∈U,j 6=i
f lslj(t), 0}+ vl(t). (5.39)
We consider two situations on the value of vl(t),
• Case 1: Qlsl(t) ≤ λV . According to (5.36), vl(t) = v
max. Qlsl(t
′ + 1) ≤ Qlsl(t
′) + vmax ≤
λV + vmax = plsl .
• Case 2: Qlsl(t) > λV . According to (5.36), vl(t) = 0. Q
l
sl
(t′+ 1) ≤ Qlsl(t
′) ≤ λV + vmax = plsl ,
Situation 2: i 6= sl. The queuing law of Qli(t) is,
Qli(t+ 1) = max
{
Qli(t)−
∑
j∈U,j 6=i
f lij(t), 0
}
+
∑
{j|i∈U,i6=j}
f lji(t). (5.40)
Since only one neighboring user can transmit to user i in time slot t, we denote him as
user j. Considering the coefficient before f lji(t) in the objective function of S3, two situations are
discussed:
• Case 1:
plsl
pli
Qli(t) <
plsl
plj
Qlj(t) − Yji(t). According to (5.40), Qli(t + 1) ≤ Qli(t) + f lji(t) ≤
pli
plj
Qlj(t) −
pli
plsl
Yji(t) + f
l
ji(t) ≤
pli
plj
Qlj(t) ≤ pli. The third inequality is satisfied due to the
following reasons,
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– Yji(t) = 0. Based on the solution to S1, s
mc
ji (t) = 0 and thus f
l
ji(t) = 0. The inequality
holds.
– Yji(t) ≥ 1. Since f lji(t) ≤ max
i∈U,j 6=i
cmaxij ∆t and
pli
plsl
≥ 1, we have p
l
i
plsl
Yij(t) ≥ f lji(t). The
inequality is satisfied.
• Case 2:
plsl
pli
Qli(t) ≤
plsl
plj
Qlj(t)−Yji(t). Based on the solution to S3, f lji(t) = 0. Following (5.40),
we get Qli(t+ 1) ≤ Qli(t) ≤ pli.
From the above proof, an arbitrary queue Qli(t) is finite in each time slot. With Definition
7, Q(t) is strongly stable.
Next, we prove the strong stability of Y(t) by considering an arbitrary queue Yij(t). In
particular,
Yij(t) ≤ max
0≤k≤t
∑
l∈L
f lij(k). (5.41)
When t = 0, Yij(0) = 0 ≤ max
0≤k≤t
∑
l∈L f
l
ij(k).
When t = t′(t′ ≥ 0), we suppose Yij(t′) ≤ max
0≤k≤t
∑
l∈L f
l
ij(k). We prove that Yij(t
′ + 1) ≤
max
0≤k≤t′+1
∑
l∈L f
l
ij(k) in the following.
• Case 1: Yij(t) ≤
∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
cmij (t)s
m
ij (t)∆t. Based on (5.20), Yij(t + 1) =
∑
l∈L f
l
ij(t) ≤
max
0≤k≤t+1
∑
l∈L f
l
ij(k).
• Case 2: Yij(t) >
∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
cmij (t)s
m
ij (t)∆t. Based on (5.20), Yij(t+1) = Yij(t)−
∑
m∈Mi∩Mj
cmij (t)s
m
ij (t)∆t+∑
l∈L
f lij(t). With inequality (5.16), Yij(t+1) ≤ Yij(t) ≤ max
0≤k≤t
∑
l∈L f
l
ij(k) ≤ max
0≤k≤t+1
∑
l∈L f
l
ij(k)
Because
∑
l∈L f
l
ij(t) ≤ cmaxij ∆t, we have Yij(t) ≤ cmaxij ∆t. Therefore, Y(t) is always finite and
strongly stable.
5.6.2 Lower and Upper Bounds for P1
In this subsection, we obtain both lower and upper bounds for the optimal results of P1,
i.e., φ∗P1.
Theorem 7. The solution obtained from our proposed algorithm serves as a suboptimal solution to
P1. And the corresponding time-averaged expected energy consumption holds an upper bound on the
optimal result of P1, i.e., φ∗P1 ≤ φ∗P3.
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Proof: Our proposed algorithm finds a feasible solution to P3 in each time while satisfying all the
constraints, e.g., (5.8), (5.11), (5.13)-(5.16) and (5.33). In addition, because (5.16) is satisfied and
Y(t) is strongly stable as proved above, Y(t) is rate stable according to the Lemma 3. Hence, the
constraint (5.19) holds as well. The solution in P3 is a feasible solution to P2. Because the problems
P1 and P2 are equivalent, the solution in P3 is also a feasible solution to P1. The corresponding
time-averaged expected energy consumption holds an upper bound on the optimal result of P2, i.e.,
φ∗P3 ≥ φ∗P1.
Next, we find a lower bound on φ∗P1 as in Theorem 8.
Theorem 8. The time-averaged expected energy consumption minimized by optimally solving P3,
denoted by φ∗P3, is within a constant gap
B
V from the time-averaged expected energy consumption
achieved by P2, i.e., φ∗P1. Specifically, we obtain,
φ∗P3 −
B
V
≤ φ∗P1,
in which B and V are defined in previous sections.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A for the detailed proof.
According to the Theorem 7 and the Theorem 8, we get a lower bound and an upper bound
on the optimal result of P1, respectively, where,
φ∗P3 −
B
V
≤ φ∗P1 ≤ φ∗P3. (5.42)
Because B and V are independent, BV definitely goes to 0 as V increases. Thus, the gap between the
upper and lower bound definitely becomes smaller. Thus, we could totally prove its sub-optimality
theoretically.
5.6.3 Simulation Results
We evaluate the performance of our proposed approximation approaches in MATLAB on a
computer with 4.0 GHz CPU and 32GB RAM. All the parameters are set in Table. 5.2. Specifically,
users are located at (375, 250), (625, 250), (300, 500), (550, 500), (800, 500), (300, 750), (550, 750),
(800, 750), (375, 1000) and (625, 1000) respectively as shown in Fig. 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Dynamic Characteristics
Table 5.2: Simulation Settings
Parameter Values
Area 1000m× 1000m
Number of Users 10
Number of Time Slots 40
Duration in each time slot 1s
Bandwidth [1.2, 1.4, 1.6]MHz
Modulation Strategy [23, 24, 25]QAM
Bit Error Rate 10−3
SINR Thresholds {24.73, 52.98, 109.50}
Max. Transmission Power 2W
Noise Power Density 10−20W/Hz
Path Loss 4
Weight V 4.6× 104
User’s Interest ρ 1
5.6.3.1 Content Queue Performance
Fig. 5.3 demonstrates the changes in content queue amount as time goes by. In each time
slot, we sum up the content queue amount for each session at each user as the total one, which is
dynamic and arrives at a stable state after a period of less than 30s. Such observation is consistent
with the analysis in subsection 6.1. Thus, in the following simulations, we consider the time slots
from 1 to 30 instead of 40. Besides, we check the effect on the content queue brought by the energy
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(a) Energy Weight Controller V Effect (b) User’s Interest ρ Effect
Figure 5.3: Content Queue Performance
weight controller and the user’s interest respectively. In Fig. 5.3a, the total content queue varies
slightly under different energy weight controller. It is mainly because we factitiously initialize the
content queue amount to be proportional to the energy weight controllers. On the other hand, the
user’s interest in the content session puts a positive effect on the content queue. If a user is more
interested in each content, he would like to store contents and popularize them at the same time.
Thus, he allows more contents to be kept in his queue. As can be seen in Fig. 5.3b, at the stable
state, the total content queue is maximized when ρ = 1.0.
5.6.3.2 Dynamic Characteristics
The dynamic content queue in Fig. 5.3 introduces the dynamic performance to the whole
system. Such dynamic characteristics are reflected on the representative user choice (1i=Sl) directly
according to (5.36). As shown in Fig. 5.4, in each time slot, different representative users are chosen
to receive different content sessions from the service provider. Meanwhile, the same content session
is transmitted to different representative users in different time slots. As time goes by, the choice of
different representative users becomes stable (from 25s to 31s), which indicates the stability of the
entire system is reached.
Besides, we describe the dynamic content transmission choice from the time slot 3 to the
time slot 6 in Fig. 5.2. The allowed and the actual content transmission pairs (smij (t) and f
l
ij(t))
change in different time slots. In some time slots, e.g., the time slot 4, no contents are transmitted
although a few transmission pairs are allowed. Whereas the contents are transmitted in all the
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Figure 5.4: Representative Choice
allowed transmission pairs in some time slot, e.g., the time slot 5. Meanwhile, different content
sessions are transmitted between different transmission pairs in different time slots. The dynamic
content queue affects the offloading content amount as in S3, which puts an effect on both the
content queue and the virtual queue like. The dynamic virtual queue affects the choice of the
allowed transmission pairs as in S2. Thus, the system becomes dynamic but finally arrives at a
stable state.
5.6.3.3 Energy Cost Performance
We consider the averaged energy cost for each user in each time in Fig.5.5. Fig. 5.5a shows
the effect on the averaged energy cost brought by different modulation schemes. To achieve content
successful transmission under random channel conditions, users have to choose different modulations
schemes adaptively. Therefore, we see that the averaged energy cost under the adaptive M-QAM
scheme is lower than that under 8QAM and higher than that under 32QAM.
Fig. 5.5b considers the averaged energy cost in time slot 2. As can be seen, the averaged
energy cost decreases with the increase of the energy weight controller, which is consistent with our
description previously. Fig. 5.5c shows the changes in the averaged energy cost as the time goes
by, from which the average energy cost becomes almost the same after 20 time slots. The dynamic
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averaged energy cost performance is the same as that of the content queue amount. Besides, we
demonstrate the time-averaged energy cost under users’ social preferences in Fig.5.5d, where “Rand”
means users have different interests in different contents. Users would like to cache their interested
contents instead of disseminating them, especially in bad channel conditions. Therefore, we see that
the time-averaged energy cost decreases with the increase of social preference.
(a) Modulation Effect (b) Energy Weight V Effect
(c) Time Effect (d) Social Effect
Figure 5.5: Energy Cost Performance
Meanwhile, as energy weight controller V increases, the difference of time-averaged energy
cost between social preferences becomes smaller in Fig.5.5d. Social preference’s effect on the energy
cost results from its effect on the maximum queue size. When V becomes larger, keeping queue
stability becomes less important. Users could cache more contents no matter how much they are
interested in the contents. Hence, the total energy cost is lowered. Besides, social preference’s effect
on the energy cost becomes subtle. When V becomes smaller, users have to strictly guarantee their
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queue stability. They could not cache too much in their buffers. Therefore, they have to offload more
contents to other users, which increases the energy cost. Meanwhile, due to the strict requirement to
queue stability, users cache their most interested contents. Thus, their social preferences will greatly
affect the energy cost.
(a) Total Content Queue (b) Averaged Content Queue
(c) Total Energy Cost (d) Averaged Energy Cost
Figure 5.6: User Number Effect
5.6.3.4 User Number Effect
Besides the above consideration, we compare the content queue and energy cost performance
under a different number of users. Specifically, we consider the cases with 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 and 18
users respectively. The minimum distance among users in each case is set to 250m. In Fig.5.6a, we
consider the time-averaged total content queues, where the content queue amount increases as the
number of users increases. In Fig. 5.6b, we further average the content queue over the user number.
The time-averaged user-averaged content queue jumps among the cases with different numbers,
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Figure 5.7: Reaching Steady State Speed
which indicates the introduction of more users does not affect the stability of the content queue.
In addition to time-averaged total content queue performance, the time-averaged energy cost also
increases with the introduction of more users whereas per-user time-averaged energy cost decreases,
which are shown in Fig. 5.6c and 5.6d respectively.
Finally, we investigate our solution’s speed to a steady network state. As shown in Fig.5.7,
when a few users exist, they can reach a steady network state very soon. When the number of
users increases, it takes a longer time to reach a steady state. Since users are always in a changing
environment, the speed of reaching a network state does not affect users to offload or to access data
as long as they do not reach the maximum queue size. Such observations further demonstrate that
our proposed online optimization solution is not affected by the number of users, which means our
solution does not suffer from the “curse of dimensionality”.
5.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we propose a social-aware energy-efficient data offloading approach to re-
duce energy consumption and achieve green communication in the cellular network. By jointly
considering storage capacity allocation, queuing and transmission scheduling, we design an offline
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energy consumption minimization problem, which is a time-coupling stochastic MINLP problem. By
introducing a virtue queue and employing Lyapunov drift-plus-penalty theory, we reformulate the
problem as an online finite-queue-aware energy consumption problem, which is decoupled and then
decomposed into several separate subproblems in each time slot. The proposed method ensures the
network with strong stability. Both lower and upper bounds on the optimal result of the original
optimization problem are obtained. Based on the simulation results, we show the feasibility and
efficiency of our approximation approach.
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Chapter 6
Secure and Optimized
Unauthorized Secondary User
Detection in Dynamic Spectrum
Access
6.1 Chapter Overview
The proliferation of mobile and interconnected devices has exacerbated the depletion of
licensed wireless spectrum bands in the recent decades. Dynamic System Access (DSA) has received
considerable attention recently due to its ability to alleviate the spectrum scarcity issue. In a DSA
system, a spectrum operator, who regulates the licensed spectrum, authorizes the secondary user
(SU) to opportunistically use the spectrum when it is not occupied by primary users. However, the
open nature of the wireless medium makes the DSA system a potential target for unauthorized access.
Specifically, by faking/replaying the spectrum permit (denoted as permit hereinafter), unauthorized
SU can use any available spectrum bands and introduce severe interference to authorized SU who
is currently using the designated spectrum bands. As a result, the authorized SU will lose interests
on participating in DSA and thus the benefits brought by the DSA system are largely deteriorated.
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Therefore, it is highly needed to devise an efficient and accurate unauthorized SU detection scheme
to ensure the DSA system and further unleash its great potential for future wireless systems with
cognitive capabilities.
Physical-layer authentication is an effective way to distinguish unauthorized SU from au-
thorized SU without having to complete higher-layer processing [97, 98, 105, 106, 185]. Specifically,
the authorized SU embeds an unforgeable permit into its data traffic using techniques related to the
physical layer. A third party named as the verifier passively eavesdrops on the SU’s transmission
and tries to detect and verify the permit. Yang et al. [185] add cryptographic permit into OFDM
symbols for detection. Permit is concealed via inter-symbol interference in [106]. These two schemes
negatively impact normal data transmission. Jin et al. [98] embed the permit by using dynamic
power control on transmitted signals. FEAT scheme in [105] embeds the authentication information
into the transmitted waveform by inserting an intentional frequency offset. It takes a long time to
detect the unauthorized SU in these two schemes, which gives the unauthorized SU opportunity to
transmit its information without being detected. By concealing the permit into the cyclic prefix
in [97], the fake/replayed permit can be detected, which is impractical due to the modification of
the existing physical layer protocols. These identified weaknesses motivate us to design an accurate,
efficient and implementable unauthorized SU detection scheme, which not only ensures the current
DSA system but also becomes a crucial component adapted to future wireless systems [4].
In this chapter, we propose a novel unauthorized SU detection scheme based on hierarchi-
cal modulation [95], where permit symbols generated using a hash function and data symbols are
synchronously aggregated before transmission. To overcome the intrusion to data transmission, the
operator picks up a proper power allocation scalar between the permit and data transmission power,
which allows the reliable transmission of both permit and data. Different from the traditional hi-
erarchical modulation, the operator modulates the permit using rotation multiple layer modulation
(RMLM), in which permit bits are first grouped, modulated, rotated and finally added together.
By choosing proper rotation angles based on the current channel condition, which sensors in DSA
obtain by performing channel estimation and then return to the operator, RMLM not only helps
permit information to resist the noise but also prevents unauthorized SU faking/preventing the per-
mit. The parameters related to the hash function, the power allocation scalar, the rotation angles
in RMLM together with permit rotation angles are sent to the verifier through an authenticated
and encrypted channel at the beginning of the spectrum authentication by the operator. At the
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verifier, MMSE-SIC (Minimum mean square error-Successive interference cancellation) is deployed
to detect the permit information. Together with RMLM, our scheme can achieve permit reliable
transmission with high transmission rate [165]. Since no extra knowledge is needed at the authorized
SU receiver, our scheme does not change the existing physical-layer protocols. We highlight and list
our contributions as follows:
• We propose a novel unauthorized SU detection scheme, which prevents unauthorized users
from capturing the authorized SU’s spectrum bands.
• We deploy an improved hierarchical modulation to embed permit information into data trans-
mission. A proper power allocation scalar is chosen to reduce the permit’s intrusiveness to
normal data transmission.
• Based on the current channel condition, we optimize the permit RMLM and achieve high
efficiency and accuracy in unauthorized SU detection.
• By combining the permit embedding at the SU transmitter and MMSE-SIC at the verifier, a
satisfactory permit error performance is achieved.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 6.2, we briefly review the existing
unauthorized SU detection schemes and study the literature of RMLM and MMSE-SIC. Then, we
give a description of our system model and the proposed framework in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4,
we elaborate the scheme from the following four parts: permit generation and encoding, permit
modulation, permit embedding, and permit detection and verification. To show the security effec-
tiveness of our proposed scheme, we analyze the resilience to emulation and replay attacks, as well
as the comprising attack in Section 6.5. Both permit and data detection performance are thoroughly
evaluated in Section 6.6, followed by the conclusion in Section 6.7.
6.2 Related Work
In this section, we review the prior works closely related to our proposed scheme.
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6.2.1 Unauthorized SU Detection
Previous methods on safeguarding the DSA system is to deploy cryptographic schemes
[12, 57, 126, 130] at the higher layers where messages carried by the waveform are detected for au-
thentication. Different with those mechanisms, the physical layer-based authentication approaches
enable a receiver to distinguish the authorized SU and the unauthorized SU without involving higher-
layer processing. This fact brings obvious advantages on efficiency improvement. More importantly,
the physical layer-based detection is indispensable in some cases. For example, in the heterogeneous
coexistence environment, e.g., IEEE 802.22 and 802.11af systems coexisting in TV white space,
incompatible system may not be able to decode each others’ higher layer signals. Thus, the re-
search on the physical layer-based detection approaches, such as RF fingerprinting in [26, 83, 166]
and authentication signal embedding in [97,98,105,106,142,163,185], attract a lot of attentions.
6.2.2 Superposition coding (SC) and MMSE-SIC
Hierarchical modulation is considered as a practical implementation of SC [131] while RMLM
is the extension of SC. Tse et al. [42,91,128,129,165] assume SC to be an alternative scheme for high
throughput transmission. An interesting feature of SC is that the transmitted signal exhibits an
approximately Gaussian distribution, which provides a more straightforward approach for achieving
the so-called shaping gain [56,167,169] as demonstrated in [129]. Successive interference cancellation
(SIC) is a physical-layer detection strategy at the receiver. As is described in [165], in SIC, one of
the users, say user 1, is decoded treating user 2 as interference, but user 2 is decoded with the benefit
of the signal of user 1 already removed. It has been proven that the transmission rate of users in the
capacity region can be achieved by deploying SC at the transmitter and SIC at the receiver in [165].
Therefore, we apply SC and SIC to improve the accuracy and efficiency of both permit and data
transmission.
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6.3 System Model and Framework Overview
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Figure 6.1: System Model of the Optimized Detection Scheme
6.3.1 System Model
As shown in Fig.6.1, our system model contains three entities.
• Spectrum Operator: It refers to a licensed spectrum owner or a spectrum-service provider that
regulates spectrum sharing. A typical example is the SAS in 3.5GHz band [38]. When a SU re-
quests an unoccupied spectrum, the spectrum operator allows the SU transmission by sending
it the spectrum authorized information. To prevent unauthorized access, the spectrum oper-
ator recruits multiple verifiers in the specific area. Besides, the spectrum operator optimizes
the permit embedding by picking up a proper allocation scalar and rotation angles in RMLM
according to the known current channel condition (In 3.5GHz, it is sensed by Environmental
Sensing Capability sensors (ESC) and reported to SAS), which are sent to the SU and its
nearby verifier. Either according to a pre-determined random schedule or when the authorized
SU in a particular area reports abnormal interference, the spectrum operator authorizes the
SU and the verifier to begin permit detection process.
• Secondary Users (SU): A SU requests and pays for a given licensed spectrum at the desired
location and time. As soon as receiving permit detection indication from the spectrum opera-
tor, the SU transmitter embeds the permit into its data and transmits the aggregated symbols.
The SU receiver has no idea about the permit embedding and detects data information without
any changes on the physical layer.
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• Verifier: It extracts the permit information from the received signal and does not participate
in normal data transmission. Even if the verifier detects data symbols, it cannot know the
data information due to the lack of higher layer protocols. After authentication, the verifier
reports its results to the spectrum operator who will then physically locate and further punish
the illegitimate transmitters.
6.3.2 Attack Model
We define the attacker as the unauthorized SU who transmits without authentication either
by accident or misconfiguration, or who illegally accesses the spectrum to avoid costs of spectrum
occupation. Given the flexibility of today’s cognitive radios, above operations can be done by
controlling its transceiver to manipulate its physical-layer symbols. Without a valid permit, the
attacker tries to compromise the spectrum by faking/replaying one. Meanwhile, we assume that the
unauthorized SU is computationally bounded and cannot break the cryptographic primitives used
to generate the permit. Finally, the unauthorized SU can compromise the verifier to report incorrect
results to the spectrum operator.
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Figure 6.2: Framework of the Secure and Optimized Detection Scheme
6.3.3 Framework Overview
The framework of the proposed detection scheme is shown in Fig.6.2. The permit sequence
pi in time slot i is encoded as the coded bit sequence cp(i), which is then mapped into permit symbol
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sequence xp(i) using RMLM:
xp(i) =
√
k(i)(mp1(i)e
jθ1(i) +mp2(i)e
jθ2(i)) (6.1)
which is then added to the modulated data symbol sequence xd(i). Given the AWGN noise nd(i)
with mean 0 and variance σ2, the received signal y(i) at the SU receiver is:
yd(i) = xd(i) + xp(i)e
jα(i) + nd(i) (6.2)
MMSE is used to detect the data bit sequence d′(i) from yd(i).
The received signal yp(i) at the verifier is:
yp(i) = xd(i) + xp(i)e
jα(i) + np(i) (6.3)
where np(i) is the AWGN noise with the same mean and variance with nd(i). We apply MMSE-
SIC to detect the permit p′i. The verifier detects data symbols while treating permit symbols as
interference at first. After subtracting detected data symbols, the remaining part is decoded as the
permit p′i using MMSE.
6.4 Optimized Unauthorized SU Detection Scheme
In this section, we elaborate the proposed unauthorized SU detection scheme. Mutual
information (MI) between the transmitter and receiver is a measure of transmission rate on the
premise of reliable communication [165]. Therefore, we choose the rotation angle in permit RMLM
by maximizing MI to achieve the accurate and efficient permit detection. As for permit embedding,
the power allocation scalar and the rotated angle for permit symbols are discussed step by step. Due
to the same detection scheme optimization in each time slot, we ignore the time slot expression i in
the following.
6.4.1 Permit Generation and Encoding
Before elaborating the scheme in detail, we make three assumptions to ensure the entire pro-
cess, which is the same as those in [98]. First, the geographic region is divided into non-overlapping
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cells of equal size to avoid the inter-cell interference. In each cell, we assume that the idle spectrum
is divided into non-overlapping channels to prevent the intra-cell interference. Finally, time is di-
vided into slots of equal length. To ensure the correct detection for permit and data, all entities are
assumed to be loosely synchronized to a global time server.
An efficient one-way hash chain is deployed by the operator to generate the unforgeable
spectrum permits. Denote h(x) as a cryptographic hash function on x and hη(x) as η successive
operations on h(·) to x. An SU transmitter requests a spectrum usage by specifying a band index, an
area index, and a time duration γ. Receiving the request, the spectrum operator transmits a random
number pγ to the SU transmitter securely. The SU transmitter recursively computes pi = h(pi+1),
i ∈ [1, γ − 1] as its permit in time slot i. The spectrum operator also generates p0 = hγ(pγ) and
sends it to the verifier.
To tolerate transmission errors resulted from the noise and reduce the hardware cost, the
permit is encoded using repetition code Cm with system parameter m. Other encoding techniques,
such as convolutional code and turbo code, can also be applied, which further improves the permit
detection efficiency by paying the complexity cost.
6.4.2 Permit RMLM
Given the permit RMLM process in Fig.6.2, we first show an example of permit constellation
assuming θ1 = 0 and θ2 = π/6 in Fig.6.3 after RMLM. We employ Quadrature Phase Shift Keying
(QPSK) to modulate the permit bits. It is widely applied in many applications and standards such
as IEEE 802.11b and IEEE 802.11g. General quadrature amplitude modulation is also supported.
In Fig.6.3, the two bits in angle brackets represent permit bits in the first layer while those in
parenthesis indicate permit bits in the rotated second layer. Every four bits correspond to one
permit symbol.
6.4.2.1 Rotation Angle Effect
As shown in Fig.6.3, the choice of rotation angle affects the permit transmission reliability
due to its effect on the minimum distance between permit symbols. In AWGN channel, increasing
the minimum distance is an effective method to enhance the noise-resilient capability [63]. A worst
case is θ1 = 0 and θ2 = π/2 under which the minimum distance becomes 0. The verifier cannot
distinguish permit bits from the detected permit symbols. Therefore, how to choose a proper rotation
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Figure 6.3: An Example for Permit Symbol Constellation
angle becomes the key part in permit RMLM. Since the repition code Cm encoding the permit has
an strong error correcting capacity of (m−1)/2, we consider the permit transmission quality instead
of its recoverability at the verifier in our scheme. According to [67], the input−output MI is an
indicator of how much coded information can be pumped through a channel reliably given a certain
input signaling. Therefore, we pick up the rotation angle by maximizing MI.
Assuming we have subtracted the data symbols at the verifier. Since choosing the proper
rotation angle is the same in each time slot, we rewrite the permit at the SU transmitter and
the verifier as U = U1 + U2e
jθ and V = U + N , where U1, U2e
jθ, U represent
√
k(i)mp1(i),√
k(i)mp2(i)e
jθ2(i) and xp(i) respectively. The noise np(i) in (6.3) is denoted as N with zero mean
and variance σ2. Our goal is to find a proper θ by maximizing MI between V and U :
max
θ
I(U ;V )
s.t. 0 ≤ θ ≤ 2π (6.4)
where I(U ;V ) =
∑
u∈U,v∈V p(uv)log2
∑
u′∈U p(v|u
′)p(u′)
p(u) [42]. The joint distribution of the input u
and output v, the probability distribution function (PDF) of u, and the PDF of v on the knowledge
of u′ are p(uv), p(u), and p(v|u′), respectively. When the probability of each elements in U is equal,
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the MI gets the maximum value [42]. It is written as:
I(U ;V ) = log2M −
1
M
∑
um∈U
v∈V
p(v|um)log2
∑
uj∈U
p(v|uj)
p(v|um)
(6.5)
where p(v|uj) = 1πσ2 exp(
−|v−uj |2
σ2 ). M denotes maximum number of permit symbols after RMLM.
Using QPSK modulation, M = 16.
6.4.2.2 MI Optimization
Denote dmj =
um−uj
σ and t =
v−um
σ . Due to the complex and continuity of the received
signal V , rewrite I(U ;V ) in (6.5) as:
I(U ;V ) = log2M −
1
Mπ
M∑
m=1
+∞∫
−∞
+∞∫
−∞
exp
(
−|t|2
)
×
log2
M∑
j=1
exp
(
−2t · dmj − |dmj|2
) dt (6.6)
Assume fm(t) = log2
∑M
j=1 exp
(
−2t · dmj − |dmj |2
)
, I(U ;V ) is expressed by Gussian-Hermite nu-
merical integration as:
I(U ;V ) = log2M−
1
Mπ
M∑
m=1
+∞∫
−∞
+∞∫
−∞
exp
(
−|t|2
)
fm(t) dt = log2M−
1
Mπ
M∑
m=1
P∑
p1=1
Wp1
P∑
p2=1
Wp2f(t1, t2)
(6.7)
where P , Wp1, Wp2, t1 and t2 are the parameters that can be found in [10].
The I(U ;V ) in (6.7) is a function with variable θ concealed in fm(t). The MI maximization
problem becomes:
max
θ
log2M −
1
Mπ
M∑
m=1
P∑
p1=1
Wp1
P∑
p2=1
Wp2f(t1, t2)
s.t. 0 ≤ θ ≤ 2π (6.8)
We solve the above optimization problem by a numerical global research method [104],
which can be implemented using the MATLAB Global Optimization Toolbox. This method is a
gradient-based algorithm using multiple randomized starting points to find different local optimal
values of a smooth nonlinear optimization problem [27].
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6.4.2.3 Rotation Angle Chosen
We figure the relationship between the rotation angle and the MI in Fig.6.4 assuming the
Signal-to-Noise Ratio SNR = 20dB and k = 0.25. The opmital rotation angle is θ∗ = π/4 and the
figure is about θ symmetric. In Fig.6.5, the permit constellations are plotted together when θ = π/6
(red solid circle) and θ = π/3 (blue hollow circle). Combining Fig.6.4 and Fig.6.5, we conclude that
the permit constellations are totally different under different rotation angles even if their effects on
MI are similar, e.g., θ = π/6, π/4, π/3. Motivated by above observations, the spectrum operator
is designed to choose a list of sequential rotation angles randomly based on the current channel
condition, e,g., θ = {π/6, π/4, π/3, π/3, π/4, · · · } at 20dB, which are sent to the verifier and SU
respectively.
Figure 6.4: MI vs Rotation Angle Figure 6.5: Permit Contellation after RMLM
6.4.3 Permit Embedding
6.4.3.1 Power Allocation
Although the permit symbols and data symbols can be transmitted simultaneously, the em-
bedded permit symbols are actually the interference of data symbols, which brings negative impacts
to the data transmission. To alleviate such negative impact, we introduce the power allocation scalar
k. Assume the unit total power, the power of the permit and the data is k and 1 − k respectively.
We will thoroughly investigate the power allocation via the experiment in Section V to choose a
proper one under which the reliable transmission of both the permit and data is achieved.
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6.4.3.2 RMLM Permit Symbol Rotation
The motivation to rotate RMLM symbols when embedded into data is to increase the data
detection accuracy and further improve the permit detection performance. Specifically, we rotate
RMLM permit symbols with an angle α when they are embedded to the data symbols in the first
quadrant, such that the minimum distance between aggregated symbols and the vertical/horizontal
axis is maximized. The aggregated symbols are then made symmetric along the vertical axis, the
central point, and the horizontal axis to construct the constellation. Since QPSK and MMSE-
SIC employed at the SU transmitter and the verifier respectively, the above minimum distance
maximization effectively helps resist against the interference to the transmitted symbols brought by
the noise. Data symbols are detected with better accuracy and thus an improved permit detection
is achieved. Meanwhile, the data detection performance is also improved at the SU receiver.
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
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Figure 6.6: Constellation of the Transmitted Symbols
An constellation example of the transmitted symbols is shown in Fig.6.6 with k = 0.25,
θ = π/6, and α = 0, in which x marks, red triangles and green blue dots represent the constellations of
the original permit symbols, the original data symbols and the final transmitted symbols respectively.
In practice, a permit can be transmitted via one or multiple data packets. Permit embedding starts
after the preamble and header transmission until either permit bits are all sent or the data symbols
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all are used up [98]. In our scheme, each data symbol carries four permit bits due to two layers’
aggregation in RMLM. More permit bits can be embedded by increasing the number of layers.
6.4.4 Permit Detection and Verification
6.4.4.1 Permit and Data Detection
MMSE-SIC is deployed to detect the permit at the receiver. With the received signal, the
verifier first detects each QPSK data symbol sequentially by using MMSE. Specifically, the verifier
suggests the QPSK constellation point nearest to the received signal as the transmitted data symbol,
e.g., red triangular in Fig. 6.6. The detected data symbol is then subtracted from the received signal.
At the same time, the verifier makes a re-symmetry for the remained signal according to the position
of the detected data symbol. If it is in the second/three/four quadrant, the verifier finds the point
that is symmetric with the remained signal about the vertical/central/horizontal axis as the received
permit signal. Similar with the data detection, the verifier detects the permit symbols using MMSE.
According to the mapping rules between permit symbols and permit bits, the verifier can easily
get the transmitted permit bits, which is then decoded as either 0 or 1 by using the hard-decision
strategy. Since each permit bit has been consecutively repeated m times, the majority rule is then
applied to determine each permit bit. Note that the verifier reconstructs the permit constellation
based on k, α, and θ, e.g., green cross (×) in Fig. 6.6.
Permit transmission and detection are totally transparent to the SU receiver as if it does
not know the existence of permit. The SU receiver still performs QPSK demodulation.
6.4.4.2 Permit Detection in Practice
In practice, the start of the permit detection is similar with that in [97,98]. The verifier keeps
detecting the permit from physical-layer signals on the corresponding band in a specific duration. It
first detects the preamble for synchronization and obtains the packet size from the header, followed
by the permit detection. If the verifier misses the preamble of the current packet, it detects the
permit from the upcoming packet.
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6.4.4.3 Permit Verification
Denote the detected permit in time-slot i as p′i. To verify the transmitter’s identity, the
verifier computes p′0 by i successive operations of the same hash function h on p
′
i, p
′
0 = h
i(p′i). If
p′0 6= p0, verifier suggests this transmitter is an unauthorized SU. Otherwise, the specific band is
assumed to be securely used by an authorized SU. All the detection results are finally reported to
the spectrum operator who will take further measures according to the receiving results.
6.5 Security Analysis
By emulating an authorized SU transmitter, replaying an overheard permit, or compromising
the verifier to report incorrect results to the spectrum operator, the unauthorized SU may access
the spectrum illegally. Our proposed scheme is resilient to above attacks.
6.5.1 Emulation Attack
A successful emulation attack is achieved if an unauthorized SU provides a proof of the
SU transmitter’s identity to mislead the verifier to believe that the current spectrum is occupied.
Specifically, the unauthorized SU launches an emulation attack if it derives a fake permit which
is the same as that of the SU transmitter. However, such emulation attack is impossible in our
scheme. The unauthorized SU does not have the computational ability to break the cryptographic
primitives. Therefore, it cannot obtain the permit in the next time slot without the root of the
hash chain. However, the unauthorized SU may occasionally create the same permit. Fortunately,
the length of the permit generated using hash function is long enough, so we can ignore such case.
Taking SHA-1 for example, which is one of the most widely used cryptographic hash functions,
it generates 160-bit values. The maximized probability of generating the same permit is 1/(2160),
which is negligible. Therefore, our scheme can successfully prevent the emulation attack.
6.5.2 Replay Attack
Although the unauthorized SU cannot derive a fake permit, it may eavesdrop on a SU trans-
mission, extract its permit, and then attempt to use it for its data transmission. To prevent the
unanthorized SU from extracting the permit, we provide three barriers. As mentioned in IV-B-3)
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part, the angles calculated based on the current channel condition are put into the roatation angle
list randomly, which is sent to the SU transmitter and the verifier through an authenticated and
encrypted channel. Both the SU transmitter and the verifier process the permit using the rotation
angles sequentially and consistently. Therefore, the first barrier in our scheme is the channel esti-
mation. With wrong channel estimation, it is difficult for the unauthorized SU to know the rotation
angle range. Even though the unauthorized SU guesses the range successfully, the randomness of the
chosen rotation angles sets up a new obstacle for the unauthorized SU to know the current rotation
angle based on the previous knowledge. Meanwhile, as shown in Fig.6.5, the constellation patterns
of the permit under different rotation angles are totally different. Hence, the unauthorized SU is
almost impossible to guess the permit exactly without the rotation angle. Taking a step back, if
the unauthorized SU luckily extracts the current permit, it cannot replay the permit in the next
slot without the hash root. Therefore, a lion is in the way for the unauthorized SU to extract the
current permit and further replay one to deceive the verifier.
6.5.3 Compromising Attack
By compromising the verifier to report the wrong detection results to the spectrum operator,
the unauthorized SU can access the spectrum “legally”. To solve such problem, the spectrum oper-
ator deploys a number of verifiers to patrol the potential transmission area. By receiving detection
results from various verifiers and combining them using known consensus distributed algorithms [41],
the probability of wrong spectrum occupation judgment is greatly lowered.
6.6 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our secure and optimized detection scheme
using both MATLAB simulations and the USRP experiment.
6.6.1 Evaluation Settings
In the evaluation, we use SHA-1 with 160-bit long as the hash function for the permit
generation. 100 data packages with payload length of 2000 bytes each are transmitted in each
time slot. As shown in Fig. 6.2, we assume the aggregated symbols are transmitted in an AWGN
environment with the noise variance σ2, the power of which is normalized. SNR is defined as
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SNR = 1σ2 . We evaluate the permit detection performance based on permit bit-error-rate (BER)
and permit error rate (PER). In particular, PER is approximated by the probability when all the
160 permit bits are correctly extracted. The data detection performance is measured using data
bit-error-rate (data BER).
(a) Permit BER with m = 17 (b) PER (c) Data BER
Figure 6.7: The Impact of Power Allocation Scalar k on Performance
6.6.2 Results in MATLAB Simulations
6.6.2.1 Permit BER Performance
In Fig.6.7a, the permit BER decreases to 0 when SNR is near 15dB with m = 17 and
k = 0.10. By increasing k, the permit BER performance improves. In a very poor wireless channel,
e.g., SNR = 5dB, our detection scheme obtains a satisfactory permit BER performance.
6.6.2.2 PER and Data BER Performance
PER Performance. Since the one-way hash function is used, we have to ensure the
correctness of each permit with 160 permit bits. The relationship between the permit BER Pb and
the PER Pp is calculated theoretically as:
Pp = 1−(
 m
dm/2e
 (1−Pb)dm/2ePm−dm/2eb +
 m
dm/2 + 1e
 (1−Pb)dm/2+1ePm−dm/2+1eb +· · ·+(1−Pb)m)160
(6.9)
In Fig.6.7b and Fig.8, we see that our scheme can achieve a very low PER. Taking the
case with m = 17, k = 0.25 as an example, when SNR equals 2|4|6|8|10|12dB, the PER is
1.00|0.86|0.14|0.02|0.0009|0. We compare the PER performance between our proposed scheme and
schemes in [98] as illustrated in Fig.6.11a. With the same repetition parameter m = 17 and similar
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power allocation scalar k, our scheme achieves a lower PER. Note that we evaluate the power allo-
cation scalar in [98] by squaring its system parameter k. When k = 0.4949 and 0.4241 in [98], the
power allocation scalar equals to 0.2499 and 0.1799.
The impact to Data detection. From Fig.6.7c and Fig.9, we see that the data can
be correctly transmitted with SNR > 15dB. This is consistent with the fact that accurate data
transmissions are unlikely to occur in poor wireless channels. In addition, the data BER performance
is compared between the case without permit transmission and the case with spectrum permits
of different allocating power in Fig.6.7c, which shows that introducing permit brings 3dB SNR
reduction. To further show the relationship between the permit and the data transmission, we
Figure 6.8: Trade off between PER and Data BER
joint consider the performance of PER and data BER as shown in Fig. 6.8 with m = 7. When
SNR = 12dB, the power allocation scalar k is equaled to 0.10, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25 and 0.3, respectively.
The setting of k in other SNRs is similar. Obviously, the closer the curves to the origin, the lower
decoding errors for the permit as well as the data BER. From Fig. 6.8, we find that the permit
brings a negligible negative impact to the data transmission even in poor wireless channels [62].
When SNR > 15dB and k > 0.20, both PER and data BER approach to the origin.
Additionally, the performance of PER and data BER are affected by parameters and opti-
mization variables related to our scheme. We discuss their influences as follows,
The Impact of Power Allocation Scalar. From Fig.6.7, we see that the power allocation
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scalar brings a positive effect on the PER whereas a negative effect on the data BER. It is because
permit symbols are considered as the noise when data symbols are detected. Thus, permit symbols
with higher power make data detection vulnerable to the noise. An interesting observation is that
the performance of permit detection mainly depends on k although the detection of permit symbols
depends on that of data symbols. It gives a credit to the repetition encoding for permit symbols and
the optimization in permit embedding. The optimization in permit embedding ensures that parts of
permit symbols can be accurately detected even if data symbols are incorrectly detected. Combing
with hard-decision decoding strategy, the PER performance is further improved.
(a) Permit Modulation (b) Permit Embedding (c) Permit Detection with k = 0.25
Figure 6.9: PER vs. SNR
(a) Permit Modulation (b) Permit Embedding (c) Permit Detection with k = 0.25
Figure 6.10: Data BER vs. SNR
Permit Modulation Optimization. Fig.6.9a and Fig.6.10a illustrate the results of permit
modulation optimization with m = 13. Both PER and data BER decrease with an optimized permit
modulation, which satisfies our expectations. By optimizing the rotation angle θ of permit symbols
in the second layer, we maximize the MI of permit symbols, which increases their resistance to the
environmental noise. The permit symbols with an optimal constellation introduce less noise to data
symbols. Therefore, the performance of data BER is improved.
Permit Embedding Optimization. The effect of permit embedding optimization is
shown in Fig.6.9b and Fig.6.10b with m = 13, in which “Opt” means that we rotate permit symbols
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and make a symmetry for them when they are embedding into data symbols whereas “noOpt”
means permit symbols are added on data symbols directly. The data detection mainly depends on
k and the permit embedding optimization contributes to permit detection. This can be supported
by comparing the “Opt” and “unOpt” cases with m = 13 and k = 0.25 in Fig.6.9b. Without
optimization, the PER of the permit detection depends on k and data detection simultaneously.
When k is large, the incorrect data detection brings negative impacts on permit detection. As
illustrated in the impact of power allocation scalar, the permit embedding optimization alleviates
the negative impact on permit detection. Thus, “Opt” case outperforms “unOpt” case.
Permit Detection. Fig.6.9c and Fig.6.10c describe the impact of parameter m Since
repetition encoding is applied to permit symbols, it has nothing to do with data BER. Due to
majority rules in the decoding, the detection performance can be easily improved by increasing
m. However, it also brings more redundancy to permit transmission. In the simulations, we find
that increasing m brings better PER performance by sacrificing efficiency with m lower than 13.
However, when m > 13, the PER cannot reduce more even if continuing increasing m. This reminds
us to choose a proper m which both improves the PER performance and increases the acceptable
redundancy.
6.6.2.3 Detection Accuracy and Efficiency
False-positive and False-negative rates. Based on the PER results, we further analyze
the false-positive rate as shown in Fig.6.11b with m = 13 and k = 0.25. The num in the figure
implies the number of verification attempts for the permit. We can clearly see that the false-positive
rate of our schemes is almost negligible even with a high PER. As for the false-negative rate, the
probability that a fake permit is identified as authorized one is (1− Pp)/2160, which is too small to
mislead the verifier. Hence, our proposed scheme can effectively defend both emulation or replay
attack.
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(a) Comparison with m = 17 (b) Accuracy (c) Efficiency
Figure 6.11: Comparison, Accuracy and Efficiency
Detection Efficiency With the above false-positive rate, we compute permit detection
time as follows. Denote l as the byte length of each data packet. Assuming the data is transmitted
with a speed of 2 Mbit/s and repetition encoding parameter m = 13, Fig. 6.11c shows the impact of
l and num on the permit detection time. Generally, the permit detection time increases with l. In
particular, larger data packet means that the time gap between the transmission of two consecutive
permits becomes longer, leading to longer permit detection time. With the same length of the data
packet, the permit detection time increases with the number of the verification attempts. This is
because the increment of the number of verification attempts will potentially increase the number
of data packets, which results in longer permit detection time. No matter how many the number
of verification attempts and data packet length are, the average detection time for each permit is
the same, which is near to 10−3s. Both permit detection time and average permit detection time
demonstrate the high efficiency of our scheme.
6.6.3 Results in USRP Experiment
An experiment using USRP N210 [150] with GNU Radio is conducted in our lab. During the
experiment, there are human activities such as walking. Since the phase ambiguity commonly exists
in QPSK modulation in practice, differential QPSK, where the information bits are differentially
coded, substitutes QPSK in our experiment [63].
The PER performance using USRP is shown in Fig.6.12. Both the power allocation scalar
k and repetition encoding parameter m have a positive impact on the permit detection. However,
the PER performance in the USRP experiment is worse than that in MATLAB simulations. Taking
the case with k = 0.25 and m = 7 as an example, the PER is near to 0.3 when the SNR increases
to 16dB in the USRP experiment, whereas the PER approaches to 0 when SNR is above 8dB in
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MATLAB simulations. We infer that it is due to the imperfect time and frequency synchronization
together with the phase recovery. Poor phase recovery mechanisms bring a serious impact on the
permit detection. Even worse, when k is decreased to 0.15, the verifier cannot detect the permit.
This is because the received permit power is further lowered due to the attenuation of transmission
signals, which submerges the permit into the noise. Although the experimental results are not as
good as those in MATLAB simulations, our scheme can achieve high detection accuracy in the good
environment and outperforms Jin’s work in [98] with proper parameters. In the case with k = 0.3
and m = 7, the PER is about 0.7|0.05|0.02|0.01 when SNR approaches to 12|14|16|18dB. This result
demonstrates the effectiveness of our scheme.
Figure 6.12: PER Performance using USRP
6.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we present a secure and optimized unauthorized SU detection scheme.
Through optimizing both permit modulation and permit embedding, our scheme achieves accu-
rate and efficient permit detection. Meanwhile, unauthorized SU is effectively prevented from fak-
ing/replaying the spectrum permit, which improves the security of the DSA system. The detailed
MATLAB simulations and USRP experiment results have proven above advantages of our proposed
scheme.
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Chapter 7
CREAM: Unauthorized Secondary
User Detection in Fading
Environments
7.1 Chapter Overview
The exploding growth and popularity of wireless devices and services have exacerbated the
depletion of licensed wireless spectrum in recent decades [36,190]. Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA)
is a viable option to mitigate the above spectrum scarcity issue by allowing the spectrum sharing
between primary users (PUs) and secondary users (SUs). In particular, Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) regulates that the spectrum sharing framework in 3.5 GHz allows the Citizens
Broadband Service Devices (CBSDs) to opportunistically use the spectrum when it is not occupied
by or interfered with the incumbent users (authorized federal and grandfathered fixed satellite service
users). To effectively regulate the spectrum access, the spectrum operator in DSA usually issues a
unique and unforgeable spectrum permit (denoted as permit hereinafter) to an authorized SU (aSU),
which acts as an authorization to allow the aSU to occupy the dedicated frequency channel in the
specified area and time duration [98].
Although the DSA is envisioned as a promising approach, quite a few practical concerns
prevent it from actually implementing. On the one hand, specifically to the wireless environment,
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due to the atmospheric ducting, ionospheric reflection/refraction, and the reflection from terrestrial
objects, the message transmitted via a wireless multi-path channel suffers dispersion, attenuation,
and phase shift, all of which are known as fading effects [132]. On the other hand, the open nature
of the wireless medium provides opportunities for unauthorized SUs (uSUs) to occupy the spectrum
by faking/replaying the permit, which would cause severe interference to aSUs allocated to the same
spectrum. As a result, no user would participate in the DSA system for improving the spectrum
usage efficiency. Therefore, it is highly needed to devise an aSU authentication scheme to ensure the
security of the DSA system in fading environments to further unleash its great potential for future
wireless systems.
In this chapter, we propose a spectrum misuse detection scheme in fading environments,
CREAM, Constellation Rotation Embedding for Authenticating the authorized SUs based on su-
perposition Modulation. Working under the Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (OFDM)
framework, CREAM conceals each aSU’s permit into its message signal by superposing them into the
power domain. To better adapt specific fading environments, CREAM constructs an optimization
problem to find the optimal angle for constellation rotation and interleaving prior to superposition
modulation. A third party verifier, close to the aSU transmitter, passively monitors the signal trans-
mission. Having a pre-shared secret on the related parameters with the aSU, e.g., power allocation
factor, rotation angles, and the permit root, the verifier detects the permit using maximum likelihood
(ML) estimation, followed by the transmitter identification. In general, CREAM has the following
salient features that make it ideal for uSU detection in fading environments:
• Security: Without the complete knowledge of modulation parameters, uSUs cannot fake or
replay the current permit of aSUs. When uSUs occupy the spectrum directly, the changes
in the received signal’s will alert the verifier. In both cases, spectrum misuse can be easily
detected.
• Accuracy: OFDM is robust against fading caused by the multi-path propagation. In addi-
tion to that, the optimized constellation rotation produces significant gains by increasing the
dimensionality of the signal in fading environments. Therefore, CREAM effectively improves
the performance for permit and message transmission and thus achieves low false-positive and
false-negative rates for permit detection.
• Efficiency: Superposition modulation benefits the DSA system from achieving a high au-
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thentication rate [105]. Spectrum misuse can be detected in an extremely short time period.
Meanwhile, the high authentication rate leaves little time for uSUs to fake or replay the permit.
• Low-intrusion: The closeness between the verifier and the aSU transmitter results in less
path loss, which requires less power to achieve the reliable communication for the permit.
Thus, the permit embedding exerts less intrusion to message transmission. Beyond that, the
constellation rotation and interleaving for the message signals contribute to their transmission
performance improvement in fading environments.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 7.2, we review the existing uSU
detection schemes, along with a brief description of the fading environments and the techniques
to defend against fading. Section 7.3 describes the system model and the proposed framework.
The CREAM scheme is elaborated in Section 7.4 from the following three components: permit
pre-processing, permit embedding, permit post-processing. Particularly, Section 7.5 optimizes the
constellation rotation in permit embedding process. In Section 7.6, we analyze the theoretical
performance for CREAM, followed by a thorough evaluation of the permit and message performance
using MATLAB simulations in Section 7.7. Finally, Section 7.8 concludes the chapter.
7.2 Related Work
7.2.1 Unauthorized SU Detection
Methods for authenticating SUs can be classified into three categories. One is to utilize
cryptographic schemes [13, 57, 126, 130] at the higher layers. However, involving higher-layer pro-
cessing lowers the authentication efficiency due to high time consumption. Meanwhile, incompatible
systems may not be able to decode each others’ higher layer signals [105]. The transmitter-unique
“intrinsic” characteristics of the waveform, such as RF fingerprinting and electromagnetic signature
identification [26,83,166], can also be deployed to identify transmitters. However, according to [105],
those methods are sensitive to environmental factors, e.g., temperature changes, interference, etc,
which limits their efficacy in real-world scenarios.
Recent methods focus on “extrinsically” physical-layer authentication scheme, in which a
unique unforgeable signal is embedded in the message signal and then extracted at the receiver
[97, 98, 105, 106, 185]. Yang et al. [185] embed the permit by duplicating sub-carriers in OFDM to
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achieve the desired and detectable cyclo-stationary feature. Such operations not only decrease the
message throughput but also introduce high computational overhead. In [106], P-DSA is proposed
to conceal permit via controlled inter-symbol interference, which negatively impacts normal message
transmission. FEAT scheme in [105] enables the verifier to perform blind parameter estimation on
multiple parameters of the OFDM signal, giving rise to a high computation complexity. Jin et al. [97]
conceal at most two permit bits by changing the cyclic prefix length in each symbol of a physical-
layer frame, resulting in low authentication rate. By controlling the power of the transmitted signals
in [98], the permit is embedded given power constraint imposed on the transmitter. However, the
first two schemes in [98] are mainly designed for AWGN environments and are not robustness to
fading effects. Although another scheme is proposed to adapt to fading environments by changing
the message constellation, it has a low authentication rate together with the first two schemes.
Hence, CREAM rotates and superposes the permit and message to achieve a secure and reliable
aSU transmission in fading environments with a high authentication rate and a low-complexity
implementation.
7.2.2 Fading Environments
The phenomenon of fading is the time variation of the channel strengths due to the small-
scale fading resulted from multi-path and moving, as well as larger-scale effects such as path loss via
distance attenuation and shadowing by obstacles, which causes the attenuation of the signal at the
receiver [165]. Multi-path fading causes the magnitude attenuation and the phase shift of the signal
due to the atmospheric ducting, ionospheric reflection and refraction, and reflection from terrestrial
objects such as mountains and buildings [63]. Rayleigh fading [146] is a stochastic model to show
the effect brought by multi-path fading in which the envelope of the channel response is Rayleigh
distributed and the phase of the channel response is randomly distributed between 0 and 2π. It is
quite reasonable for scattering mechanisms where there are many small reflectors.
Constellation rotation is considered as a practical implementation of signal space diversity
(SSD) [127]. By increasing the diversity order [165], the rotated signal transmitted over the fading
channel has exactly the same performance of the nonrotated one transmitted over an additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel [24]. OFDM is a widely used modulation scheme in fading environ-
ments [144]. It is robust against the multi-path fading by separating a wideband signal into many
smaller narrowband signals [156]. CREAM combines the constellation rotation and the OFDM to
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achieve the permit and message reliable transmission in fading environments.
7.3 System Model
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Figure 7.1: System Model
7.3.1 System Model
As shown in Fig.7.1, our system model contains three entities.
Spectrum Operator: Being an administrator and pivot in DSA system, it obtains the current
channel estimation from dispersed sensors. For example, in 3.5GHz, Environmental Sensing Capa-
bility (ESC) is deployed to sense and then report the channel conditions. Receiving the spectrum
request from each aSU, it chooses a proper allocation factor and constellation rotation angles based
on the channel condition together with a permit root. These parameters are transmitted to the
aSU and its nearby verifiers via an authenticated and encrypted channel respectively. When an aSU
reports abnormal interference or when a pre-determined random schedule is required, it mandates
the verifiers to begin uSU detection.
Secondary Users: They request and pay for a given licensed spectrum by submitting their locations
and time periods. Meanwhile, they embed the unique spectrum permits into the message signals to
demonstrate their legal identities using the received parameters from the spectrum operator.
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Verifiers: They are employed by the spectrum operator to help identify their nearby SU transmit-
ters. The authentication results are sent to the spectrum operator. They do not participate in the
message transmission.
7.3.2 Adversary Model
We define the attacker as an uSU who accesses the spectrum either by accident or misconfig-
uration, or to avoid costs of spectrum occupation. The above operations can be done by controlling
its transceiver to manipulate its physical-layer symbols. By occupying the channels allocated to aSUs
directly or with a faked/replayed permit, the uSU brings severe interference to aSUs. Meanwhile,
we assume that the uSU is computationally bounded and cannot break the cryptographic primitives
used to generate the permit. Finally, it can compromise verifiers to report incorrect results to the
spectrum operator.
Encoding ModulationEncryption
Modulation
A
g
g
reg
a
tin
g
Fading 
Channel
+ 
AWGN
Data Detection
De-interleavingML Detection
Permit 
Decoding
Permit Pre-processing Permit Embedding
Permit Post-processing
SU 
Transmitter
Verifier
SU
Receiver
0p
id
x( i )
y( i )
ip '
'
id
px ( i )
dx ( i )
Interleaving OFDM
Power 
Allocation
Constellation 
Rotation
OFDM
Demodulation
Encoding
Data Decoding
ip
Permit 
Decryption
0
'p r( i )
Power 
Allocation
Constellation 
Rotation
'x(i)
Figure 7.2: Framework
7.3.3 Framework Overview
The CREAM framework is shown in Fig.7.2, in which the superposed signal in time slot i
is:
x(i) =
√
Pp(i)xp(i)e
jθp(i) +
√
Pd(i)xd(i)e
jθd(i) (7.1)
where xp(i) and xd(i) are the permit and message symbols after encoding and modulation respec-
tively. Their corresponding constellation rotation angles are θp(i) and θd(i) whereas Pp(i) and Pd(i)
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are their transmitted powers. Denote x(i)’s real and imaginary components as xR(i) and xI(i).
After interleaving [101], it becomes:
x
′
(i) = xR(i) + jxI(i− k) (7.2)
which is remapped to OFDM symbols to be transmitted.
Denote h(i) as the channel multi-path fading coefficient with expectation E{|h(i)|2} = 1.
At the verifier and the aSU receiver, the received signal is:
r(i) = h(i)x
′
(i) + n(i) (7.3)
where n(i) is the equivalent AWGN noise with large-scale path loss absorbed into it. It has noise
variances σ2p and σ
2
d at the verifier and the aSU receiver respectively. Assume perfect channel
estimation, the received signal after OFDM demodulation and de-interleaving is:
y(i) = h(i)∗/|h(i)|r(i) = |h(i)|x(i) + η(i) (7.4)
where |h(i)| is the channel gain and the equivalent noise becomes η(i) = h(i)∗/|h(i)|n(i). It has the
same variance as the original noise n(i). ML detection is deployed at both the verifier and the aSU
receiver. Without loss of generality, we ignore index i in what follows.
7.4 CREAM Scheme
According shown in Fig. 7.2, CREAM is divided into three sequential parts permit pre-
processing, permit embedding, and permit post-embedding, each of which will be discussed respectively
as follows.
7.4.1 Permit Pre-processing
Similar to [98], the spectrum and the geographic region are divided into non-overlapping
parts respectively. The time period is split into slots of equal length. All entities are assumed to be
loosely synchronized to a global time server.
• Generation: An efficient one-way hash chain is used to generate the unforgeable spectrum
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permits. Let f(x) denote a cryptographic hash function on x, and fη(x) means η successive
operations on f(·) to x. Assuming an aSU requests a spectrum in a time period γ. The
spectrum operator sends a random number pγ to the aSU. The aSU recursively computes
pi = f(pi+1), i ∈ [1, γ − 1] as its permit in time slot i. Meanwhile, the spectrum operator
transmits p0 = f
γ(pγ) to the verifier.
• Encoding: For simplicity, the permit is encoded using repetition code Cm to tolerate transmis-
sion errors resulted from the noise, in which each permit bit is repeated m times.
• Modulation: Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (QPSK), which has been widely applied in many
applications and standards such as IEEE 802.11b and IEEE 802.11g, is chosen as the basic
modulation scheme for both permit and message. General quadrature amplitude modulation
is also supported.
7.4.2 Permit Embedding
As shown Fig.7.2, CREAM allocates the power to permit and message, followed by rotating
their constellations with the optimized angles. Finally, the rotated permit and message are super-
posed with the Gray-mapping rule [156], in which constellation points with the minimum Euclidean
distance have one-bit difference. A Grey-mapping constellation example after permit embedding is
shown in Fig.7.3 with θd = θp = π/6 and Pp = 0.1, Pd = 0.9, where the first two bits represent
message and the second bits in the bracket denote the permit.
In order to achieve low intrusion to the message, the permit and message power should
satisfy:
Pp + Pd = 1, Pd > Pp > 0. (7.5)
Fractional Transmit Power Allocation (FTPA) [21], as an effective power allocation method, is chosen
in CREAM. In FTPA, the power of the permit is allocated as:
Pp =
1
(|h|/σp2)−α + (|h|/σd2)−α
(|h|/σp2)−α (7.6)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is the decay factor. The case of α = 0 corresponds to equal transmit power
allocation between the permit and message. When α is increased, the more power is allocated to the
message. In CREAM, the spectrum operator thoroughly investigates the value of the decay factor
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via experiments such that the reliable transmission of both permit and message is ensured.
X1: 11(11)
X2: 11(01)
X3: 11(00)
X4: 11(10)
X5: 01(11)
X6: 01(01)
X7: 01(00)
X8: 01(10)
X9: 00(11)
X10: 00(01)
X11: 00(00)
X12: 00(10)
X13: 10(11)
X14: 10(01)
X15: 10(00)
X16: 10(00)
Figure 7.3: An Example of Superposed Constellation
7.4.3 Permit Post-processing
According to Eq (7.2), interleaving the real and imaginary components of the superposed
symbol x makes them being transmitted in different time. Hence, when the duration between
the transmission of real and imaginary components is larger than the coherent time of the fading
channel [165], their transmissions suffer independent fading effect. Therefore, different to Eq (7.4),
the received signal after de-interleaving can be rewritten as:
yR = |hR|xR + ηR, yI = |hI |xI + ηI (7.7)
where |hR| and |hI | are the channel gains of the signal x’s real and imaginary components, respec-
tively. To ease the description, we rewrite |hR| and |hI | as hR and hI . In the Rayleigh fading model,
they are i.i.d. Rayleigh random variables with distribution as follows:
p(x) = 2x/β × e−
x2
β , x = hR, hI (7.8)
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where β = E(h2R) = E(h
2
I) =
1
2 .
At the verifier, ML is deployed. According to Eq (7.7), the ML metric for detecting xp is:
M(x) = exp
(
− (yR − hRxR)
2 + (yI − hIxI)2
σ2
)
(7.9)
The bit Likelihood ratio (LLR) for the permit is written as:
L(i) = In
∑
x∈A0i
M(x)− In
∑
x∈A0i
M(x), i = 3, 4 (7.10)
where Ali is a set of x whose i bit is l, l = 0, 1. If L(i) > 0, the i bit in x is detected as 0. Otherwise,
it is detected as 1. The majority rule is applied to decode each permit bit. Permit transmission and
detection are totally transparent to the aSU receiver as if it does not know the permit existence.
QPSK together with ML detection is utilized at the aSU receiver.
Denote the detected permit in time-slot i as p′i. To verify the transmitter’s identity, the
verifier computes p′0 by i successive operations of the same hash function f on p
′
i, p
′
0 = f
i(p′i). If
p′0 6= p0, the verifier suggests the transmitter as an uSU. The detection results are finally reported
to the spectrum operator who will physically locate and further punish the transmitter.
7.5 Optimized Constellation Rotation in CREAM
In this section, we thoroughly investigate the how to optimize constellation rotation for
permit and message in a specific fading environment.
7.5.1 Motivation
Consider the case without constellation rotation, θp = θd = 0 in Eq (7.1). the superposed
symbol becomes:
x =
√
Pp(xp,R + xd,R) + j
√
Pd(xp,I + xp,I). (7.11)
in which the real/imaginary component of x is only composed of the corresponding real/imaginary
component of the permit and message respectively. Suppose that a deep fade hits only one of the
components of the superposed signal, e.g., real component. Then, only the imaginary components
of the permit and message survive. The integrity of the permit and message symbol is negatively
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affected.
While we rotate the constellation of the permit and message with θp and θd respectively, the
real component of x in Eq (7.1) becomes
√
Pp(xp,R cos θp−xp,I sin θp)+
√
Pd(xd,R cos θd−xd,I sin θd),
whereas the imaginary component changes to
√
Pp(xp,R cos θp − xp,I sin θp) +
√
Pd(xd,R cos θd −
xd,I sin θd). Each component now contains all the components of the permit and message after rota-
tion. Thus, even if one component suffers from deep fading, the integrity of the permit and message
is still retained. The information involved in real and imaginary components of the symbol can be
reconstructed. Fig. 7.4 shows a simple example to further illustrate the advantages of the rotation.
With constellation rotation, any two points achieve the maximum number of distinct components.
In the case that one component is deep faded, e.g., imaginary component, the ‘compressed’ constel-
lation in Fig.7.4b (empty circles) offers more protection against fading effect, since no components
for any two points collapse together as would happen with Fig.7.4a.
(a) QPSK (b) QPSK with Rotation
Figure 7.4: Comparison between QPSK and QPSK with Rotation
7.5.2 Constellation Rotation Optimization
To effectively defend against fading effects, the constellation rotation is usually optimized
by maximizing the minimum product distance or minimizing error probabilities when ML detection
is deployed. However, it is difficult to obtain an explicit expression for the exact error probabilities
[165]. Therefore, CREAM employs a suboptimal method, which is to minimize the permit symbol
error rate (PSER) upper bound.
Pe ≤
1
N
∑N
i=1
∑N
k=1,k/∈Γ(i)
P (xi → xk) (7.12)
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where N is the size of the superposed constellation. P (xi → xk) is the pairwise error probability
(PER) of confusing xi with xk when xi is transmitted. Γ(i) is the set involving symbols that do
not constitute a valid PER for xi after permit detection. For example, when x1 is transmitted, the
detected permit bits are always 11 if the detected signal belongs to the set [x1, x5, x9, x13] as shown
in Fig.7.3.
PER in Eq (7.12) is refined as P (xi → xk) =
∫∞
0
∫∞
0
P (xi → xk|hR, hI)p(hR)p(hI)dhRdhI
given the probability density function of channel gain p(hR) and p(hI), where P (xi → xk|hR, hI) is
calculated based on Eq (7.9) as:
P (xi → xk|hR, hI) = P
(
(yR − hRxk,R)2 + (yI − hIxk,I)2 ≤ (yR − hRxk,R)2 + (yI − hIxk,I)2|xi is sent
)
= P
(
hR(xi,R − xx,R)ηR + hI(xi,I − xk,I)ηI ≤ −
1
2
h2R(xi,R − xk,R)2 −
1
2
h2I(xi,I − xk,I)2
)
=
1
2
erfc
(
1
2
√
1
σ2p
√
h2R(xi,R − xk,R)2 + h2I(xi,I − xk,I)2
)
≤ 1
2
exp
(
− 1
4σ2p
(
h2R(xi,R − xk,R)2 + h2I(xi,I − xk,I)2
))
(7.13)
in which the third equation is derived because hR(xi,R − xk,R)ηR + hI(xi,I − xk,I)ηI is a Gaussian
random variable with zero mean and the variance Ω2 = h2R(xi,R − xk,R)2 + h2I(xi,I − xk,I)2. The
inequality is based on the rule P (X ≤ x) = 12erfc(
√
x2/2Ω2) [94].
Since hR and hI are the Rayleigh channel gain, p(h
2
R) and p(h
2
I) submit to the exponential
distribution where p(x2) = e−x
2
[170]. P (xi → xk) in Eq (7.12) is finally expressed as:
P (xi → xk) ≤
1
2
∞∫
0
exp
(
−h2R
(
1 +
1
4σp
(xi,R − xk,R)2
))
dh2R ×
∞∫
0
exp
(
−h2I
(
1 +
1
4σp
(xi,I − xk,I)2
))
dh2I
=
1
2
(
1 +
(xi,R−xk,R)2
4σ2p
)(
1 +
(xi,I−xk,I)2
4σ2p
) (7.14)
Based on Eq (7.14), the upper bound for PSER Pupper in Eq (7.12) is:
Pe ≤
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
k=1,k/∈ΓN
(i)
1
2
(
1 +
(xi,R−xk,R)2
4σ2p
)(
1 +
(xi,I−xk,I)2
4σ2p
) (7.15)
Since the constellation rotation angels θp and θd are concealed in xi and xk, the angles can be
obtained by minimizing above PSER upper bound. The optimization problem in CREAM is as
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follows:
min
θp,θd
Pupper
s.t. 0 ≤ θp, θd ≤ 2π (7.16)
Based on Eq (7.15), Pupper mainly depends on the constellation pattern. In addition, different
rotation angles may produce the same constellation pattern. Therefore, the PSER upper bound
minimization is a non-convex problem. We deploy a numerical method by performing a global
search with one-degree step.
(a) SNR = 10dB (a) SNR = 20dB
Figure 7.5: PSER Upper Bound vs. SNR
Table 7.1: PSER Upper Bound when SNR = 10dB
Upper Bound 0.0092 0.0092 0.0092 0.0092 0.0092
θd 19 20 20 70 71
θp 23 24 25 65 67
Two examples are shown in Fig.7.5 with Pp = 0.1 and Pd = 0.9. Meanwhile, Table 7.1
illustrates the minimized PSER upper bound with corresponding rotation angles θp and θd when
SNR = 10dB. From them, we see that 1) the PSER upper bound has different shapes under dif-
ferent channel conditions, which verifies that the constellation rotation angles vary with the current
channel condition; 2) the PSER upper bound minimization problems have multiple solutions. Such
characteristics make CREAM a powerful scheme to prevent the uSU from replaying the permit.
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7.6 Scheme Analysis
In this section, we analyze the spectrum misuse detection efficiency, the computational
complexity, and the security of CREAM.
7.6.1 High Detection Efficiency
Assume the permit is repetition coded with 1/7 rate (m = 7) and the message is con-
volutional coded using 1/2 rate. In IEEE 802.11a standard with 24Mbps message bit rate, the
transmission rate for the permit bits is close to 7Mbps. FEAT [105] and SafeDSA [97] embedded
one permit bit into each OFDM frame. The permit bit transmission rate is at most 1/4Mbps when
there is only one OFDM symbol in each frame that includes 96 message bits. Compared with
SafeDSA and FEAT, CREAM achieves a high authentication rate. For the uSUs who have not
accessed the spectrum, CREAM leaves them little time to prepare the faked/replayed permit. For
the uSUs who are occupying the spectrum, CREAM can detect them in a short time.
7.6.2 Low Computational Complexity
In CREAM, the transmission and reception of both permit and message use the basic
physical-layer techniques. Although interleaving and de-interleaving are the most time-consumption
operations, they only require a buffer to store the received signal without complex operations.
Whereas in SafeDSA [97], the verifier needs to estimate the cyclic prefix length based on the mes-
sage dependency test to detect each permit bit. Even worse, in FEAT [105], the verifier has to
perform blind parameter estimation on multiple parameters of the OFDM signal. For complete
blind estimation, the possible ranges of the parameters to be estimated need to be comprehensive,
which covers all possible values and thus results in a high computation complexity.
7.6.3 High Resilience to Attack
Emulation Attack. A successful emulation attack is achieved if a uSU provides a proof
of an aSU transmitter identity to mislead the verifier to believe that the current spectrum is not
misused. Specifically, the uSU launches an emulation attack if it derives a faked permit which is
the same as that of the aSU transmitter. Since the one-way hash chain is employed to generate
the spectrum permits, the uSU does not have the computational ability to break the cryptographic
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primitives and therefore it cannot obtain the permit without the root of the hash chain. Unfortu-
nately, the uSU may occasionally create the same permit. However, the probability of such situation
is so small that we can ignore it. Taking SHA-1 with 160-bit length as an example, the probabil-
ity of generating the same permit is (1/2)160. Therefore, our scheme can successfully prevent the
emulation attack [157].
Replay Attack. The uSU may eavesdrop an aSU transmission, extract its permit, and
then attempt to use it for its message transmission. CREAM provides several barriers to prevent the
replay attack. Since the constellation rotation angles are calculated based on the current channel
condition, it is difficult for the uSU to extract the permit from the received signals with wrong
channel estimation. In addition, the characteristics of the minimized PSER upper bound allows for
using different rotation angles in the same channel condition. Therefore, even if the uSU eavesdrops
the angles by monitoring the permit transmission in the current slot, it does not know the rotation
angles in the next slot, which confuses it when extracting permit. In addition to that, since it cannot
generate the next permit based on the current eavesdropped one without the root of the hash chain,
it is impossible for the uSU to replay the future permits to deceive the verifier. Therefore, CREAM
is resilient to replay attack.
Free-rider Attack. In free-rider attack, the uSU hides behind the aSU by sending message
parallel without permits [185]. Since the messages of the uSU and the aSU are independent, the
free-rider attack would increase the number of the constellation points, which can be easily found
by the verifier.
Compromising Attack. By compromising the verifier to report the wrong detection
results to the spectrum operator, the uSU can access the spectrum “legally”. The low computa-
tional complexity allows the DSA to employ a number of verifiers to patrol the area near the aSU
transmitter. By receiving detection results from various verifiers and combining them using known
consensus distributed algorithms [41], the probability of wrong spectrum occupation judgment is
greatly lowered.
7.7 Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of CREAM in fading environments using MATLAB simula-
tions. Specifically, three indoor environments are considered as listed in Table 7.2 and CREAM
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Table 7.2: Fading Parameters
Parameter Values
Moving speed 2.7km/h
1. Small office/ Home office
Rms delay spread 50ns
Number of taps 5
2. Large office building
Rms delay spread 100ns
Number of taps 10
3. Factory
Rms delay spread 200ns
Number of taps 19
performance in fading environment 1 is mainly discussed. We show the performance in other two
fading environments 2 and 3 by comparing with that in fading environment 1.
7.7.1 Simulation Settings
Adapting to indoor environments, we set parameters in CREAM with the help of IEEE802.11a
standard, in which message transmission speeds as high as 54Mbps are possible. The main difference
is that we consider CREAM performance in 3.5GHz band, particularly for small cell deployments [23]
approved by FCC [3]. The system parameters are listed in Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 respectively.
Table 7.3: OFDM Parameters
Parameter Values
Operation Frequence 3.5GHz
Sampling rate 20Mhz
IFFT/FFT sampling point 64
Subcarrier frequency spacing 0.3125MHz
Total Bandwidth 16.25MHz
OFDM Symbol Period 4µs
Guard interval 0.8µs
Number of message Subcarriers 48
Number of pilot Subcarriers 4
Table 7.4: System Parameters
Parameter Values
message Encoding 1/2 Conv coding
Permit Encoding 1/m repetition coding
Modulation QPSK
Mapping Grey mapping
Coded bits 96
message bits 48
Permit bits 96/m
As for other default simulation settings, CREAM uses the 160-bit SHA-1 function to con-
struct the permit. Each frame has a constant message payload length of 100 OFDM symbols. Hence,
Ns =
⌊
100∗96
160m
⌋
=
⌊
60
m
⌋
permit is transmitted in each frame. Moreover, we transmit 500 frames to
average each point in MATLAB results. As for power settings, we assume the superposed symbols
are transmitted using the unit power. The received signal-to-noise radio at the verifier SNRp and
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the aSU receiver SNRd are defined respectively as follows:
SNRp =
1
σ2p
, SNRd =
1
σ2d
, SNRδ = SNRp − SNRd > 0
Since the aSU transmitter is further to the aSU receiver than the verifier as assumed previously, we
denote SNRδ as the received SNR difference. In the following simulations, SNRδ = 10dB. The
default delay factor α is set to 1 to ensure the reliable communication for the message. The permit
encoding rate m is set to 7.
7.7.2 CREAM Performance
We first evaluate the permit bit-error-rate (BER) and message BER performance. Permit
BER is a basic measurement on the permit transmission accuracy, whereas message BER reflects
the permit’s intrusion to message. Further, we calculate the permit error rate, which describes
transmission error for a whole permit composed of 160 bits. False-positive rate is also considered
to measure the negative effect CREAM possibly brings to the aSU’s transmission. Several key
parameters affect the CREAM performance, including the SNR difference between the verifier and
the secondary user receiver SNRδ, the power allocation factor α, the rotation angles θp and θd, etc,
all of which will be discussed in the following.
Note that although the physical-layer authentication work in fading environments is men-
tioned in [97] and [105], they do not consider the detailed factors, e.g., the moving speed, the time
delay, and the multi-path. Therefore, we cannot compare the CREAM performance with these works
directly.
7.7.2.1 Impact Factor
The Impact of the Power Allocation. According to Eq (7.6), the power allocation
between the permit and message depends on the decay factor α given SNRs. Fig.7.6a and Fig.7.6b
show its impact on the permit BER and message BER respectively. By comparing these two figures,
it seems that the decay factor puts an opposite effect on the permit and message transmission. When
α = 0, the power is allocated evenly. The permit is transmitted with the high power. However, it
results in the loss of message power and brings serious intrusion to message. When the decay factor
is near to 1, most power is allocated to the message transmission. The permit is easily affected by
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the fading effects and noise. Thus, permit BER has a poor performance. In practice, we have to
ensure that the permit embedding brings the slightest negative impact on message transmission.
Under this premise, we try to distribute more power to the permit.
(a) Permit Bit Performance (b) Message Bit Performance
Figure 7.6: Power Allocation Impact
The Impact of the Received SNR Difference. SNR difference between the verifier
and the aSU receiver plays an important role in both permit and message performance as illustrated
in Fig.7.7a and Fig. 7.7b. When they are near to each other, the message and permit transmission
cannot be easily distinguished in the power domain. Hence, the message transmission is negatively
affected by the permit. When they are far from each other and the permit is much closer to the aSU
transmitter, a reliable permit transmission can be achieved with less power and thus more power is
allocated to the message transmission to help it defend against the pass loss. However, when they
are far apart and the aSU receiver is much further to the aSU transmitter, the message transmission
would suffer larger pass loss and thus most power has to be allocated to the message, which affects
the permit transmission negatively. As shown in Fig.7.7a and Fig. 7.7b, the message BER has a poor
performance when SNRδ = 0dB and 20dB. The permit BER also performs poor at SNRδ = 20dB.
When SNRδ = 4dB, both the permit and message can be transmitted accurately with a low BER.
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(a) Permit Bit Performance (b) Message Bit Performance
Figure 7.7: SNRδ Impact
Fading Environments. We simulate the permit BER and message BER under different
fading environments in Fig.7.8a and Fig.7.8b, respectively. From them, we see that CREAM has
a similar performance and performs well under three different fading environments. The differ-
ence is that permit transmission performs slightly better in large office building whereas message
transmission has a better performance in small office/home office environments.
(a) Permit Bit Performance (b) Message Bit Performance
Figure 7.8: Fading Environments Impact
The Impact of the Repetition Code Rate. Fig.7.9a describes the permit BER perfor-
mance using different repetition encoding rates 1/m. From it, we see that a low rate helps improve
the permit BER performance. According to [63], a repetition code with parameter m has an er-
ror correcting capacity m−12 . Hence, when m is large, the permit BER has a good performance.
However, a low encoding rate decreases the permit transmission rate and brings a negative impact
on the authentication rate. We will discuss it later. The Impact of the Rotation Angles. By
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(a) Permit BER Performance (b) Permit Performance
Figure 7.9: Repetition Encoding Impact
optimizing the rotation angles in Section V, we can get a minimized PSER upper bound. Fig.7.10
compares the permit BER performance under different rotation angles. From it, we conclude that
optimized permit rotation angle indeed improves the permit BER performance. Specifically, when
the SNRp ∈ [0dB, 10dB], it brings almost 3dB gain.
Figure 7.10: θp Impact
7.7.2.2 Detection Accuracy
Permit Error Rate. Since the one-way hash function is used to secure the authentication,
CREAM has to ensure the correctness of each permit with 160 bits. Denote above permit BER
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as Pb. The permit length is L = 160, the permit error rate Pp can be calculated theoretically as
follows:
Pp = 1−(
 m
dm/2e
 (1−Pb)dm/2ePm−dm/2eb +
 m
dm/2 + 1e
 (1−Pb)dm/2+1ePm−dm/2+1eb +· · ·+(1−Pb)m)L
(7.17)
From Fig. 7.9b, we see that the permit error rate has a good performance above SNRp = 8dB.
Based on [62], the channel SNR in [10, 15), [15, 25), and [25, 40) indicates very poor, poor, and very
good wireless channels. Hence, the whole permit transmission can realize in CREAM even in poor
channel conditions.
(a) Repetition Encoding Impact (b) Symbol Number Impact
Figure 7.11: False-positive Rate
False-positive Rate and False-negative Rate. As shown in Fig. 7.11a, the false-positive
rate performs better above SNRp = 5dB, which means the aSU is mistakenly recognized as the uSU
with an extremely low possibility even in a poor channel. Comparing Fig.7.9b and Fig.7.11a, m
puts a more important impact to the permit error rate than to the false-positive rate. With the
same number of transmitted message bits in each frame, the number of permits is decreased due
to low repetition rate. Therefore, we say that a large m lowers the permit transmission efficiency.
Meanwhile, the number of OFDM symbols in each frame also affects the false-positive rate as shown
in Fig.7.11b. With more OFDM symbols in each frame, each permit is transmitted more times. Since
the verifier considers the transmitter as unauthorized when all the permits cannot be identified, the
probability of identifying an incorrect aSU is lowered.
As for the false-negative rate, the probability that a uSU is identified as an aSU by success-
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fully faking the 160-bit permit is (1 − Pp)/2160. The probability is so small that the faking attack
is considered as negligible.
7.7.2.3 Intrusiveness to message
Finally, we compare the message BER performance between the case without the permit and
CREAM in Fig. 7.12. Suppose that the SNR difference SNRδ = 12dB. When SNRp ∈ [4dB, 14dB],
the actually received SNR at the aSU receiver is in [−8dB, 2dB]. From Fig. 7.12, we conclude that
CREAM almost brings no negative effect on message transmission. Instead, CREAM improves the
message BER performance due to rotating the message constellation.
Figure 7.12: Comparison
7.8 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we present a physical-layer unauthorized secondary user detection scheme
referred to as CREAM. Combining the constellation rotation optimization, interleaving and super-
position modulation in the OFDM framework, CREAM not only alleviates the negative effect of
the aSU message transmission brought by fading, but also prevents the uSU from occupying the
spectrum effectively. Detailed analysis and MATLAB simulation results have proven its accuracy,
efficiency, security and low intrusion to message transmission.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Discussion
This dissertation is along the line of designing schemes to ensure reliable and secure data
transmission in emerging networks, especially in IoT network and cellular network. The common
drawback in these emerging networks is the resource limitation due to the explosively increasing
number of devices and data traffic they have generated, which devastates the data transmission in
terms of reliability. Besides, most smart devices in IoT network are resource-constrained, for which
they are vulnerable to various attacks. Although DSA is a promising way to alleviate the spectrum
scarcity issue for both IoT network and cellular network, security concern arises. To address those
problems, different schemes are designed in each chapter. Through simulations, real-world data
evaluations, as well as practical experiments, we have demonstrated the effectiveness and efficiency
of the proposed schemes, which validate our design objective, achieving reliable and secure data
transmission in emerging networks given resource limitation.
As a matter of fact, IoT is transforming every corner of our daily life and plays a more and
more important role. At the same time, there will be a larger number of smart devices equipped
with various wireless protocols, resulting in severe wireless interference. As one of the future work,
the potential attacks due to heterogeneous environment need to be future explored. For instance,
following the line of signal emulation attack from WiFi to ZigBee devices, is it possible to launch
the attacks from WiFi to BLE and from BLE to ZigBee in 2.4GHz band as well as from ZigBee
to LoRa in 900MHz band? For the second future work, in the heterogeneous environment, the
interference among different wireless protocols, named as the cross-technology interference (CTI),
is usually treated as bad things. A plethora of work discusses how to alleviate and even eliminate
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it. CTI is small and a slight disturbance results in perceptible changes on it. Different from the
traditional work, whether the above CTI feature can benefit us is a new direction. I will compre-
hensively investigate those features and attempt to apply them to human behavior detection and
access authentication. In the end, with the application of machine learning or even deep learning
in both wireless communication and networks, I would like to investigate it from the perspective of
security. To be specific, adversarial attacks have been widely investigated in the image processing
area, but they are scarcely addressed in the RF signal domain. The general idea for adversarial
attacks to RF signal is to generate imperceptible perturbations to RF signal at the transmitter so as
to mislead the DL classifier at the receiver. However, it is far more complex and difficult than that
in the image domain. To be specific, RF adversarial examples suffer from complex channel proroga-
tion/interference/noise during transmission, the effects of which will persist at the DL classifier and
may change the classification results. As an emerging area, there are many open problems worth
further investigation.
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square error in gaussian channels. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 51(4):1261–
1282, 2005.
[68] Linke Guo, Xinxin Liu, Yuguang Fang, and Xiaolin Li. User-centric private matching for
ehealth networks-a social perspective. In Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM),
2012 IEEE, pages 732–737. IEEE, 2012.
[69] Linke Guo, Chi Zhang, and Yuguang Fang. A trust-based privacy-preserving friend recom-
mendation scheme for online social networks. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure
Computing, 12(4):413–427, 2015.
[70] Linke Guo, Chi Zhang, Jinyuan Sun, and Yuguang Fang. Paas: A privacy-preserving attribute-
based authentication system for ehealth networks. In Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS),
2012 IEEE 32nd International Conference on, pages 224–233. IEEE, 2012.
[71] Linke Guo, Chi Zhang, Jinyuan Sun, and Yuguang Fang. A privacy-preserving attribute-based
authentication system for mobile health networks. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing,
13(9):1927–1941, 2014.
[72] Linke Guo, Chi Zhang, Hao Yue, and Yuguang Fang. Psad: A privacy-preserving social-
assisted content dissemination scheme in dtns. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing,
13(12):2903–2918, 2014.
[73] Linke Guo, Xiaoyan Zhu, Chi Zhang, and Yuguang Fang. Privacy-preserving attribute-based
friend search in geosocial networks with untrusted servers. In 2013 IEEE Global Communica-
tions Conference (GLOBECOM), pages 629–634. IEEE, 2013.
[74] Xiuzhen Guo, Yuan He, Xiaolong Zheng, Liangcheng Yu, and Omprakash Gnawali. Zigfi:
Harnessing channel state information for cross-technology communication. In Proceedings of
ACM INFOCOM, 2018.
[75] Piyush Gupta and Panganmala R Kumar. The capacity of wireless networks. Information
Theory, IEEE Transactions on, 46(2):388–404, 2000.
[76] Biao Han, Jie Li, Jinshu Su, Minyi Guo, and Baokang Zhao. Secrecy capacity optimization via
cooperative relaying and jamming for wanets. IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed
Systems, 26(4):1117–1128, 2015.
[77] Bo Han, Pan Hui, VS Anil Kumar, Madhav V Marathe, Jianhua Shao, and Aravind Srinivasan.
Mobile data offloading through opportunistic communications and social participation. Mobile
Computing, IEEE Transactions on, 11(5):821–834, 2012.
[78] Tao Han and Nayeem Ansari. Offloading mobile traffic via green content broker. Internet of
Things Journal, IEEE, 1(2):161–170, 2014.
[79] Tao Han, Nayeem Ansari, Mingquan Wu, and Haoyong Yu. On accelerating content delivery
in mobile networks. Communications Surveys & Tutorials, IEEE, 15(3):1314–1333, 2013.
180
[80] Zhiqiang He, Xiaonan Zhang, Yunqiang Bi, Weipeng Jiang, and Yue Rong. Optimal source
and relay design for multiuser mimo af relay communication systems with direct links and
imperfect channel information. IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 15(3):2025–
2038, 2015.
[81] Zhiqiang He, Xiaonan Zhang, Yunqiang Bi, Weipeng Jiang, and Yue Rong. Optimal source
and relay design for multiuser mimo af relay communication systems with direct links and
imperfect channel information. IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 15(3):2025–
2038, 2016.
[82] Roger A Horn and Charles R Johnson. Matrix analysis. Cambridge university press, 2012.
[83] Weikun Hou, Xianbin Wang, and Jean-Yves Chouinard. Physical layer authentication in ofdm
systems based on hypothesis testing of cfo estimates. In 2012 IEEE International Conference
on Communications (ICC), pages 3559–3563. IEEE, 2012.
[84] Y Thomas Hou, Yi Shi, and Hanif D Sherali. Spectrum sharing for multi-hop networking with
cognitive radios. Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on, 26(1):146–155, 2008.
[85] Wei-jen Hsu, Debojyoti Dutta, and Ahmed Helmy. Profile-cast: Behavior-aware mobile net-
working. In 2008 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, pages 3033–
3038. IEEE, 2008.
[86] Sha Hua, Xuejun Zhuo, and Shivendra S Panwar. A truthful auction based incentive framework
for femtocell access. In Wireless Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC), 2013
IEEE, pages 2271–2276. IEEE, 2013.
[87] Pan Hui, Jon Crowcroft, and Eiko Yoneki. Bubble rap: Social-based forwarding in delay-
tolerant networks. Mobile Computing, IEEE Transactions on, 10(11):1576–1589, 2011.
[88] De-Thu Huynh, Xiaofei Wang, Trung Q Duong, Nguyen-Son Vo, and Min Chen. Social-aware
energy efficiency optimization for device-to-device communications in 5g networks. Computer
Communications, 2018.
[89] iData Research. Small cells market and wifi offloading opportunities for mnos discussed in
new 2015 research report.
[90] iData Research. Small cells market and wifi offloading opportunities for mnos discussed in
new 2015 research report. Mobile Computing, IEEE Transactions on, 8(7):975–990, 2009.
[91] Hideki Imai and Shuji Hirakawa. A new multilevel coding method using error-correcting codes.
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 23(3):371–377, 1977.
[92] Texas Instruments. Simplelink multi-standard cc26x2r wireless mcu launchpad development
kit. http://www.ti.com/tool/LAUNCHXL-CC26X2R1, Jun. 2017.
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